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ABSTRACT
Analysis of the Application of First Amendment 
Jurisprudence to University 
Student Fees Policies
by
Christine Chairsell
Dr. Gerald C. Kops, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Educational Leadership 
University of Nevada Las Vegas
The allocable student activity fee represents a fee imposed by the 
university administration and is paid at the time that tuition is paid. The 
administration or the elected student government body representatives disperse 
these collected fees to groups that have made application for funding and have 
passed the review process. Sometimes students object to their mandatory 
activities fees being diverted to certain groups because they are either political or 
advocate opinions with which the students disagree. Thus, the controversy 
becomes a free speech challenge.
The purpose of this study was to provide a historical case study about the 
legal controversies over mandatory student fees. It explores the application of 
First Amendment jurisprudence of student fees and assesses the impact of the 
U.S. Supreme Court's Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs. et. al. v. South worth, et. 
aL, 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000) on select public universities’ mandatory student fees
iii
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programs in the Ninth Circuit. Guidelines are offered to administrators on how to 
rigorously review and modify their respective policies concerning student fee 
collections and disbursements in order to comply with the First Amendment rights 
associated with the Southworth decision.
In order to accomplish this, the following research questions are 
addressed by this study:
1 ) How did the U.S. Supreme Court resolve the conflict between the 
circuits regarding allocable mandatory student fee programs in 
Southworth?
2) What were the major arguments in the judicial process that influenced 
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision?
3) What areas were left in doubt?
4) Were there continuing disagreements?
5) Are there questions left unanswered?
6) What, if any, new questions or issues emerged from this decision?
7) What is the impact on mandatory student fees policies of specific, 
major state universities in the Ninth Circuit as a result of the 
Southworth decision?
8) What should administrators do to come into compliance with the 
Southworth decision/precedent?
Because this endeavor constitutes legal research, the writing style contained in 
this dissertation was a combination of APA and Harvard Blue Book.
IV
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Mandatory student activity fees, imposed by post secondary institutions, 
are a source of funding for a variety of service-related and educational functions. 
For instance, student fees provide funding for student health centers, science 
laboratory experiences, access to technology resources and technology-based 
educational programs. These fees are identified as non-allocable fees. They 
cannot be allocated to other student activities. A percentage of mandatory 
student fees are allocated to student government organizations, which in turn, 
distribute funding to registered student clubs and organizations (Schmitz, 1996). 
The process by which funds are distributed to student organizations is mandated 
by governing board policies and student government constitutions that are 
approved by the governing boards.
The allocable student activity fees program, which is a central issue in this 
study, is one that is supported by a fee imposed by the university administration 
that is paid with tuition. It is mandatory and is not refundable (Kramer, 1995). 
The administration or the elected student government body representatives 
disperse these collected fees to groups that have made application for funding
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and have passed the review process (Kramer. 1995). Recent studies indicate 
that over 90% of universities finance student activities with mandatory fees. Only 
2.5% of funded student activities use an optional fee system. The rest secured 
funds through other sources such as a portion taken from tuition, private 
donations and fundraisers (Kramer, 1995).
Most university officials contend that mandatory allocable student activity 
fees are necessary to ensure that the educational value of the university 
experience extends beyond the classroom as student groups contribute to the 
total exchange of ideas in educational forums (Wells, 1988). It is considered 
paramount that universities do everything possible to ensure that students' First 
Amendment rights are protected. However, it is just as important that students 
have the opportunity to participate in a variety of public forums that student 
groups provide as part of the educational experience (Wells, 1988).
The mandatory student fees that fund these extra-curricular activities 
serve a number of purposes. They create a fund for financing channels of 
communication for student organizations, and they ultimately create a limited 
public forum. They provide stability for student organizations that rely upon the 
funding to maintain their core funding. They create opportunities for the 
members of the student government to administer the allocation of such funds 
that constitutes a useful and real-world experience (Brief for the States of New 
York, et. al., Southworth). The university may limit use of the funds to particular 
topics or forums congruent with its educational objectives, but it may not 
discriminate among speakers on the basis of their viewpoints with respect to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
permitted topics (Brief for the States of New York, et. a!., Southworth). The 
funding method also emphasizes to the student body that they are ultimately 
responsible for the activity through the allocation and distribution process under 
the direction of the student body governmental representatives (Brief for the 
States of New York, et. al., Southworth).
Under the legal standards that protect First Amendment rights, the 
mandatory student activity fees create non-spatial public forums that are much 
like the traditional physical public facilities, like public parks, and other physical 
locations that are used for public speeches.
Since the era of Vietnam protests on college campuses, there have been 
increased activities among students to politically organize. Public universities 
have operated programs which fund, through the use of mandatory student 
activity fees, various student and community organizations, some of which 
engage in political and ideological speech. These programs serve the mission of 
public universities by creating forums on the university campuses that ultimately 
encourage university students to express themselves on academic, social and 
political issues. They ultimately increase the opportunities for debate and open 
discussion by exposing students to a variety of viewpoints.
Beginning in the 1970s, Ralph Nader encouraged formation of Public 
Interest Research Groups (PIRGs) for the purposes of training students to 
become political organizers and advocates. They operated both on and off 
campuses. Over the years, they have become not only accepted but also, in 
some cases, supported by the colleges and universities through student activity
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
fees (Schmidt. 1999). With such funding, PIRGs and other similar issue- 
organizations have enhanced the university setting as a marketplace of ideas 
where conflicting viewpoints can be expressed. Beyond enriching the 
marketplace, these organizations have also provided “out-of-class” educational 
services that allow interested students to gain experience in organizing around 
public policy issues, sometimes for extra class credit. However, allocation of 
student fees for this type of political research or activism was repugnant to some 
students and they have questioned whether their First Amendment rights to free 
speech were violated through their compelled funding of such organizations. 
Universities argued that as long as access to the student activity fees, like a 
public park, was available to all speakers on a viewpoint neutral basis, no First 
Amendment burden was imposed by the university's use of a mandatory student 
activity fee to create a forum for diverse speech (Brief for the States of New York, et. 
al., Southworth).
Throughout the decade of the 1970's, there was a dramatic increase in 
student fee-related litigation. For all students, the mandatory student fees 
program became an increasingly important issue. For some, the student activity 
fees represented forced contributions to disagreeable groups. For others who 
supported the groups, the student activity fee represented student democracy in 
action and thus an extension of the educational experience (Rouse & Howard, 
1998).
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Relevant Precedent for Determining Constitutionality 
of Allocable Student Fees 
In earlier years, the courts acknowledged that the primary function of 
student activity fees was to create and maintain a forum, or marketplace, of ideas 
where diverse viewpoints could be expressed and tested and, thus, have 
educational value.
Beginning in the late 1970’s courts addressed cases that involved 
mandatory, public sector, union dues that were expended for political purposes. 
Some bargaining unit members argued that diversion of dues to political causes 
was beyond the unions' primary purpose of collective bargaining thereby violating 
their First Amendment right to Free Speech. Some courts facing student 
complaints regarding diversion of student fees used the union dues cases to 
analyze the dispute. Other courts disregarded the union cases. Instead they 
have focused on the idea that it is the unique mission and role of the university to 
create a limited public forum as an extension of the educational experience and 
used this notion as the foundation for deciding the constitutionality of allocable 
student fees cases. In order to fully appreciate the challenges and controversies 
associated with the judicial inquiry into student activity fees, a short history of 
how the jurisprudence developed is presented here to introduce the research 
problem. The cases are presented in chronological order. A more detailed 
analysis will be presented in Chapter II.
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Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District. 393 U.S. 503 (1969), 
established the view that courts must consider the unique characteristics of 
educational institutions in deciding the nature and extent of student First 
Amendment rights. The Court held that only when student expression materially 
and substantially interfered with the operation of schools could the student 
expression be prohibited. In Tinker, the Court held that school officials violated 
students’ First Amendment rights when they disciplined students for wearing 
black armbands in protest of the Vietnam War. While Tinker ruled that public 
high school students have First Amendment protection, courts have extended 
such protection to university students (Steele, 1987),
Healv V. James. 408 U.S. 169 (1972), represents the first attempt by the 
U.S. Supreme Court to balance student rights with the rights of school officials to 
produce a successful educational environment. Justice Powell, who wrote the 
majority opinion, acknowledged that the operation of colleges and universities is 
a delicate process that should not be interfered with by the courts unless school 
officials become inequitable and arbitrary in their implementation of the 
educational environment. Central Connecticut State College denied official 
recognition to a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). 
Without official recognition, this group was locked out of the college's facilities 
and the campus newspaper. The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that school 
officials know more about establishing and maintaining an academic community 
and that courts should not interfere; however, in order to protect student rights.
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the Court placed a heavy burden on colleges and universities to prove the 
appropriateness of their actions to prevent disruptions (Gibbs & Crisp, 1979). 
Ultimately, the Court could not find a valid reason to uphold the actions of the 
college and ordered that the SDS chapter be recognized as a student group.
The Eighth Circuit Court, in Veed v. Schwartzkoof. 353 F.Supp. 149 (D. 
Neb. 1973), afTd mem. 478 F.2d 1407 (EF" Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 414 U.S.
1135 (1974), directly involved a dispute over mandatory student fees. In Veed. 
the court ruled that the university's educational program extended beyond the 
formal classroom by providing students with a broad range of ideas within a 
variety of student activities that were supported by student fees. In upholding the 
university fee assessment, the court conferred upon the Board of Regents the 
right to determine what qualifies as educational; and concluded that while the 
views of some funded student groups might be repugnant to a student, he was 
not forced to attend the activities (Gibbs & Crisp, 1979).
In Larson v. Board of Regents of Universitv of Neb.. 204 NW2d. 568 
(1973). the court held mandatory fees to fund a student newspaper, student 
government and speaker’s program to be constitutional because they are part of 
the educational process so long as many viewpoints are expressed.
In Good V. Associated Student of the Universitv of Washington. 86 Wash. 
2d 94, 542 P.2d 762 (1975), the Supreme Court of the State of Washington 
attempted to balance academic purpose with the students’ First Amendment 
rights. In doing so, the court decided that the university’s interest in providing a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8public forum that promotes competing ideas was compelling and upheld the right 
of the university to impose the student fees.
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. 431 U.S. 209 (1977). the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that all members of a public sector bargaining unit could be 
required to finance union activity. However, the Court also determined that 
public sector unions could not fund political speech with mandatory union dues. 
Mandatory union dues could only be dedicated to activities associated with the 
mission of unions -  collective bargaining, contract administration and grievance 
adjustment. Thus, the Court held unconstitutional the requirement that 
individuals contribute to political or ideological causes that they are opposed to 
as a condition of their employment.
In Galda v. Blowstein. 686 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1982), also known as 
Galda I. students argued that Rutgers Camden College's use of mandatory 
student fees to fund the Public Interest Research Group (PIRG), an independent 
organization, violated their right of freedom of association. The Third Circuit 
Court reaffirmed Veed by recognizing that the college's potential to demonstrate 
a compelling state interest was sufficient enough to outweigh students' First 
Amendment rights (Steele, 1987). The court ruled that the students had not 
successfully rebutted the college's presumptive valid judgment that the PIRG had 
substantial educational value and held in favor of the college.
In Kania v. Fordham. 702 F.2d 475 (4“* Cir. 1983), University of North 
Carolina students argued that the university violated their First Amendment rights 
by using student fees to finance the student newspaper. Daily Tar Heel. The
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court ruled in favor of the university because it found that the imposition of 
student fees did not promote ideological biases, but instead, promoted an 
educational environment. The court distinguished Abood by explaining that, on 
the contrary, the union used mandatory fees (dues) to promote a one-sided 
ideological viewpoint. It found that the university in Kania used student fees for 
the Dailv Tar Heel to increase the exchange of ideas and opinions on campus. 
Thus, the fee assessment was used to promote more speech rather than the 
limited speech associated with unions.
Following the Third Circuit’s ruling in Galda I. the students returned to 
court to challenge the university fee policy. In Galda v. Rutoers. 772 F.2d 1060, 
1065 (3d Cir. 1985), cert, denied 106 S. Ct. 1375 (1986), also known as Galda II. 
the students at Rutgers Camden College appealed a U.S. District Court's ruling 
in favor of the college by arguing this time that the college's mandatory student 
fee program supporting the PIRG violated their First Amendment rights. On this 
matter, the Third Circuit Court held that the college had failed to establish a 
compelling state interest, which would justify funding the PIRG. Accordingly, the 
court ruled that the PIRG was a separate organization that took a single or 
narrow political view and conducted its speech outside the college's public forum.
In Keller v. State Bar of Califomia. 496 U.S. 1 (1990), the U.S. Supreme 
Court relied upon the Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. 431 U.S. 209 (1977), 
holding that the Califomia State Bar’s use of mandatory dues to fund the annual 
conference of delegates that passed political resolutions endorsing gun control 
and the nuclear freeze was unconstitutional. The Court held that these
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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expenditures were not necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of 
regulating the legal profession or improving the quality of legal sen/ices.
In Lehnert v. Ferris Facultv Association. 500 U.S. 507 (1991), the U.S. 
Supreme Court adopted a three-prong test to provide guidance on expenditure of 
union dues. The first prong required the use of mandatory dues be germane to 
the mission of the union. The second prong required the use of mandatory dues 
to be justified by the govemment’s compelling interest in preserving peace and 
eliminating free rides (non-members that receive benefits of dues-paying 
members). The third prong required that the use of mandatory dues must not 
add a significant burden to the First Amendment rights of the workers. The Court 
concluded that the unions could require all members of the bargaining unit to pay 
for lobbying activities within the limited context of union contract ratification or 
implementation. However, the union could not force members of the bargaining 
unit to fund lobbying on other issues such as taxes or support of public 
education, even though these activities are very closely related to the union's 
interests.
In Carroll v. Blinken. 957 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1992), also known as Carroll I. 
the Second Circuit Court held that a PIRG did serve university-related functions 
sufficiently to justify the university’s compelled student fees for speech on 
campus (Wiggins, 1994).
In Havs Guardian v. Supple. 969 F.2d 111 (5^ Cir. 1992), cert, denied, 
605 U.S. 1087 (1993), the Fifth Circuit found that a university's educational goals 
justified the subsidy of a university-sponsored newspaper.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11
In Smith v. Regents of University of California. 4 Cal. 4“' 843,844 P.2d 
500, cert, denied, 510 U.S. 863 (1993), University of Califomia Berkeley students 
sued the university’s administration and the Associated Students of the 
University of Califomia (ASUC) because the students were opposed to the 
collection of mandatory student fees that supported the student government.
The students automatically became members of the student govemment when 
they enrolled and paid their fees. Complaining students opposed some of the 
ASUC’s espoused political views. Of all the cases involving mandatory student 
fees and compelled speech, the circumstances in this case were the closest to 
the union dues cases Abood. Keller, and Lehnert (O’Neil, 1999). The Califomia 
State Supreme Court ruled that, in the future, the university had to publish a list 
of organizations that practice political advocacy. From that list, students should 
be allowed to select those groups they wish not to fund with their mandatory 
student fees. A deduction would be taken from the base amount of the 
mandatory student fees for each group a student did not wish to support. The 
Smith court indicated that the university was free to adopt any type of mandatory 
student fee system so long as they avoided the constitutional defects, like not 
allowing students an opportunity to opt out of funding groups they found 
objectionable. For the first time, students were given an opportunity to opt out of 
funding certain groups at the time of payment of mandatory student fees.
After the decision in Carroll I, students retumed to court continuing their 
challenge to the university fee policy. Carroll v. Blinken. 42 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 
1994) afTd 899 F.Supp 1214, also known as Carroll II. the court applied the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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germaneness analysis of Abood and Keller and ruled that the university could 
constitutionally fund the NYPIRG as long as that organization spent the 
equivalent of student contributions on campus and fulfilled the university’s 
mission of providing for a market place of ideas.
In Galda I and Carroll I & II. the courts have allowed universities to charge 
mandatory student fees to support political speech within the campus’ public 
forums. The program had to be a forum and the govemment (university) could 
not discriminate against speakers based upon content of their speech (Wiggins, 
1994).
In Rosenberoer V. Rector and Visitors of the Universitv of Virginia. 515 
U.S. 819 (1995), the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the ability of a university to 
decide whether or not to fund a student religious newspaper. Students who 
published the Christian newspaper. Wide Awake, at the University of Virginia 
challenged the university’s denial of their request for funding from mandatory 
student fees. They argued that they were denied funding by the university based 
upon the newspaper’s viewpoint. For the first time, the Court announced that 
student activity fees created a limited public forum with the money and that, when 
established, the forum (or distribution of fees) had to be conducted on a 
viewpoint neutral basis. The Court ruled that the university had discriminated 
based on the religious viewpoint of the newspaper, Wide Awake, and had 
violated the First Amendment rights of the students associated with the 
newspaper. The issue before the U.S. Supreme Court in Rosenberoer was the 
distribution of mandatory student fees. While the Court acknowledged that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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another pressing issue was the authority to collect mandatory student fees, it 
chose not to address that issue. Thus, in the Rosenberoer decision, the Court 
basically invited future litigation that posed the question of the university’s ability 
to collect mandatory student fees.
The student plaintiffs in Southworth v. Grebe. 151 F.3d 717(7* Cir. 1998), 
opposed being required by the University of Wisconsin, Madison to pay fees that 
directly subsidized student groups that engaged in political and ideological 
advocacy (Rouse & Howard, 1998). In 1998, the Seventh Circuit Court upheld 
the U.S. District Court’s decision that struck down the University of Wisconsin's 
mandatory student fee requirement. Relying upon Abood. Keller, and especially 
Lehnert. the court concluded that the Board of Regents had failed to sustain their 
fee program under Lehnert’s three-prong test. The court concluded that the fee 
system was not germane to the university’s mission (the first prong) and that the 
forced funding of objectionable student organizations significantly burdened the 
students’ free speech rights (the third prong).
The Seventh Circuit Court did not order the university to completely 
abandon its fee system and it did not rule that such fees might not be used to 
support political or ideological organizations. Ultimately, the court left it up to the 
university to create its own solution, but it was expected that part of the solution 
would have to include an opt out opportunity in advance for students who find 
funding of certain groups objectionable (O’Neil, 1998).
As with most circuit court appeals, the Southworth case was heard before 
a panel of three judges. The Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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System petitioned for a rehearing en banc. Such a petition represents a request 
for rehearing by the full Seventh Circuit Court. This request was denied. 
However, four judges from the Seventh Circuit dissented from the denial to the 
en banc review. Judge Rovner wrote one dissenting opinion and was joined by 
judges Wood, Evans, and Cummings. Judge Wood wrote the second dissenting 
opinion and was joined by judges Rovner and Evans. The two dissenting 
opinions explaining why, in their view, the Southworth case should have been 
considered by the full court.
The dissenters' argument included a number of components. First, the 
fact that the circuit courts were in conflict demanded a rehearing by the full 
Seventh Circuit Court. Second, the dissenting judges distinguished Southworth 
from the three precedent cases, Abood. Keller, and Lehnert. particularly within 
the context of viewpoint neutrality. The precedent union cases were single 
organizations with single political agendas. Thus, these cases should not apply 
to Southworth where the university setting demands an educational experience 
of robust debate on a variety of issues and viewpoints. The dissenting judges 
argued that the court should have acknowledged the broad, unique role or 
mission of universities to create an educational experience beyond the traditional 
classroom. The dissenting judges acknowledged that the student fees in 
Southworth created the same limited public forum as in Rosenberoer. The 
forum analysis asserts that the forum welcomes a variety of diverse ideas and 
debates. Thus, the only remedy under the forum analysis should have been 
allowing more speech to take place in the forum rather than evaluating the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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activity and group and whether each were germane to the university’s 
educational mission as required by Abood. Keller, and Lehnert.
Finally, the dissenting judges feared that the opt out remedy would result 
in hit lists of organizations to which some students objected. Additionally, the 
judges worried that the great administrative and financial burdens of operating 
such a program could ultimately eliminate the forums all together.
Following denial of the request for rehearing en banc, the Board of 
Regents filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. While 
the Court was considering the petition of the Wisconsin Regents, another case 
was decided concerning mandatory student fees in the Ninth Circuit. In Rounds 
V. Oregon State Board of Higher Education. 166 F.3d 1032 (1999), students 
sought relief under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution. They argued that mandatory student fees allocated to the OSPIRG 
compelled speech and violated their First Amendment rights. The Ninth Circuit 
Court held that the activities of the OSPIRG were germane to the university’s 
mission (according to Abood) and justified the mandatory collection of fees from 
students. In its concluding remarks, the Ninth Circuit Court stated, ’To the extent 
that (the Seventh Circuit Court in) Southworth holds that a public university may 
not constitutionally establish a limited public forum for the expression of diverse 
viewpoints, we respectfully disagree” (Rounds, at 1470).
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Research Problem 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Southworth case. The 
Court would resolve the conflict within the circuit courts. Some lower courts were 
relying on the narrow focus of union cases and focusing upon the activities of 
each challenged group to determine if such activities were germane to the 
university missions. Lower courts were not in agreement over exactly what 
represented the mission of the university. As a result, university fees programs 
and the matriculated students were treated very differently from one jurisdiction 
to another. The intent of this study was to analyze how the U.S. Supreme Court 
resolved the conflict between the circuits and assess the impact of the decision 
on university operations. Further, a thorough analysis of this decision was 
necessary to formulate and provide guidance to administrators for establishing or 
implementing allocable mandatory student fees programs.
Research Questions
• How did the U.S. Supreme Court resolve the conflict between the circuits 
regarding allocable mandatory student fee programs in Southworth?
• What were the major arguments in the judicial process that influenced the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision?
• What areas were left in doubt?
• Are there continuing disagreements?
• Are there questions left unanswered?
• What, if any. new questions or issues emerged from this decision?
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• What is the impact on mandatory student fees policies of specific, major, 
state universities in the Ninth Circuit Court as a result of the Southworth 
decision?
• What should administrators do to come into compliance with the 
Southworth decision/precedent?
Significance of the Study 
The purpose of researching the law is to ascertain the legal 
consequences of a specific set of actual or potential facts” (Wren & Wren, 1986, 
p. 24). The purpose of this dissertation was to provide a historical case study 
about the legal controversies over mandatory student fees. In doing so, I 
explored the application of First Amendment jurisprudence to mandatory student 
fees programs. I assessed the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court's Southworth 
decision on university student fees policies. It was anticipated that questions 
would be left unanswered and new questions would arise as a result of the 
decision. But, the Court has provided guidelines for student fee policies. These 
guidelines are offered to administrators on how to rigorously review and modify 
their respective programs in accordance with the Southworth decision.
Definition of Terms
For the purpose of this study, the following definitions of terms are 
provided:
Advocacv: In practice, the active espousal of a legal cause. The art of 
persuasion (Gifis, 1997).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
18
Allocable Fees: That portion of student fees that Is disbursed through a variety of 
processes (soliciting applications from student organizations, holding hearings, 
conducting referenda) by student governments or universities/colleges (Rouse & 
Howard, 1998, p.3).
Amicus Curiae: Friend of the Court brief. One who gives information to the court 
on some matter of law, which is in doubt. The function of amicus curiae is to call 
the court's attention to some matter, which might otherwise escape its attention. 
(Gifis, 1997).
Bill of Rights: The first ten amendments of the U.S. Constitution, which articulate 
the fundamental rights of citizenship. They were added to the U.S. Constitution 
in 1791. It is a declaration of rights that are substantially immune from 
governmental interference, and constitutes a reservation of limited individual 
sovereignty. Among such rights guaranteed in the federal Constitution are the 
rights to speak, assemble, and practice religion free from federal government 
regulation, the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and the 
right to a jury trial when tried for a criminal offense. Originally, the Bill of Rights 
was intended to be restrictive upon federal power; however, the various 
amendments have mostly been incorporated to apply to state governments 
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. (Gifis, 1997).
Certiorari: Gaining appellate review. An order issued from a superior court to 
one of inferior jurisdiction, commanding the latter to certify and return to the 
former a record in the particular case. In the U.S. Supreme Court, the writ is
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discretionary with the Court and will be issued to any court in the land to review a 
federal question if at least 4 of the 9 justices vote to hear the case (Gifis, 1997). 
Collective Bargaining: In labor law, the negotiation of employment matters 
between employers and employees through the use of a bargaining agent 
designed by an uncoerced majority of the employees within the bargaining unit. 
(Gifis, 1997).
Declaratorv Relief: Also known as Declaratory Judgment. A judgment of the 
court for the purpose of establishing the rights of the parties or expressing the 
opinion of the court on a question of law without ordering anything to be done. 
The distinctive characteristic of a declaratory judgment is that it stands by itself, 
and no executory process follows as a matter of course (Gifis, 1997).
En Banc: Many appellate courts sit in divisions of three or more judges from 
among a larger number on the full court. These parts will generally decide a 
particular case but sometimes either on the court's motion or at the request of 
one of the litigants, the court will consider the matter by the full court. This is 
called a rehearing an banc (Gifis, 1997).
Equal Protection of the Laws: Constitutional guarantee embodied in the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which states in relevant part that 
"no state shall...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws" (Gifis, 1997).
First Amendment: The first of the ten amendments (Bill of Rights) to the U.S. 
Constitution. Originally intended to restrict federal power, the various rights of 
political and religious freedom articulated in this amendment have been held
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applicable to state governments through the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The First Amendment 
guarantees freedoms of speech, press, assembly, petition, free exercise of 
religion, and non-establishment of religion (Gifis, 1997).
General Student Services Fund (GSSF): A student activity fund that was 
administered through the Associated Students of Madison’s (ASM) Finance 
Committee (Southworth v. Grebe. 151 F.3d 717 (7“' Cir. 1998)).
Germaneness Test: Created by the U.S. Supreme Court In the Abood decision. 
Any expenditures for political or ideological activities must be germane (related) 
to the purpose for which the collection of fees or compelled association is 
justified. In this instance collection of fees must be germane to the university’s 
role or mission (Abood& Keller: Frank, 2000).
Iniunctive Relief: A judicial remedy awarded for the purpose of requiring a party 
to refrain from doing or continuing to do a particular activity. The injunction is a 
preventative measure which guards against future injuries rather than affording 
remedy for past injuries (Gifis, 1997).
In Loco Parentis: Refers to a person who has put himself in the situation of a 
lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental relation without 
going through the formalities necessary to legal adoption. It embodies the two 
ideas of assuming the parental status and discharging the parental duties (Gifis, 
1997).
Labor Union: Any association of workers whose main purpose is to bargain on 
behalf of workers with employers about the terms and conditions of employment.
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to include, but not be limited to, grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, 
hours of employment, or conditions of work (Gifis, 1997).
Petitioner: One who presents a petition to a court to take an appeal from a 
judgment. The adverse party is called the respondent (Gifis, 1997).
Primarv Purpose Test: Established in Galda I. If a group is found to be engaged 
primarily in political and ideological activities, then any funding by mandatory 
student fees should be subjected to strict scrutiny (Galda v. Blowstein. 686 F.2d 
159 (3d Cir. 1982).
Public Forum: There are three types of forums: the traditional public forum, 
limited public forum that is open by govemment for specific purposes, and all 
remaining use of public property (Greenawalt, 1996 & Perrv Education Asociation 
V. Perrv Local Educators' Association. 460 U.S. 37 (1983)).
Public Interest Research Groups (PIRG): Encouraged to form in the early 1970s 
by Ralph Nader for the purpose of training students to become political 
organizers and advocates. They have operated on and off campuses, but have 
become accepted and, in some cases, supported by colleges and universities 
through student fees (Schmidt, 1999). The University of Wisconsin at Madison’s 
student PIRG is known as WISPIRG.
Public Policv: A general plan of action adopted by govemment to solve a social 
problem, counter a threat, or pursue an objective (Janda, Berry, & Goldman, 
2000).
Rational Basis Test: A method of constitutional analysis under the equal 
protection clause used to determine whether a challenged law bears a
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reasonable relationship to the attainment of some legitimate governmental 
objective. The principle that the constitutionality of a statute will be upheld, if any 
rational basis can be conceived to support it. If the violation of a fundamental 
right, such as the right to vote, right to free speech, or the creation of a suspect 
classification such as color, religion, national origin, or indigence, is alleged, then 
the law is subject to strict scrutiny and may only be upheld if the govemment 
shows a compelling interest in sustaining the statute (Gifis, 1997).
Remand: When a judgment is reversed, the appellate court usually remands the 
matter for a new trial to be carried out consistent with the principles announced in 
its opinion. Often, the court will simply direct that the matter be remanded to the 
lower court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion (Gifis, 1997). 
Respondent: Any one who answers or responds may properly be called a 
“respondent.” The term also refers to the party against whom an appeal is 
brought (Gifis, 1997).
Student Govemment Activitv Fund (SGAF): An activity fund administered by the 
Associated Students of Madison (ASM). Funds may be issued to support an 
RSOs operations and events, travel expenses central to the purpose of the 
organization (Southworth v. Grebe. 151 F.3d 717 (7“’ Cir. 1998).
Strict Scrutinv Test: A test to determine the constitutional validity of a statute that 
creates a classification of persons. Under this test, if a classification scheme 
affects fundamental rights, it requires a showing that the classification is 
necessary to, and the least intrusive means of. achieving the compelling state 
interest. The govemmental body passing the legislation in question bears a
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heavy burden of justification to show that the law is necessary to promote a 
compelling state interest and is being accomplished by the least drastic and 
intrusive means (Gifis, 1997).
U.S. Federal Courts: These courts derive their legitimacy from Article III of the 
U.S. Constitution. The U.S. District Courts are the general courts of original 
jurisdiction or the federal trial courts. The U.S. Courts of Appeal (formerly circuit 
courts of appeal) are the appellate review courts. The U.S. Supreme Court is the 
only court directly created by the U.S. Constitution, and is the court of last resort 
in the federal system. The U.S. Supreme Court has final appellate review of 
lower federal courts and of state court decisions involving questions of federal 
law (Gifis, 1997).
Viewpoint Neutralitv: When opening a public forum, govemment may not restrict 
speech at that forum based upon the views of the speaker (Lamb’s Chapel v. 
Center Moriches Union Free School District. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
This review of literature discusses the legal issues evolving around student 
fees. Significant court decisions were analyzed illustrating the development of 
First Amendment jurisprudence applicable to mandatory student fees and 
compelled speech. This chapter concludes with an extensive discussion of the 
Southworth decisions rendered by the U.S. District Court and the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals. The petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court is 
reviewed. In addition, the briefs of the parties, amicus curiae briefs, and the oral 
arguments before that Court are reviewed.
Historical Background of Court Cases
Education As a Privilege
The earliest judicial approach to students' constitutional rights can be 
described as the privilege approach as it applied (Steele,1987). In Steier v. New 
York State Education Commission. 271 F.2d 13 (2"*^  Cir. 1959), Brooklyn College 
suspended one of its students because he bitterly expressed his view of college 
administration. The dean of the college suspended Steier and justified the
24
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suspension by citing the rule that required students to conform to the 
requirements of good manners and good morals. Steier was readmitted into the 
college on the condition that he honor and live by the rules of the college. Steier 
was then expelled again when he wrote the story of his probation in the campus 
newspaper. Steier sued the college for violation of freedom of speech, equal 
protection and due process. The college argued the actions were justified 
because it assumed the responsibilities of parents in loco parentis to its students. 
In loco parentis was the parental authority institutions of higher education held 
over students. It justified curbing student speech and activities. The U.S. District 
Court sided with Brooklyn College and the Second Circuit Court affirmed that 
decision. The court implied that Steier could say anything he wished, but could 
not say it as a student at Brooklyn College. Thus, the college had not impaired 
Steier’s ri&.ht to free speech
In Steier. the court refused to grant constitutional rights to students in public 
colleges. In an earlier U.S. Supreme Court Case, Hamilton v. Regents. 293 U.S. 
245 (1934), the Supreme Court described attendance at state universities a 
privilege and not a constitutional right. Thus, courts deferred to the actions of 
public universities.
Fundamental Fairness 
In 1961. the Fifth Circuit Court held that a college degree no longer 
represented a privilege or a luxury. Society and, more specifically, middle class
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America, viewed a college education as a necessity for success in the modem 
world. Such changes in society resulted in the chipping away of the in loco 
parentis. In Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education. 294 F. 2d 150 (5“’ Cir. 
1961), cert, denied, 286 U.S. 930 (1961), Alabama State College for Negroes 
expelled students after they had participated in a sit-in at a whites only cafeteria 
in the Montgomery County Courthouse. These students received no reason for 
their expulsion and they were not given the opportunity to have a hearing. The 
court sided with the students and held that when an act of govemment injures 
individuals, there must be due process of law. Dixon established the principle 
that students attending state institutions of higher teaming had constitutional 
rights.
Applying First Amendment Rights 
to University Students 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District. 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
involved the discipline of high school students who protested the Vietnam War in 
violation of a school rule forbidding such protests. The Court held that students 
possessed limited First Amendment protection in the school setting. Specifically, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that only if student expression materially and 
substantially interferes with the operation of schools, could the student speech be 
sanctioned. The Court determined that discipline by school officials violated 
students’ First Amendment rights because students wore black armbands in 
protest of the Vietnam War. While Tinker applied the First Amendment to high
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school students, the courts, almost Immediately in Healv v. James. 408 U.S. 169 
(1972), began to use this reasoning to extend such protection to university 
students (Steele, 1987).
In Healv the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the control/authority of 
universities over the use of facilities and publications partially financed by student 
fees. Central Connecticut State College denied official recognition to a local 
chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). The group could not utilize 
the campus newspaper or college bulletin boards to announce their meetings. 
They could not utilize college facilities for their meetings. The students argued 
that this violated their First Amendment rights to freedom of expression and 
association. The Court agreed. While the Court acknowledged that school 
officials knew more about establishing and maintaining an academic community 
and that courts should not interfere, the Court also placed a heavy burden on 
colleges and universities to prove the appropriateness of their actions to prevent 
disruptions (Gibbs & Crisp, 1979).
The college president's justification for denying the SDS official recognition 
included four points. First, the group's national reputation was unfavorable. This 
reason was rejected as a basis for denying recognition because the govemment 
failed to meet its burden to prove that the local chapter knowingly affiliated with 
an organization possessing unlawful aims and goals, with a specific intent to 
further those legal aims (Healv). Second, the philosophy of the SDS was 
questionable. This basis for denying recognition was also rejected by the Court. 
Third, the president denied recognition because he feared potential of school
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
28
disturbances. The Court cited Tinker and denied this basis for rejection by 
stating that potential for disturbances in the educational environment was not 
enough to deny official recognition. Fourth, the president believed that the SDS 
would be unwilling to obey the rules of the school. This final basis for denying 
recognition provided the only justification for the college’s non-recognition of the 
SDS and the Court remanded the case to the district court directing that court on 
the grounds that there was no way to determine if the college had any valid rules 
to justify non-recognition. According to Healv. the SDS chapter could be 
recognized unless it was determined that the organization would not obey 
reasonable university rules. First Amendment restriction can be imposed only 
when speech and association activities infringe upon reasonable campus rules, 
interrupted classes, or substantially interfered with the opportunity of other 
students to obtain an education (Gibbs & Crisp, 1979).
Constitutionality of Mandatory Student Fees 
The Eighth Circuit Court, in Veed v. Schwartzkoof. 353 F.Supp. 149 (D. 
Neb. 1973), affd mem. 478 F.2d 1407 (8“’ Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 414 U.S.
1135 (1974), addressed the constitutionality of mandatory student fees. In Veed 
a student argued that because he disagreed with the philosophy of many 
speakers appearing on campus and the editorial policies of the student 
newspaper, he should not be required to pay the mandatory student fees. The 
mandatory student fees forced him to associate himself with philosophies he 
disagreed with and, thus, violated his First Amendment rights. Further, the 
student argued that because the activities for which fees are collected and spent
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were non-credit hours, the University of Nebraska could not justify these fees as 
being educationally necessary.
The court ruled that the university's educational program extended beyond 
the formal classroom by providing students with a broad range of ideas within a 
variety of student activities. The court opted not to intervene in the educational 
process and deferred to the Board of Regents the right to determine what 
qualified as educational (Gibbs & Crisp, 1979). The court concluded in Veed 
that, while some views may be repugnant to the student, he was not forced to 
attend the activities where these views were expressed. Thus, there was no 
violation of his First Amendment rights. The court was careful to focus upon the 
entire university community rather than attempting to rectify that which Insults 
only a few. The Veed court followed the precedent set by Justice Powell in Healv 
and acknowledged that it was the Board of Regents' responsibility to determine, 
the activities which are part of the educational environment in or out of the formal 
classroom.
The Balance Test
The courts continued to be very careful to balance the university's right to 
determine what is educational with students' First Amendment rights. In Good v. 
Associated Students of the Universitv of Washington. 86 Wash. 2d 94, 542 P.2d 
762 (1975), the Supreme Court of Washington attempted to balance the 
students' First Amendment rights against the university's duty to “provide an 
atmosphere of learning, debate, dissent and controversy” (Good at 768). The
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court noted that given the environment of challenges and spirited debate, it would 
hardly be fair to allow students the right to refuse to pay for those debates they 
disagree with as it would negate the whole educational experience (Gibbs & 
Crisp, 1979). Hence, in balancing academic purpose with First Amendment 
rights, the court decided that the university’s interest in providing a public forum 
with competing ideas was compelling and upheld the university’s right to impose 
fees supporting a variety of expression activities.
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. 431 U.S. 702 (1977), the U.S. 
Supreme Court examined the question of whether employees' constitutional 
rights were violated by a Michigan statute which allowed local govemments to 
enter collective bargaining agreements that required all local govemment 
employees represented by a union to pay a service fee equal to union dues as a 
condition of employment. The Court upheld the Michigan statute with the proviso 
that the service charge was used to finance union expenditures for collective 
bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment. The Court 
specifically addressed the use of non-union member fees for non-collective 
bargaining purposes. First, the Court established the right of freedom of 
association for the purpose of presenting ideas and beliefs to be protected by the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments. Second, the Court established the 
individual's right not to give up guaranteed First Amendment rights as a condition 
of public employment. The Court upheld the non-union member’s argument that 
they have the constitutional right to prevent the unions from spending a part of 
their required service fees to contribute to political candidates and to express
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political views unrelated to its duties as exclusive bargaining representative.
Thus, the Court held unconstitutional the use of service fees for political or 
ideological causes that non-members opposed. The Abood case Is relevant here 
because some courts considered mandatory union service fees jurisprudence an 
important component deciding mandatory student fees litigation.
In Galda v. Blowstein. 686 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1982). also known as Galda I. 
students argued that Rutgers’ Camden College’s use of mandatory student fees 
to fund the Public Interest Research Group (PIRG), an independent organization, 
violated their right of freedom of association. The court held that if students are 
to prove a violation of their First Amendment rights, they must establish that the 
challenged group functions essentially as a political action group with only an 
incidental educational component. The court further determined that even if the 
students were able to successfully prove fees violated their First Amendment 
rights, the college could still impose the fees by demonstrating a compelling state 
interest of the PIRG's contribution to the college’s public forum. The case was 
remanded to the U.S. District Court for the students to build their case of violation 
of their First Amendment rights and for the college to prove that the PIRG was 
not operating as a political organization. Galda I reaffirmed Veed by assigning a 
burden of proof, and recognized the college’s potential to demonstrate a 
compelling state interest sufficient to outweigh student dissenters’ First 
Amendment rights (Steele, 1987). Galda also established the Primary Purpose 
Test. If a group is found to be engaged primarily in political and ideological
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activities, then any funding by mandatory student fees should be subjected to 
strict scrutiny.
As mentioned earlier, in Abood. the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that it was 
unconstitutional for public sector bargaining parties to impose fees for the 
purpose of funding political views or ideologies unrelated to the primary mission 
of collective bargaining. In Galda I. students relied upon the Abood ruling to 
support their claim that student fees used by Rutgers to fund the PIRG violated 
their freedom of association. The Third Circuit Court also relied upon Abood and 
held that in order to justify an infringement upon the students' right to associate, 
the college must show a compelling state interest. On remand, the U.S. District 
Court found that the students had not convinced the court that the PIRG was 
solely a political entity with no substantial educational value (Galda v. Blowstein. 
686 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1982), and held in favor of the college.
In Kania v. Fordham. 702 F.2d 475 (4**’ Cir. 1983) was decided by the 
Fourth Circuit Court. University of North Carolina students argued that the 
university violated their First Amendment rights by using student fees to finance 
the student newspaper. The Dailv Tar Heel (DTH). The students relied upon 
Abood to support their argument. The university argued that Abood supported 
the use of student fees to fund the DTH because Abood upheld the union's right 
to collect mandatory fees to support its collective bargaining function. The 
university also argued that the DTH provided an educational forum for the 
exchange of ideas as part of the university’s educational mission.
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The court ruled in favor of the university because it found that the 
imposition of student activity fees to fund the DTH did not promote ideological 
biases, but instead promoted an educational environment. It found that the 
university in Kania. unlike the union in Abood. used mandatory fees for the DTH 
to increase the exchange of ideas and opinions on campus rather than limit 
expression.
In Galda v. Rutgers. 772 F.2d 1060,1065 (3d Cir. 1985), cert, denied 106 
S. Ct. 1375 (1986), also known as Galda II. the students at Rutgers appealed the 
district court's ruling. The Third Circuit Court held that the college had failed to 
establish a compelling state interest that would justify funding the PIRG. Further, 
the court held that a true distinction could be made between a PIRG and student 
organizations funded by mandatory student fees. The court said that mandatory 
student fees fund a variety of student organizations and, therefore, provided a 
public forum that sustained the market place. The Third Circuit Court 
distinguished between student organizations and the PIRG finding it was a 
separate organization that took a single or narrow political view and conducted its 
speech outside the college’s public forum.
In Keller v. State Bar of California. 496 U.S. 1 (1990), the Court relied upon 
the Abood reasoning and held that the Califomia State Bar’s use of mandatory 
dues to fund the annual conference of delegates that passed political resolutions 
endorsing gun control and the nuclear freeze was unconstitutional. The Court 
ruled that these expenditures were not necessarily or reasonably incurred for the
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purpose of regulating the legal profession or improving the quality of legal 
services, the primary purpose of bar associations.
In Lehnert v. Ferris Facultv Association. 500 U.S. 507 (1991), the U.S. 
Supreme Court provided a three-prong test to provide guidance for determining 
whether union dues were being properly used. First, the Court ruled that use of 
mandatory dues must be germane to collective bargaining (the Germaneness 
Test of Abood). Second, the use of mandatory dues must be justified by the 
government’s vital interest in preserving labor peace and eliminating free rides by 
non-union members (the Compelling Interest Test). Free rides refer to non-union 
bargaining unit members who do not pay dues and, thereby, unfairly benefit from 
the collective bargaining efforts of union members. Third, the use of mandatory 
service fees must not add a significant burden to the First Amendment rights to 
pay the service fee.
Based upon the three-prong test above, the Court ruled in Lehnert that the 
union had only limited power to fund political activities with mandatory dues. The 
union members could not be forced to subsidize public relations activities 
because such activities were not related enough to the collective bargaining 
function. However, the Court concluded that fees could be expended to pay for 
lobbying activities within the limited context of contract ratification or 
implementation. It was also improper applying the three-prong test to fund 
lobbying on issues such as taxes and support of public education.
The Court, in Abood. Lehnert and Keller, established a constitutional 
framework forjudging union and bar association expenditures of mandatory fees.
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These cases became important precedents used by some lower courts, and 
especially in Southworth. in deciding mandatory student fee litigation. Other 
circuit courts rejected the labor union/bar association precedents creating 
significant conflict between the circuits called on to address student fees 
litigation.
In Carroll v. Blinken. 957 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1992), known as Carroll I. the 
Second Circuit Court held that a PIRG did serve university-related functions 
sufficiently to justify use of mandatory fees to fund its speech on campus 
(Wiggins, 1994). Carroll v. Blinken. 42 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 1994) a/Td 899 F.Supp 
1214 (1994), or Carroll II. applied the Germaneness Test of Abood and Keller 
and ruled that the university could constitutionally fund the NYPIRG as long as 
that organization spent the equivalent of student contributions on campus and 
fulfilled the university’s mission of providing a market place of ideas. In Galda I 
and Carroll I & II. courts have allowed universities to charge mandatory student 
fees to support political speech within the campus’ public forum. Moreover, 
within the govemment could not discriminate against speakers based upon the 
views expressed (Wiggins, 1994).
A New Category and Standard of First Amendment Interests 
The University Setting
In Smith v. Regents of Universitv of Califomia. 4 Cal. 4*^  843, 844 P.2d 500, 
cert, denied, 510 U.S. 863 (1993), University of Califomia Berkeley students
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sued the university’s administration and the Associated Students of the 
University of Califomia (ASUC) because they were opposed to the collection of 
mandatory student fees and the distribution of those fees to various student 
groups that promoted viewpoints with which they disagree. The Berkeley 
students also opposed the ASUC’s use of mandatory student fees to fund the 
student government’s own lobbying efforts. The ASUC was a statewide 
organization authorized by the Board of Regents to administer student 
government and extracurricular groups. Students automatically became 
members of the student govemment when they enrolled and paid their fees. Of 
all the cases involving mandatory student fees and compelled speech, the 
circumstances in this case were the closest to the circumstances in Abood.
Keller, and Lehnert because student govemment was lobbying and espousing 
political views.
The Supreme Court of Califomia reaffirmed earlier decisions, and adopted a 
Jeffersonian philosophy in its ruling, by stating that forced monetary contributions 
were a form of speech and compelled speech offended the First Amendment, 
just as restrictions on speech. The Smith court cited the Galda I & II decisions 
referring to the Primary Purpose Test (Smith at 858). As mentioned earlier, the 
Primary Purpose Test dictates that if a group is found to be engaged primarily in 
political and ideological activities, then its funding (by mandatory student fees) 
should and will be subjected to a strict scrutiny.
The Smith case was remanded to the lower court to test the funding of each 
group as well as the lobbying activities of the ASUC. The lower court ruled that.
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in the future, students should be given a list of groups not eligible for funding with 
mandatory student fees. Students would allowed to select, on a group-by-group 
basis, those groups they chose to fund with their mandatory student fee. 
Deductions would be allowed from the base amount of the mandatory student 
fees for each group a student did not wish to support.
While it seemed that Smith broke with tradition by not fully appreciating the 
university's role to invite diverse speech to the public forums in the educational 
environment (Wiggins, 1994), it is apparent that because students automatically 
became members of the student govemment organization when they paid their 
student fees, and that group was involved in lobbying efforts, the circumstances 
in Smith were very much like those in the union cases of Abood. Keller, and 
Lehnert -  automatic membership through the payment of mandatory student fees 
to a political organization (association), as a condition of matriculation. However, 
Smith served to compound the great dissention among the lower courts and 
between the circuits as to what precedents to rely on and how best to interpret 
First Amendment rights as they applied to mandatory student fees. It also 
represented a departure from the challenge to an isolated, single group approach 
to a strategy of challenging the entire student fees program and the university's 
power to collect and disburse these fees (O’Neil, 1999).
Many legal scholars agreed that the U.S. Supreme Court should have 
granted certiorari in the Smith case in order to provide lower courts with some 
direction. Still others attempted to put the Smith ruling into legal perspective by
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pointing out that the University of Califomia Berkley administrators failed to prove 
sufficient First Amendment protection to its students (Gibbs, 1999).
The court admonished the administrators and instructed them how to bring 
their student fees program within constitutional compliance (Gibbs. 1999). The 
constitutional compliance imposed by the Smith decision required the university 
to allow students to opt out of funding groups they found objectionable. There 
was concern among legal scholars that this opt out provision could, in reality, 
merely reflect the student’s unwillingness to pay student fees rather than taking a 
stand on their true political ideological beliefs (Schmitz, 1996).
In Rosenberoer v. Rector and Visitors of the Universitv of Virginia. 515 U.S. 
819 (1995), students who published a Christian newspaper at the University of 
Virginia challenged the university’s denial of their request for funding from 
mandatory student fees. They argued that they were denied funding by the 
university based upon the newspaper’s religious viewpoint.
The authority of the university to impose mandatory student fees was not at 
issue in Rosenberoer. The issue before the U.S. Supreme Court was the fee 
allocation process, and the university’s regulations governing the process.
Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion for the Court and held that student 
activities created a limited forum (to become known in Southworth as the 
Rosenberoer forum) of money and that when established, the forum had to be 
operated on a viewpoint neutral basis. To Kennedy, religion provides a variety of 
opportunities for debate within the marketplace of ideas without violating the 
Establishment Clause. Therefore, the Court held that the University of Virginia
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had failed to grant funding based on the religious viewpoint of the newspaper 
and, thus, it had violated their First Amendment rights.
Justice Souter wrote a scathing dissent joined in that dissent by Justices 
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. The dissenters expressed the view that the 
Supreme Court was, for the first time, approved direct funding of core religious 
activities by an arm of the State. Thereby the State supported evangelism by the 
direct funding of the newspaper and violated the Establishment Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution. Justice Souter argued concluded that there was no viewpoint 
discrimination in the application of the university's guidelines to deny funding to 
the newspaper (in the dissenters' minds, the newspaper was an arm of religion). 
Justice Souter concluded his dissent by predicting that the Rosenberaer decision 
would make a "shambles out of student activity fees in public colleges” 
(Rosenberaer at 422 (Souter, J., dissenting)), as there was no longer a clear 
distinction between the Establishment Clause and free speech rights.
The Rosenberaer case created considerable confusion between content 
discrimination, which is constitutional, and viewpoint discrimination, which is not 
(Sadurski, 1997). While the Court acknowledged that such a distinction is not a 
precise one, viewpoint neutrality was the standard the majority chose to rule in 
Rosenberaer. The result, however, was a blurring between content neutrality 
and viewpoint neutrality. The Rosenberaer Court also limited its judicial focus on 
a student fee program already in place. It did acknowledge that there might be a 
question entertained in the future concerning the legitimacy of such fee 
programs. Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, raised the possibility that
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mandatory student fees were susceptible to a Free Speech Clause challenge by 
objecting students who may argue that they should not be compelled to pay for 
speech with which they disagree (Rosenberaer. at 59 (O’Connor, J„ concurring)). 
This statement led some legal scholars to conclude that student fee programs 
were on their way out. Others, at least, saw this to mean that the U.S. Supreme 
Court would no longer limit its focus to just the allocation of mandatory student 
fees, but instead, would broaden its scrutiny to include the issue of imposing and 
collecting the fees (O’Neil, 1999).
The Southworth Lower Court Decisions 
Where Rosenberaer was concerned with the rights of students to funding 
from an extracurricular speech program already in place, Southworth addressed 
the question that was recognized in Rosenberaer but left unresolved. That is, 
whether a public university may require its students to pay a fee which funds the 
opportunity for extracurricular speech they object to (Reoents of Univ. of Wis. 
Svs. V. Southworth. et al.. 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000)).
Wisconsin is one of several states in which state statutes mandate student 
participation in the governance of the public's university. Student government is 
supported by student fees and determines the distribution of allocable student 
fees at each of the 26 University of Wisconsin campuses had developed 
processes for making their decisions -  soliciting applications from student 
organizations -  holding hearings -  conducting referenda. If the students and 
chancellor disagreed regarding distribution of fees, the students presented their
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case to the Board of Regents who made the final decision each year about the 
mandatory student fee amount (Rouse & Howard, 1998). During the 1995-96 
academic year, the total activity fee per student was $380. Seventy-four dollars 
of the $380 was allocable to student activities. The total allocable fees at the 
University of Wisconsin, Madison amounted to $2,548,570 and the student 
governance process earmarked funding to a wide variety of student 
organizations. Groups receiving these activity fees had to follow state guidelines 
in spending the funds. Student government elections at the Madison campus 
rarely attracted more that 5% to 7% of the student body to vote for their 
representatives (Rouse & Howard, 1998).
While students challenged eighteen student organizations, at the center of 
this controversy, like other lower court cases, was the PIRG (Public Interest 
Research Group). As mentioned earlier, PIRGs were the creation of Ralph 
Nader and they were intended to associate with universities, hire students, and 
train them to be advocates and activists. Given their origins, PIRGs tend to 
espouse liberal doctrine. They also receive a great deal of funding from 
mandatory student fees.
The attorney for the students, Jordan Lorence of the Northstar Legal 
Center for the Family and Constitutional Rights, was funded by the very 
conservative Scottsdale, Arizona-based Alliance Defense Fund. Its literature 
describes its goals as "defunding the Left and reclaiming legal ground for the 
body of the Christ" (Greenhouse. 1999, p. A20). Thus, this case represented the
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growing trend of a legal challenge from fundamental conservatives (O'Neil,
1999).
In Southworth. the students claimed that when they paid fees to support 
various student groups, it violated their First Amendment rights to freedom of 
speech, association and free exercise of religion. They had no objection to 
student groups using the university's facilities to meet, collecting voluntary 
contributions, or organizing for their causes. But they were opposed to being 
required by the university to pay fees to directly subsidize student groups and 
especially student groups engaging in political and ideological advocacy 
(Southworth v. Grebe. No. 96-C-0292-S (W.D. Wis.1996)). The following are a 
few of the eighteen groups that received funding from the student activity fees 
that complaining students found objectionable: WISPIRG received $49,500 and 
volunteers lobbied the State legislature on a variety of environmental issues; The 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual Center received $22,000. Its charter included a promise 
to advocate for gay-positive University policies. It also supported various events 
to publicize gay issues; The Campus Women's Center received $34,000. It 
published a newsletter that included articles urging the defeat of legislation 
initiatives to limit access to abortion; The Madison Aids Support Network 
received $26,000. Some of its programs gave explicit information about the use 
of condoms; The International Socialist Organization received $350. They 
oppose the Republican Contract on America; The Progressive Student Network 
received $590. They also opposed the Republican Contract on America and 
lobbied the legislature to oppose mining in Wisconsin.
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The responsibility for governing the University of Wisconsin System is 
vested by law with the Board of Regents. Students share in aspects of the 
university's governance; one aspect is the disposition of those student fees which 
constitute substantial support for campus student activities (Construing Wis. Stat. 
§36.09(1-5) (1993-1994)). Fees were distributed in a large measure by the 
student government, Associated Students of Madison (ASM) and its 
subcommittees. Once fees were collected, they were deposited by the university 
into State of Wisconsin accounts. Such fees were classified into two types: non- 
allocable (80% of the total fees) which are used for student health services, 
intramural sports, debt service, upkeep and operations of the student union 
facilities; and allocable (20% of the total fees) that support endeavors pursued by 
the university's registered student organizations (RSOs).
To qualify as an RSO, students had to organize a not-for-profit group, limit 
membership primarily to students, and agree to undertake activities related to 
student life on campus. In the 1995-96 school year, 623 groups had RSO status 
on the Madison campus. The expressive activities undertaken by RSOs were 
diverse in range and content, from displaying posters and circulating newsletters 
throughout the campus to hosting campus debates and guest speakers, and 
political lobbying.
Allocable student fees were distributed three ways. First, student 
organizations could seek funding from the Student Government Activity Fund 
(SGAF) administered by the ASM. SGAF funds were issued to support an 
RSO s operations and events, as well as travel expenses central to the purpose
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of the organization. Second, an RSO could apply for funding from the General 
Student Services Fund (GSSF) administered through the ASM’s finance 
committee. In the 1995-96 academic year, 15 RSOs received GSSF funding -  
campus tutoring center, the student radio station, a student environmental group, 
a gay and bisexual student center, a community legal office, an AIDS support 
network, a campus women’s center, and the Wisconsin Student Public Interest 
Research Group (WISPIRG). In addition to providing counseling and tutoring, 
RSOs that received GSSF funding also engaged in political and ideological 
expression (according to the university). Third, a student referendum allowed the 
student body to vote either to approve or disapprove a funding for a particular 
RSO. The WISPIRG received $45,000 via a student referendum during the 
1995-96 academic year. According to the university, a referendum could also 
operate to defund an RSO or to veto a funding decision of the ASM.
GSSF and SGAF funding decisions were made in an open session where 
interested students attended when RSO funding was discussed. In addition, 
ASM approved the results of the student referendum. Counsel for the university 
advised that the student government voluntarily viewed the referendum as 
binding. Approximately 30% of the university's RSOs received funding during the 
1995-96 academic year.
In 1996, Southworth. et. al. v. Grebe, et. al. was argued in U.S. District 
Court before Judge John C. Shabaz. Students requested declaratory and 
injunctive relief for the alleged violations of their First Amendment rights to 
freedom of speech, freedom of association, free exercise of religion. Students
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sought a declaration that the university’s imposition of mandatory student fees 
upon students enrolled at the University of Wisconsin was unconstitutional 
because it compelled them to fund private ideological and political groups on the 
Madison campus. They contended the university must grant them the choice not 
to fund those recognized student organizations (RSOs) that engage in political 
and ideological expression offensive to their personal beliefs.
The university responded that the fees enhanced the educational 
experience by stimulating advocacy and debate on diverse points of view, 
enabling participation in campus administrative activity and provided 
opportunities to develop social skills, all consistent with the university's broad 
educational mission. The state law defined the university's mission 1o develop 
human resources, to discover and disseminate knowledge, to extend knowledge 
and its application beyond the boundaries of its campuses and to serve and 
stimulate society by developing in students heightened intellectual, cultural and 
humane sensitivities. . . and a sense of purpose” (Construing Wis. Stat. §36.07(1) 
(1993-1994)). Further, the University of Wisconsin Board of Regents argued that 
the mandatory fee doctrine established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Abood and 
Keller was not applicable for two reasons. First, the student organizations that 
were being subsidized by the allocable fee did not purport to speak for all 
students. Second, unions and bar associations did not offer the opportunity for 
dissenting members to work in the democratic process, unlike ASM.
It appeared that, like other previous lower court decisions, the United States 
District Court's goal was to strike a balance between two very significant
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competing interests - the student’s constitutional right not to be compelled to 
financially subsidize political or ideological activities balanced against the Board 
of Regent’s authority to promote the university's educational mission by providing 
opportunities for the free expression of diverse viewpoints on difficult and 
challenging issues. Judge Shabaz found the Regents' first argument to be 
without merit and the second to be without difference because in Keller, 
attorneys were required to be members of the state bar association and were 
provided an opportunity to work within the democratic system to elect their own 
representatives. He seemed to be swayed by Justice O’Connor’s concurring 
comments in Rosenberaer. O'Connor stated that, “although the question is not 
presented here, I note the possibility that the (mandatory) student fee is 
susceptible to a Free Speech Clause challenge by an objecting student that she 
should not be compelled to pay for speech with which she disagrees” 
(Rosenberaer at 2527 (O’Connor, J, concurring)). Thus, would the student have 
the First Amendment right to demand a pro rata return of fees allocated for 
speech he/she does not agree with? Justice O'Connor also cited Abood and 
Keller suggesting that these cases were pivotal in determining the 
constitutionality of mandatory student fees being used to subsidize political and 
ideological student organizations.
Judge Shabaz also appeared to agree with the Smith v. Reoents of 
Universitv of California. 4 Cal. 4“’ 843,844 P.2d 500, cert, denied, 510 U.S. 863 
(1993), for direction. That court addressed the educational function of the state 
university, describing it as “extremely broad; it potentially encompasses all of life”
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(Smith, at 508). Because of the broad function a state university served, the 
Smith court recognized the possibility that activities germane to the educational 
function of a university could impermissibly infringe upon a dissenting student’s 
constitutional rights. The California Supreme Court then reasoned that it must 
set a rational limit on the use of mandatory student fees in order to protect the 
constitutional rights of dissenting students.
The court relied on earlier school fee cases in reaching its decision. The 
court noted that in Carroll v. Blinken. 957 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1992), also known as 
Carroll I. the Second Circuit Court recognized that forcing students to contribute 
to the NYPIRG was an infringement on their First Amendment rights not to be 
compelled to speak. The Second Circuit did rule that the on-campus NYPIRG 
activities were germane to the university's mission and, therefore, could justify an 
infringement; however, the NYPIRG off-campus' activities were not narrowly 
tailored to the university's mission and could not be justified as germane. In 
Galda v. Rutoers. 772 F.2d 1060,1065 (1985), cert, denied 106 S. Ct. 1375 
(1986), also known as Galda II. the Third Circuit Court recognized that NJPIRG 
offered some educational benefits to students; however, the court found that 
such benefits were incidental to the organization's primarily political and 
ideological purpose. Accordingly, the Galda II court found that the incidental 
educational benefits NJPIRG offered were insufficient to justify the infringement 
of the dissenting students' speech and associational rights (Southworth).
Judge Shabaz found that the California State Supreme Court in Smith 
determined that the cumulative holdings in Carroll I and Galda II. in addition to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
48
Abood and Keller, stood for three principles. First, a state university may support 
student organizations through mandatory student fees because the use of the 
funds can be germane to the university's educational mission. Second, at some 
point, the educational benefits that funded student groups offer may become 
incidental to the group's primary function of advancing its own political and 
ideological interests. Third, while the funding of those student groups may still 
provide some educational benefits to students attending the university, the 
incidental benefit to the students' education will not justify the burden on the 
dissenting students' constitutional rights. The U.S. District Court in Southworth 
found these principles to be persuasive.
The district court decided that it was not necessary for that court to 
determine if each of the eighteen groups challenged offered educational benefits 
that might justify an infringement upon the students' speech and association 
rights. The court held that so long as more than an insignificant number of 
student organizations were using their funding from allocable fees to engage in 
primarily political or ideological activity, the university infringement upon the 
students' First Amendment rights could not be justified.
The trial court concluded that there were clearly many instances where 
portions of the mandatory student fees were being used to create a forum for 
student organizations to express their views. However, there were a number of 
situations where portions of the allocable fees were being used clearly to fund 
political or ideological activity and not to provide a forum for the free exchange of 
ideas. Furthermore, the court concluded that it would be distorting the facts to
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say that these activities, which were purely political and ideological in their 
nature, were offering students services or creating a forum for the exchange of 
ideas.
The U.S. District Court found in favor of the students' First Amendment right 
not to be compelled to speak or associate. Because it had been determined that 
the educational benefits of some of these student organizations were only limited 
and incidental to their primary political or ideological purposes, the funding of 
these student organizations was not germane to the university's function and, 
accordingly, not narrowly tailored to avoid the unnecessary infringement of the 
students' First Amendment rights. The U.S. District Court granted the student's 
declaratory relief and injunctive relief. The court ordered the Regents of the 
University of Wisconsin to stop the funding of private groups that engage in 
political or ideological advocacy. Further, the Regents were ordered to publish 
written notice of student organizations engaging in political and ideological 
speech, the type of activities these organizations were engaged in, recipients of 
these fees, and the pro rata share of mandatory fees devoted to these 
organizations; and to establish an arbitration process for disputes over the 
amount of fees being paid. The injunction also established detailed and specific 
procedures that the Regents were to undertake to administer the distribution of 
mandatory student activity fees. The court’s injunction further rejected the 
referendum mechanism as a proper procedure for distribution of student fee.
The Regents appealed Judge Shabaz's decision to the 7"' Circuit Court of 
Appeals. In 1998, Southworth v. Grebe. 151 F.3d 717 (7“* Cir. 1998), was heard
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and decided. The question before the appellate court was very limited; Can the 
Regents force objecting students to fund private organizations, which engage in 
political and ideological activities, speech, and advocacy?
Circuit Court Judge Manion wrote the opinion for the unanimous panel and 
issued the decision on August 10,1998. The court concluded that the Abood 
and Keller analyses, and the three-prong test of Lehnert. governed the students' 
First Amendment challenge of the Regents' mandatory student fee policy. No 
other court had ever relied upon Lehnert before. The Lehnert test is a three- 
prong test consisting of germaneness, vital policy interests of government, and 
burdening of free speech. The court held that the Regents had failed to sustain 
their burden under the three-prong analysis. Even if funding private political and 
ideological organizations was germane to the university’s mission, the forced 
funding of such organizations significantly added to the burden of the students' 
free speech rights. Therefore, the court held that the Regents could not use the 
allocable portion of objecting students' mandatory activity fees to fund 
organizations, which engage in political or ideological activities, advocacy, or 
speech. The court also held that the eighteen challenged private organizations 
engaged in ideological and political activities and speech, and could not be 
constitutionally funded with objecting students' fees.
The court described the U.S. District Court's injunctive relief by saying that it 
established detailed and specific procedures that the Regents must undertake to 
administer the distribution of mandatory student fees. However, the court held 
that it was inappropriate to issue such an injunction stating that federalism
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required caution in ordering states what to do (Southworth). The Seventh Circuit 
Court reversed the injunction stating that “until it appears that the state will not 
comply with (an injunction commanding compliance with the law), there is no 
occasion for the entry of the complicated decree that treats the state as an 
outlaw and requires it to do even more than the ...law requires” (Southworth at 
734). The court further stated that detailed mandatory injunctions should be last 
resorts and the U.S. District Court’s injunction went much further than enjoining 
the Regents from using objecting students' mandatory fees to fund organizations 
that engage in political and ideological activities. The injunction set forth detailed 
measures that the Regents had to undertake. Because the Constitution did not 
mandate this exact procedure, and because the state had not yet refused to 
comply with a general negative injunction -  saying what the State cannot do -  
the Seventh Circuit struck down the injunction.
The students also contended that each individual student, not the university, 
should have the final decision to fund an advocacy group before his or her fees 
were paid to the university and that the university should not define private 
groups’ advocacy as a service to other students in order to require students to 
fund those groups. The Seventh Circuit Court agreed and reiterated that the 
university could not even temporarily collect from objecting students the portion 
of the fees that would fund organizations that engage in political and ideological 
activities, speech, or advocacy, whether or not the organization also provided 
some a service by doing so. In doing this, the Seventh Circuit Court endorsed
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the remedy allowing students to opt out of the mandatory student fee that would 
be ultimately earmarked for objectionable groups.
On August 31,1998, the Board of Regents filed a petition for rehearing with 
a suggestion for rehearing en banc. The three judges on the original panel voted 
to deny rehearing and a majority of the judges in active service voted to deny 
rehearing en banc on October 27,1998. Four judges wrote two dissenting 
opinions. Judges Walter J. Cummings, liana Diamond Rovner, Terence T.
Evans and Diane P. Wood dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc.
Judge Rovner wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Judges Wood, Cummings, 
and Evans. According to Rovner, the question concerning First Amendment 
issues warranted being heard before the full court, first, because the Seventh 
Circuit panel’s opinion conflicted with the Second Circuit Court; and second, the 
Seventh Circuit panel had extended the prohibition against compelled speech 
beyond what had been recognized by the Supreme Court.
While acknowledging Abood and Keller to be the precedents for compelled 
speech. Judge Rovner made an argument that there is a distinct difference 
between the fees in Abood. Keller, and university study fees in Southworth. In 
Abood and Keller, the recipients of funding were engaging in direct and indirect 
political and ideological speech. In fact, they were funded because of their 
political and ideological positions, and for the purpose of enhancing those 
positions. In Southworth. the recipient of funding (student government) was not 
engaging in challenging speech and the challenged speech was not attributable 
to student government. Rovner argued that the students were not paying fees to
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challenged groups, but instead to student government. Student government, in 
turn, used the money to fund its own operations and over 100 student groups 
regardless of viewpoint. Student govemment did not align itself with any political 
or ideological viewpoint and, therefore, was not speaking. If student govemment 
were not speaking, Rovner posed the question, how could that be considered 
compelled speech?
Rovner disagreed with the circuit panel's decision not to address each 
challenged expenditure individually and to analyze the proper balancing of each 
one. Instead, the circuit panel declared that political and ideological speech, as a 
whole was not germane to the university's educational mission. Rovner asserted 
that such a position defied previous U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding the 
importance of robust debate and free expression in a university setting (Healv v. 
James. 408 U.S. 169,180-81 (1972); Kevishian v. Board of Regents. 385 U.S. 
589 (1967); Widmarv. Vincent. 454 U.S. 263, 278-80 n.2 (1981 ). Rovner 
believed that the panel's interpretation of Galda I &II was flawed because in 
those decisions the fee was targeted specifically for the objectionable group, not 
a forum of all groups, and was granted for the purpose of funding the challenged 
group’s objectives.
Finally, Rovner argued that the panel failed to recognize that the burden 
on the students’ speech (Lehnert) was lessened because of the availability of the 
same funding for opposing speech. Again, this illustrated a difference between 
Southworth. Abood and Keller. In Abood and Keller, the union was the sole 
determinant of the speech. In Keller, the bar association received the funds and
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controlled the speech. In Southworth. the mandatory student fees were available 
to a variety of student organizations and supported multiple viewpoints. Student 
govemment was the vehicle by which the fees were disbursed and espoused no 
particular views of its own. According to Rovner, where the same funds were 
available for them to express their disagreement, the burden of their speech was 
minimal.
Rovneris dissenting opinion drew distinct differences between Abood. 
Keller, and Southworth in particular within the context of viewpoint neutrality.
The dissent made mention of the forum that the Southworth funding created and 
criticized the panel for not recognizing the important role universities play in 
creating marketplaces for ideas.
Judge Diane Wood wrote another opinion dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc. Judges Rovner and Evans joined. Judge Wood laid out 
three principles in her dissent. She believed that the en banc review was 
appropriate for several reasons: There was a conflict between the circuits; 
important and unsettled questions of law persisted, particularly because the 
panel had relied so heavily upon Lehnert: and the panel's decision appeared to 
create serious conflicts with the premise that supported the Rosenberaer 
decision.
Wood took issue with the panel's premise that the fees were a compelled 
subsidy of speech itself, rather than a compelled subsidy of a neutral fomm for 
speech. According to Wood, Rosenberaer provided strong support for the 
premise that the mandatory student activity fees created a forum for expression
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available to a diversity of views from private speakers. Access to that forum, 
according to Rosenberaer. had to be handled on a nondiscriminatory basis.
Wood disagreed with the panel's position that there is no distinction between a 
forum for speech and the speakers who use that forum. Wood, again, turned to 
Rosenberaer to argue that there are different principles that control the analysis 
of compelled funding of a neutral forum than just compelled funding of particular 
group. She illustrated this point by noting that taxpayers support the Mall in 
Washington, D.C., where speakers with a variety of viewpoints use the facility. 
Students also paid tuition and undoubtedly disagreed with the viewpoints of 
some faculty. However, the university did not endorse the viewpoint of the 
faculty members and the ASM did not endorse the viewpoints of speakers.
Wood concluded that the university and the ASM did nothing more than creates a 
forum for expression with tuition and student fees.
Wood continued by contending that it was more appropriate to utilize the 
forum-creation analysis, associated with Rosenberaer. rather than the 
Germaneness Test that was associated with Abood. According to Wood, Abood 
and Keller provided very little guidance for deciding student fee cases. Neither 
the union nor the bar association in Abood and Keller created a viewpoint neutral 
forum. These organizations were actually pursuing their own political agendas 
and specifically funded only those activities or organizations that supported the 
viewpoints of the union or bar association. In the Southworth case, students 
were required to fund the ASM and the ASM funded a variety of organizations 
regardless of viewpoints, even encouraging conflicting viewpoints. The unions or
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bar associations were subjected to additional First Amendment constraints 
because the service fees collected did not create a forum for expression. Hence, 
it was appropriate to allow dissenters to opt out of the funding of political 
expression. According to Wood, the university satisfied the First Amendment’s 
concerns with the plurality of views inherent in viewpoint neutrality by using 
mandatory student fees to create a public forum. Wood was asserting that 
Abood and Keller simply did not apply in the Southworth case. Wood also did 
not agree that Lehnert was a compelling precedent for Southworth. The Lehnert 
decision, like Abood and Keller, was involved with the constitutional limitations 
upon the use of union dues, required as a condition of employment, to be used 
for payments to organizations engaged in one-sided political speech and not a 
viewpoint neutral forum.
Wood feared that an opt out remedy would result in hit lists of 
organizations that students objected to. Also, the heavy administrative 
requirements to solicit and process the individual preferences of over 40,000 
students would most likely result in elimination of the forum altogether. To Wood, 
the opt out remedy would lead to less speech when what was need on a 
university campus was more speech, not less. The elimination of such forums 
would also deprive the students of the opportunity to develop skills required to 
run a student association, student union, etc.
On January 25,1999, the University's Board of Regents petitioned the 
United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari arguing that the Southworth 
case should be added to its docket because of its great national importance. The
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arguments presented in the dissenting opinions for a rehearing en banc in the 
Seventh Circuit Court would find their way into the Board of Regents' Petition for 
a writ o f certiorari and, ultimately, their written and oral arguments presented to 
the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Board of Regents' Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari
The Regents' petition for certiorari argued that the first question before the 
U.S. Supreme Court was whether the First Amendment was violated when a 
public university used a portion of student activity fees paid by students, who 
have chosen to matriculate, to fund forums for the expression of a wide-range of 
ideas on diverse topics. The parties had stipulated that the funds were 
distributed on a viewpoint neutral basis (Stip. at 13). So the question presented 
to the Court was that previously reserved in Rosenberaer. whether an objecting 
student has the First Amendment right to demand a pro rata return to the extent 
the fee is expended for speech to which he or she does not subscribe 
(Rosenberaer at 851 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
The second question presented involved whether the First Amendment 
was violated when a public university uses a portion of student fees to fund 
organizations that provide student services. This question arose out of by the 
parties' stipulation that these organizations provided sen/ices to a significant 
number of the students on campus (Stip. at 13). Up to that time, courts had not 
addressed these two questions separately but instead treated student service
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organizations and/or the services themselves as though their principal purpose 
was political or ideological advocacy and subjected them to strict First 
Amendment analysis (Petition for writ of certiorari, at 9, Southworth).
The Regents requested that the U.S. Supreme Court grant their petition 
for a writ of certiorari for the following reasons. First, the circuits were split on 
how or whether to apply the analysis of Abood and Keller to the disputes 
regarding mandatory student activity fees. In Carroll v. Blinken. 957 F.2d 991 (2d 
Cir. 1992) (Carroll I), the Second Circuit ruled that it was in the university’s 
interest to promote extracurricular activities, teach civic duty, and to provide for 
energetic student debate and thus justified an infringement upon students' First 
Amendment rights. On appeal and after remand, the Second Circuit held in 
Carroll v. Blinken. 42 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 1994) a/fd 899 F.Supp 1214, (Carroll II). 
that student activity fees could be used for activities that foster a marketplace of 
ideas; activities that provide students with hands-on educational experiences; 
and extra-curricular activities for students both on and off the campus to fulfill 
SUNY educational objectives. In Havs Guardian v. Suoole. 969 F.2d 111 (5^^
Cir. 1992), cert, denied, 605 U.S. 1087 (1993), the Fifth Circuit found that a 
university's educational goals justified the subsidy of a university-sponsored 
newspaper. In Kania v. Fordham. 702 F.2d 475 (4*' Cir. 1983), the Fourth Circuit 
held that the university's partial funding of a student newspaper through 
mandatory student fees was constitutional. In Galda II. the Third Circuit Court 
used the Abood and Keller Germaneness Test and concluded that the New 
Jersey Public Interest Research Group’s educational benefits were incidental to
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the organization’s primarily political and ideological purposes. However, that 
court also acknowledged the importance of, and the distinction when, a forum is 
created with funds.
State supreme courts were also split on this First Amendment issue. In 
Smith V. Reoents of Universitv of Cal.. 4 Cal. 4“’ 843, 844 P.2d 500, cert, denied, 
510 U.S. 863 (1993), the California State Supreme Court held that no student 
group could claim to be a public forum. When the educational benefits a student 
group offers to the campus community become incidental to the group's primary 
objective of advancing its own political and ideological interests, it cannot be 
funded with compulsory fees. In Good v. Associated Students of Universitv of 
Washington. 86 Wash. 2d 94, 542 P.2d 762 (1975), the court held that 
mandatory fee funding was constitutional when balanced against the university's 
purpose of presenting a broad spectrum of ideas, so long as expenditures were 
within the laws that authorized them. In Larson v. Board of Reoents of Universitv 
of Neb.. 204 NW2d. 568 (1973). the court held that mandatory fees to fund a 
student newspaper, student govemment and speaker's program to be 
constitutional because they are part of the educational process so long as many 
viewpoints are expressed.
The Regents also argued that the Seventh Circuit Court’s decision 
undermined the traditional role of universities as centers of free speech and the 
tradition of student-run activities. The U.S. Supreme Court had long recognized 
the unique role of universities in providing opportunity for a wide range of 
expression even if that speech is political and ideological. The mission of the
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University of Wisconsin System had been established by statute and represented 
the broad role a public university plays in the community. This was in stark 
contrast to the narrow roles of unions and bar associations as stated in Abood. 
Keller, and Lehnert (Petition for writ of certiorari at 23, Southworth).
Petitioners also contended that the Seventh Circuit Court also failed to 
recognize the critical difference between being forced to support the speech of a 
particular group and being compelled to provide funding to create a forum for 
speech by any group. To the Board of Regents, this was a fundamental 
distinction at the heart of First Amendment jurisprudence. The whole point of a 
forum and its special First Amendment status is that anyone and everyone can 
use it, no matter how offensive their speech may be to some (Petition for writ of 
certiorari at 23, Southworth). So, the Seventh Circuit Court clearly erred in using 
the compelled speech analysis rather than the forum creation analysis. By using 
the compelled speech analysis, the court failed to recognize that both parties had 
agreed that a forum was created with the student activity fees, that the funded 
student organizations did not speak for the university or even for the student 
body (Petition for writ of certioriari at 23, Southworth).
Petitioners also faulted the Seventh Circuit's decision because it included 
all organizations that provided sen/ices to students within an umbrella of political 
and ideological advocacy. This appeared to disregard the stipulation that certain 
student organizations provided services to significant numbers of students and 
failed to consider the importance of these services, separate from any advocacy 
(Petition for Writ o f Certiorari at 23, Southworth). The Board of Regents ended
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their petition by saying that a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court was needed to 
give guidance to public universities across the nation concerning collecting and 
distributing student activity fees.
While the Regents' petition was pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, 
another similar case was decided in the Ninth Circuit Court.
Students at the University of Oregon sought relief under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, in Rounds, et. al., v. Oregon State Board 
of Higher Education. 166 F.3d 1032 (S®’ Cir. 1999). Oregon statutory law allowed 
the imposition of student fees to finance programs under the supervision and 
control of the Oregon State Board of Higher Education. The State Board argued 
that such financing of programs contributed to the cultural and physical 
development of students. Over eighty university organizations received funding 
from fees during the 1995-96 academic year, including two campus newspapers, 
the Muslim Student Association, Amnesty International, Students for Choice, the 
Lesbian and Gay Alliance, Men and Women Against Rape, and the National 
Lawyers Guild. In addition the OSPIRG EF, a nonpartisan statewide organization 
run entirely by students to address student concerns, was also funded. Its 
mission was to “develop students' potential to become educated and responsible 
citizens who are informed about the American legislative process and political 
system” (Rounds at 1458). Students complained that the collection of the fees 
was a condition of their matriculation at a state institution and the distribution of a 
portion of the proceeds to OSPIRG EF compelled them to speak in support of
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beliefs they did not hold and infringed upon their freedom not to associate with an 
organization with which they strongly disagree (Rounds).
The Ninth Circuit Court compared the issues of the Oregon case with 
other cases that had set precedents in the past. In Carroll I. the Second Circuit 
struck down automatic membership to organizations that receive student fees. 
The Oregon system did not compel students to associate with the OSPIRG EF. 
They were neither afforded automatic membership by paying fees, nor were they 
required to participate in OSPIRG EF’s activities (Carroll I). In Carroll II. the 
Second Circuit Court upheld allocations to the New York PIRG as long as that 
organization spent equivalent of student contributions on campus and served the 
university’s mission of fostering the marketplace of ideas (Carroll II). In Galda II. 
the Third Circuit Court disapproved of an earmarked mandatory student fee paid 
directly to the New Jersey PIRG. The New Jersey PIRG s mandatory fee was 
separate from the general student fee as it created a forum that only supported 
New Jersey PIRG s viewpoints. Further, the educational benefit afforded by the 
New Jersey PIRG was only incidental and “subordinate to the group’s function of 
promoting its political and ideological aims” (Rounds at 1466). In the Oregon 
case, the court cited the distinct separation between OSPIRG EF's educational 
and political functions. Further, the university's funding was limited to the 
educational activities only.
Accordingly, the Oregon case differed from Abood in terms of the 
communication issue. In Abood. the plaintiffs alleged that they had no control 
over the union's communications, and these communications were one-sided
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presentations of the union's viewpoint. The mandatory fees in Abood. therefore, 
enhanced the power of one, and only one, ideological group to further its political 
goals. In contrast, the OSPIRG EF in the Oregon case increased the overall 
exchange of information, ideas and opinions on the campus (Rounds).
While the court had already stated that this was not a case of compelled 
association, it concluded that the principles of Abood and Keller were still 
applicable. Therefore, ideological activities funded by the mandatory incidental 
fee had to be germane to the purposes for which the compelled association was 
justified to pass strict constitutional scrutiny (Keller). Thus, the Germaneness 
Test was applied in Rounds. The Ninth Circuit Court first held that the goals of 
the university were much broader than the goals of a labor union or a state bar, 
and they were inextricably connected with the underlying policies of the First 
Amendment (Rounds). The Ninth Circuit Court then turned its attention to 
Rosenberaer. which held that there are extracurricular activities that are related 
to the educational purpose of a university. In the Oregon system, according to 
the court, the mandatory student fees were authorized by Oregon statute,
Or. Rev. Stat. §351.070(3)(d) (1997), to finance programs the Board of Higher 
Education deemed to be advantageous to the cultural or physical development of 
students. According to the Ninth Circuit Court, the university had developed an 
adequate system of dispersing fees that would ensure legal compliance 
(Rounds).
In order to qualify for funding, an organization had to first be recognized by 
the University of Oregon’s Associated Students. Criteria for recognition included
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a requirement that the organization engaged in activities of common interest of 
students. If recognized, the organization could apply for funding by submitting a 
budget request. Organizations were funded by either approval of a majority vote 
of the entire student body (referendum) or through a budget process that 
included approval by various committees of the Associated Students as well as 
the Student Senate. The university president and the Board of Higher Education 
then approved the budget allocation. Specific disbursements were monitored. In 
order to obtain payment, organizations had to submit documentation and a 
certification that the funds were expended for the purposes authorized by the 
Associated Students and the university. In accordance with Rosenberoer. the 
university created a limited public forum that encouraged a "diversity of views 
from private speakers” (Rosenberoer at 834).
The Ninth Circuit Court held that in this context, the activities of OSPIRG 
EF were germane to the university’s purpose. OSPIRG EF differed from other 
PIRGs in that it was a nonpartisan organization whose objective was to provide 
college students hands-on experience in recognizing, researching and solving 
the problems of society through offering internships, sponsoring conferences and 
workshops, providing research reports and leadership training. The U.S. District 
Court held that OSPIRG EF did not have programs that do not meet the 
university’s educational objectives. The district court further noted that the 
plaintiffs conceded that there clearly was an educational benefit from the 
Education Fund’s programs. When asked for something more specific in the
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record indicating a lack of constitutionality, the p la intiff provided nothing 
persuasive.
The Ninth Circuit Court agreed with the U.S. District Court and ruled that 
OSPIRG EF's activities were germane to the purpose for which the mandatory 
exaction of fees was imposed as a matter of law and that the distribution of funds 
to OSPIRG EF served a legitimate governmental interest that did not violate the 
First Amendment. In its concluding remarks, the Ninth Circuit Court mentioned 
the Southworth case and concluded, "To the extent that Southworth holds that a 
public university may not constitutionally establish and fund a limited public forum 
for the expression of diverse viewpoints, we respectfully disagree" (Rounds at 
1470). The Ninth Circuit Court sided with the university by affirming the judgment 
of the U.S. District Court. Finally, the Rounds decision emphasized the split in 
the federal circuit courts re-enforcing the Regents' argument that the issue was 
ripe for a Supreme Court review.
Supreme Court Brief Petition Analysis 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted the Board of Regents' petition for a wrtf 
of certiorari on March 29,1999. The following outlines the written argument the 
Board of Regents filed in their brief before the Court. The first question set for 
consideration by U.S. Supreme Court was whether the First Amendment was 
violated when a public university used a portion of student activity fees paid by 
students who have chosen to matriculate to fund a forum for the expression of 
the wide-range of ideas on diverse topics.
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The second question involved whether the First Amendment was violated 
when a public university used a portion of student fees to fund organizations that 
provide student services.
The Board of Regents argued that compelled funding of student services 
and creation of a limited public forum for robust debate in a university setting did 
not constitute compelled speech or association in violation of the First 
Amendment. While the First Amendment included a right not to speak and a 
right not to associate in certain circumstances, the Regents argued that the Court 
had also recognized the unique role of universities as places for development, 
expression, debate, and synthesis of ideas, inside and outside the classroom, 
citing Regents of the Universitv of California v. Bakke. 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978); 
Healv V. James. 408 U.S. 169,180-81 (1972); Kevishian v. Board of Regents of 
the Universitv of the State of New York. 385 U.S. 589,603 (1967). The 
appellants also contended that the Court had recognized that a public university, 
at least for its students, possesses many characteristics of a public forum 
(Widmar v. Vincent. 454 U.S. 263, 267 n5 (1981)).
They also stated that in Perrv Education Association v. Perrv Local 
Educators’ Association. 460 U.S. 37 (1983), the Court further recognized three 
different types of forums. First, the traditional public forum -  parks and streets; 
second, the limited or non-traditional forum where government opens up its 
property, for a specific purpose, for public expression -  schools after hours; and 
third, the non-public forum simply not a forum at all. For the first time since 
Perrv. the Court, in Rosenberoer. held that a public university created a limited
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public forum by providing funds to cover publication costs of student 
organizations. The U.S. Supreme Court also held in Rosenberoer that the 
student activity fees created a limited public forum (funds) of money and that 
once established, the forum had to be made available on a viewpoint neutral 
basis. In fact, what had become the Limited Public Forum Doctrine (and it is still 
evolving) demands that when a university imposes viewpoint-based restrictions 
in limited public forums, the university must justify such restrictions by a 
compelling interest that is narrowly defined. However, a university may restrict a 
limited public forum to certain subjects (topics) (McGill, 2000). The facts 
concerning student funding in Rosenberoer were very similar to the University of 
Wisconsin’s funding program. Rosenberoer addressed the disbursement and 
Southworth addressed the collection.
The Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin further argued that 
the compulsory payment of a fee to establish a limited public forum for student 
expression and to provide services to a significant number of students did not fall 
within the category of compelled speech under the Abood and Keller precedents. 
Adopting the argument of rehearing dissenters Judges Rovner and Wood, the 
Regents noted that the panel had erred in using a compelled speech analysis 
instead of the forum creation analysis (Petitioner’s Brief, Regents of the Univ. of 
Wis. Sys. et. al. v. Southworth et. al. 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000). Further, the 
Regents claimed that no argument was ever made in Abood and Keller that the 
expressive activities of the union and bar association were forum related. The 
fees collected in Abood and Keller were used to support a single point of view. In
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Southworth. the student activity fees collected by the university were used to 
fund a variety of points of view on a viewpoint neutral basis. This collection and 
disbursement of funds to RSOs on a viewpoint neutral basis was very similar to 
the construction of a classroom, auditorium, university mall, or other university 
facility made available to student groups for meetings, rallies or speeches.
Further, the Regents' brief noted that there has never been a decision by 
the U.S. Supreme Court that recognized a First Amendment right to opt out of 
funding a forum. The fundamental First Amendment response to individual 
sensitivities to ideas found objectionable has always been more speech, not less. 
Since political speech is the central concern of the First Amendment, it is 
appropriate for govemment to establish a forum for it to take place.
The Regents' brief also challenged the conclusion of the Seventh Circuit 
Court that it was imperative that students not be compelled to fund organizations 
that engage in political and ideological activities. That, according to the Seventh 
Circuit Court, was the only way to protect individual rights. The Regents argued, 
instead, that the First Amendment was not offended when liberal and 
conservative students were required to share equal costs for creating a forum 
that allows the expression of all viewpoints. Objecting students are, therefore, 
free to associate and participate in the forum to ensure their opinions and views 
are expressed.
Then the Regents' brief outlined the circumstances of creating a forum 
funded by student activity fees at the University of Wisconsin, Madison: First, the 
university had created a forum open to all RSOs; second, the objecting students
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admitted that the views of the groups were not likely to be considered individual 
groups and the ASM required a disclaimer that the views of the funded 
organization were not the views of the student govemment; third, neither the 
Board of Regents nor the student govemment was dictating a specific message 
as both parties had already agreed that the forum was viewpoint neutral; and 
fourth, the objecting students and other students were free to form their own 
student groups and receive the same funding to express their views or 
disagreements with the views of any other student group.
Wis. Stat. § 36.09 (1993-1994) authorized the student governments to 
distribute the mandatory student fees and these fees were maintained separately 
from tuition revenues. It was not uncommon for funded organizations to engage 
in some type of client advocacy. There also had been no recognized right to opt 
out of supporting govemment programs funded by general tax revenues on the 
basis of objection of conscience.
This case, as in Rosenberoer. student groups were funded in order to 
facilitate the expression of a broad spectrum of ideas. The Regents argued that 
students were not being compelled to speak or associate, and their challenge to 
providing general support to the creation of a limited public forum should be 
rejected. The Wisconsin Legislature had specifically authorized the collection of 
student activity fees by the Board of Regents, directing that primary responsibility 
for distributing such funds be delegated to the students, in accordance with the 
principle of shared governance (Petitioner’s Brief, Regents of the Univ. of Wis. 
Svs. et. al. V. Southworth et. al. 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000))(Construing Wis. Stat.
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§36.09(5) (1993-1994)). The Wisconsin Legislature had also defined as part of 
the University of Wisconsin's mission the extension of the application of 
knowledge beyond the classroom, even beyond the campus (Petitioner’s Brief, 
Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs. et. al. v. Southworth et. al. 120 S. Ct. 1346 
(2000)) (Construing Wis. Stat. §36.01(2) (1993-1994)). The difference between a 
university’s function and that of a labor union or professional association 
rendered the financing of diverse public expression on a viewpoint-neutral basis 
proper. That is, it was germane to carrying out the university’s essential function 
of education.
The Students’ Response Brief Submitted to 
The U.S. Supreme Court 
The students’ response to the Regents’ brief is outlined. According to the 
students, analysis of the university’s mandatory student fee program should have 
begun with the right not to speak. Because the fundamental right of freedom of 
speech is at the heart of this challenge, the students argued that the university 
must show compelling state interest to compel student speech, and further, that 
the restriction on free speech must be implemented by the least restrictive means 
to justify the compelled funding. The mandatory student fees program was not 
necessary to promote diverse and robust debate on campuses because over 
70% of the student organizations receive no funds from the mandatory fee.
Next the students set out to distinguish the Rosenberoer precedent. The 
use of a nonspatial forum (as in Rosenberoer) did not apply in this case.
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Rosenberoer addressed how student fees are disbursed and, therefore, was of 
limited value in deciding Southworth. The coerced fees cases (like Abood and 
Southworth) addressed how student fees money was collected and thereby 
provided relevant guidance to the Court. Thus, the Seventh Circuit judgment 
should be affirmed.
There is a fundamental First Amendment principle that a person has a 
right not to speak. Govemment cannot compel individuals to speak or to fund the 
advocacy of others. The respondents’ brief noted that in Abood the Court ruled 
that govemment requirements compelling teachers to contribute to the union's 
political advocacy violated the teacher First Amendment rights when the 
advocacy was not germane to collective bargaining. This ruling was extended to 
mandatory bar association dues in Keller.
The respondents’ continued claiming the university violated the First 
Amendment by forcing students to contribute to a fund that gives money to 
various campus groups in order to accomplish an advocacy. Further, there was 
no way for students to be excused from paying a portion of the fees to groups 
they objected to. This was also an infringement on the First Amendment.
The students’ brief also asserted that when govemment infringes on a 
person’s First Amendment rights, it must demonstrate a compelling interest to do 
so and the Strict Scmtiny Test should be applied (Widmar v. Vincent. 454 U.S. 
263 (1981 )). In addition to the obligation to show a compelling state interest, the 
university must fulfill the Germaneness Test to satisfy constitutional mandates 
established by prior court precedent.
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In holding the student fee program unconstitutional, the Seventh Circuit 
Court did not use the Compelling State Interest Test. Instead, it applied its own 
version of a Germaneness Test, distinct from and less rigorous than the 
Compelling State Interest Test (Lehnert), and found that the Regents’ program 
could not stand. Lehnert was an awkward application and should not apply in 
Southworth because the university had not first demonstrated that it had a 
compelling interest to support the use of the coerced funding of student activities 
and organizations. The students contended that the U.S. Supreme Court should 
correct the Seventh Circuit’s mistake and analyze this case according to a 
straightforward Compelling Interest Test outlined in Abood and Keller. In 
addition, the Court should clarify that the Germaneness Test was a specific 
application of the Strict Scrutiny Test, used only when a portion of a mandatory 
fees was justified by compelling state interest. The Germaneness Test would 
sort out which expenses may be charged to the unwilling contributors as 
necessary for furthering the compelling state interest and which expenses may 
not.
The brief continued stating that the university had failed to show a 
compelling state interest to support collection of fees accomplished by the least 
restrictive means. The students also asserted the university could not define its 
educational mission so broadly that it violated the First Amendment rights of 
students. Since govemment generally cannot use compelled fees to promote the 
First Amendment; so neither should the university.
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The brief continued that in a marketplace of ideas at a state university or 
elsewhere, the First Amendment prohibits govemment from compelling people to 
fund the speech of others. The reason for this is that the First Amendment 
leaves the ultimate decisions of which ideas to accept or reject to the individual, 
not the state. The reason why the First Amendment leaves the decision of what 
ideas to support financially to the individual is because the decision of whom to 
fund is ultimately based on personal values and moral systems. In this case, the 
university distorted the natural workings of the marketplace of ideas with its fees 
coerced from the students.
The brief then tumed to arguments showing that the university student fee 
system was not the least restrictive means to further student exposure to a wide 
range of ideas. First, many student groups expressed a wide range of viewpoints 
on campus without receiving any funding from the mandatory fee. Approximately 
70% of the student groups operated successfully on campus without using 
money coerced from other students. Second, the university did not actively work 
to make sure it actually funded diverse or under represented viewpoints. The 
university did not determine what viewpoints were under represented on campus 
and then fund those groups espousing those ideas in order to broaden the 
viewpoints expressed on campus. Third, the university contradicted its goal of 
promoting diverse viewpoints by prohibiting funding to partisan political groups 
and religious groups. This shows that the university's formal fee system policies 
did not promote all viewpoints when other countervailing interests became more 
significant. The policy created the interesting anomaly that the mandatory fee
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would not fund the Republicans or Democrats but would fund the political 
activism of the nonpartisan groups like the International Socialist Organization, 
WISPIRG and the UW Greens.
Rosenberoer did not answer the question in this case because 
Rosenberoer addressed how student fees are distributed. Abood and Keller 
were applicable in this case since they addressed the principle for how fee 
money is collected. However, there was no inherent tension between Abood and 
Rosenberoer as it addressed the protection for those who receive funding and 
not those who pay mandatory fees. Rosenberoer principles and the Abood 
principles both flow from the First Amendment, thus, the university should 
implement both sets of principles at the same time. First, the Rosenberger: 
Widmar line of cases should be implemented by allowing RSOs, whatever their 
viewpoint, to apply for funding; and the Abood-Keller line of cases should be 
implemented in order to exempt all objecting students from paying for the forum 
by funding certain student groups. To implement both sets of principles would 
protect people from viewpoint discrimination in two different ways. All student 
groups, no matter what their viewpoint, would be eligible to seek funding from the 
student fund, whatever the size of the fund (Rosenberoer-Widmar). Students 
would be protected from funding viewpoints they did not wish to voluntarily 
support financially (Abood-Keller) -  no exclusions due to viewpoints, no 
compulsions due to viewpoints.
Rosenberoer should not apply to this situation in which a campus group 
received funding by direct referendum, because no Rosenberoer limited public
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forum existed in a referendum context. Through the referendum process, the 
students approved a per capita assessment on each student for WISPIRG alone. 
The referendum process did not create a Rosenberoer forum of money because 
only one group was funded. The referendum mechanism was flawed because it 
allowed a majority of students to force every student to fund WISPIRG.
The Abood-Keller principle applied to the referendum funding system 
because the university compelled the student to pay the fee imposed by the 
referendum. Abood-Keller applied to collection situations involving mandatory 
fees, whether generated by referendum or a Rosenberoer limited public forum. 
The argument that the student fees funded many groups rather than one union 
as in Abood or one bar association as in Keller was constitutionally irrelevant.
To claim that the students were funding a non-spatial forum and were not 
funding the various organizations obscured the reality of what actually happened. 
The mandatory student fees funded actual speech the groups expressed. 
Choosing to fund multiple voices did not nullify the employees' or the students' 
right not to fund political and ideological advocacy they found objectionable.
The money leaves the hands of the student and remains in the form of money 
when it reaches the various campus groups. The fee money funds the actual 
speech the groups express" (Southworth at 39).
Allowing students to opt out of paying the fee will not permit taxpayers to 
opt out of paying for parks, sidewalks and schools. Mandatory student fees were 
not tax revenue, as they did not produce general operating revenues. The typical 
university system gave the student govemment and Board of Regents significant
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involvement In the process and wide discretion to decide which groups would 
have access to the forum money; unlike govemments' passive role in scheduling 
use of parks and other physical forums for expressive activities by private 
groups. Then private groups or individuals may decide whether they want to use 
the physical forum. According to the students, the only way to protect the 
students' First Amendment rights is to allow them to decline to pay the 
mandatory fee. It would then allow the dissenting students to express their 
opposition to the ideas advocated by the funded groups.
The students argued that when a Rosenberoer limited public forum was 
created with student fees, the funded group's expressive activity actually 
consumed the forum of money. That is, the group expended the money in order 
to advocate their ideas. Once finished the money was gone, so a second group 
could not reuse the same money to express opposite ideas; there was no 
guarantee of funding for the opposite views. Because the act of advocacy 
consumed a Rosenberoer limited public forum, allowing the students Abood 
rights to opt out of paying the fee before the advocacy group spent it would be 
the appropriate way to protect the objecting students' right of conscience and 
right not to speak.
The objecting students requested the Court to issue the following 
remedies: Individual students, and not university officials, should decide which 
campus groups to support financially. The university's mandatory student fees 
program should not take students' money first and then require students to seek
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a refund, as it did not meet Constitutional standards. Students should consent to 
the taking of their fees by the university.
Objecting students then proposed Constitutional altematives for campus 
groups receiving funding that would not violate First Amendment rights. First, 
each student should designate which group he/she would like to fund. The 
adjusted total should be added to the fee statement and the student would 
voluntarily pay that amount. The university would pass the money through to the 
student groups. Each student should decide whether to fund a subsidized 
speech fund. The university would bundle all the advocacy groups' funding into 
one category and decide how much money it would award each group. On the 
fee statement, there would be a line for the subsidized speech fund. Each 
student would decide individually whether to check that box and add that amount 
to his/her statement.
The Regents' Reply Brief Submitted 
To the U.S. Supreme Court 
In their response, the Regents argued that the students never challenged 
the university's mandatory student fees program as not being in compliance with 
the Rosenberoer requirement of viewpoint neutrality. In fact, according to the 
Regents, the students explicitly stipulated, Ihe  process for reviewing and 
approving allocations for funding (to student groups) is administered in a 
viewpoint neutral fashion" (Petitioner's Reply Brief, Regents of the Univ. of Wis. 
Svs. et. al. V. Southworth et. al. 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000) at 1). Further, the
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students also acknowledged that the university had created a non-spatial forum 
for speech with the mandatory student fees. The students never presented 
evidence that there was a denial to a particular RSO based upon viewpoint 
neutrality. And, the U.S. District Court and U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals never 
based their decisions on the noncompliance with the viewpoint neutrality 
requirement. There is ample evidence presented in this case that the ASM 
grants funded diverse student speech. The regents agreed with the students that 
the referendum mechanism that funded a single group could not be regarded as 
a Rosenberoer forum.
The Regents responded that the university’s compelling interest, 
extending education beyond the classroom, was defined by Wisconsin Statutes 
and the mandatory funding of the Rosenberoer forum accomplished this. In 
addition, they contended that provisions for services to a significant number of 
students was also an important function of the university. In the case of 
organizations that provide such services, political speech occurred. But it 
occurred in the forum created by the fees. The Regents further argued that the 
Compelling Govemment Interest Standard was not appropriate in this case 
because the students were compelled to fund a forum rather than fund the 
speech of a particular organization. The mandatory student fees created the 
Rosenberoer forum. The compelled funding of a non-spatial Rosenberoer forum 
should be treated the same way as compelled funding of a traditional, spatial 
forum, "it is the free choice of the student groups to apply for grants that 
determine which ideas will be expressed" (Petitioner’s Reply Brief, Reoents of
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the Univ. of Wis. Svs. et. al. v. Southworth et. al. 120 S. Ct 1346 (2000) at 6). 
Further, no membership or speech was compelled through the implementation of 
the mandatory student fees program. When speech through the forum is found 
objectionable, students have the right to use the forum to express their own ideas 
or views. Thus, an opt out remedy was not warranted. The mandatory student 
fees program actually established a process that would respond to objectionable 
speech rather than silence it. The student's slogan "no exclusion due to 
viewpoint, no compulsions due to viewpoints,” offered no basis for this decision 
since, in Abood and Keller: dues were not distributed on a viewpoint neutral 
basis.
Amicus Curiae Briefs Submitted on Behalf 
Of the Board of Regents 
A total of fourteen amicus curiae briefs were filed in support of the Board 
of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System. All of them contained the 
general theme of the public forum creation and viewpoint neutrality being 
applicable to Southworth as opposed to the union cases and the Germaneness 
Test of Lehnert. Abood or Keller.
Fourteen states joined in writing one amicus curiae brief on behalf of the 
Board of Regents. They put forth the argument that since the student fees 
created a viewpoint neutral forum the university's mandatory student fees 
program did not burden the First Amendment. The states further argued that 
Abood and Keller were erroneously applied by the Seventh Circuit Court as these
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cases compelled association with one particular group as opposed to an open, 
public forum that they contended was created with the student fees (Brief for the 
States of New York, et al., Southworth).
The State of Oregon presented its own amicus curiae brief and argued 
that Lehnert had no relevance to Southworth: that the Germaneness Test did not 
apply as it was the vital interest of the university to expose students to a variety 
of viewpoints. Rosenberoer had implied that the fee exaction was different from 
the union cases. The State of Oregon feared most that forums would disappear 
under the burden of the Seventh Circuit Court’s opinion (Brief for the State of 
Oregon, Southworth).
Many of the other organizations and interest groups that filed an amicus 
curiae brief on behalf of the Board of Regents echoed the above arguments. The 
ACLU agreed with the states that the student fees created a limited public forum 
that operated on a viewpoint neutral basis. The ACLU also argued that the opt 
out remedy was not appropriate in a limited public forum where the student fees 
supported the entire forum and not the speech in the forum. The ACLU likened 
the opt out remedy to a "financial heckler’s veto” (Brief for the American Civil 
Liberties Union, at 22, Southworth).
The NYPIRG filed an amicus curia brief stating that Carroll I & II in the 
Second Circuit Court provided proper balance to the issues that were at stake in 
Southworth and the court correctly deferred to the educational judgment of the 
university. The NYPIRG argued that the Seventh Circuit Court had misapplied 
the Germaneness Test by analyzing whether students groups, rather than the
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activities in which those groups engaged, were germane to the university's 
mission. The NYPIRG stated that the university should not be required to 
determine which groups engaged in political and ideological speech and then 
restrict funding to those groups from the student fees. Such action would force 
the university to engage in potential viewpoint neutrality violations. Thus, 
monitoring the student groups would mean making value judgments about where 
the exact point a student group became too political or too ideological. Such a 
requirement could force the university to shut down a forum completely in order 
to satisfy concerns of a vocal minority. This would constitute a heckler’s veto. 
(Brief for the New York Public Interest Research Group, Southworth).
The Student Press Law Center, Associate Collegiate Press, and College 
Media Advisors joined together in an amicus curiae brief and argued that the 
university represented a marketplace of ideas with compelling interest in 
promoting a diversity of viewpoints. Student organizations, and especially the 
press organizations, depended heavily upon the student fees. These 
organizations stated that they would not be able to continue to publish without 
the help of student activity fees. They felt it was unnecessary for expressive 
activities of student organizations to be regulated so long as the funding 
mechanism was viewpoint neutral (Brief for the Student Press Law Center, the 
Associated Collegiate Press, and College Media Advisers, Inc., Southworth).
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Amicus Curiae Briefe Submitted 
On Behalf of the Students 
A total of thirteen organizations wrote amicus curiae briefs on behalf of the 
students. These arguments were much more diverse. The National Legal 
Foundation argued that the U.S. Supreme Court should embrace the Seventh 
Circuit Court's use of Lehnert. Further, the Seventh Circuit Court panel’s 
analysis was simple and correct. The mandatory fees would not create a conflict 
with Rosenberoer so long as the students were allowed to opt out. Without an 
opt out remedy, it would constitute compelled speech (Brief for the National Legal 
Foundation, Southworth). According to the National Legal Foundation, the issue 
was not forum-creation, but instead, a simple proposition stated by Thomas 
Jefferson and reiterated in Abood by the U.S. Supreme Court, T o  compel a man 
to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he 
disbelieves is sinful and tyrannical” (Abood, at 234, n.31).
Owen Brennen Rounds submitted amicus curiae brief to the Court. 
Rounds previously challenged mandatory student fees at the University of 
Oregon. He argued that the compelled funding should be found unconstitutional 
because there were less restrictive means for govemment to pursue its 
educational goals than to require students to pay for political positions with which 
they disagree. Rounds further argued that unlike collective bargaining and the 
regulation of the legal community, education did not provide criteria sufficient to 
establishing the constitutionality of compelled funding. The lower court was 
correct in holding that subsidized political and ideological speech violated
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objecting students' First Amendment rights even if the funding somehow 
promoted education (Brief for Owen Brennen Rounds, Southworth).
The Atlantic Legal Foundation previously represented the students in 
Carroll I and Galda II. The Foundation’s amicus curiae brief stated that the 
prohibition of mandatory funding of political and ideological speech by private 
groups would not impair the educational function of the university as it was not 
germane to the educational mission of the university. The voluntary contributions 
would be sufficient to foster diverse political and ideological advocacy (Brief for 
the Atlantic Legal Foundation, Southworth).
The First Freedoms Foundation wrote an amicus curiae brief and argued 
that throughout the history of universities, the search for the truth depended on 
the conscience of the individual scholar to think for himself. Students who are 
compelled to pay for political or ideological speech don’t have the opportunity to 
walk away from the speech they disagree with. Further, the foundation argued 
that the university should instill in students an "unassailable, Camelot’-like vision 
-  that they should convince others by their enthusiasm and the force of their 
arguments, not by exercising the power of the state to extract support from their 
opponents’* (Brief for the First Freedoms Foundation at 24, Southworth). The 
First Freedoms Foundation worried about how the university would implement a 
program that distributed fees to organizations on a viewpoint or content neutral 
basis. The act of selecting which group received the funds would almost always 
demonstrate a personal bias towards viewpoint. A small student committee 
made the final decisions over which groups would get funding. Such a policy did
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not control the bias of the student group, thus, decisions reflected personal 
preferences and value judgments (Brief for the First Freedoms Foundation, 
Southworth).
The Family Research Institute's amicus curiae brief argued that the forum 
analysis was workable only when addressing expenses paid from the fund. 
Income deposited into the fund, however, should be screened for compulsion. 
Further, If the purpose of the fund had only the incidental effect of promoting the 
expression of an idea or ideas, there was no constitutional harm. However, since 
in this case, the purpose of the money, at least in part, was to promote the 
advocacy of ideas or opinions, the First Amendment prohibited such compelled 
contributions (Brief for the Family Research Institute, Southworth).
In separate briefs, the Christian Legal Society, the Rutherford Institute, the 
National Right to Work Legal Defense, the Liberty Counsel, the Pacific Legal 
Foundation, and the National Smoker’s Alliance all provided the following same 
argument. First the Germaneness Test from Lehnert. Abood and Keller should 
have applied in Southworth. In addition, students should be allowed a remedy to 
opt out. The Pacific Legal Foundation represented Rounds in Rounds, et. al., v. 
Oregon State Board of Higher Educaton. 166 F.3d 1032 (1999), and argued that 
the university may have had compelling interest to expose students to various 
conflicting viewpoints, but it did not have compelling interest to coerce support for 
those viewpoints. Further, the Pacific Legal Foundation argued that providing an 
opt out remedy would serve three important purposes. First, an opt out remedy 
would require thought on the part of the students; second, it would encourage
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students to organize and articulate to attract financial support; and third, it would 
send a strong message to the student body that the university respected the 
constitutional rights of all students and would make every effort to protect their 
rights (Brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation, Southworth).
Oral Arguments Before the 
U.S. Supreme Court 
On November 9,1999 the U.S. Supreme Court heard the oral arguments 
of Southworth. Original transcripts were recorded verbatim and did not identify 
the justices who posed the questions. In some instances, justices were identified 
by the attorney when he or she responded to their questions. In the following 
presentation of the oral arguments, justices are presented in association with 
their questions when it could be ascertained.
Ms. Susan Ullman, on behalf of the Board of Regents, was first to present 
the University of Wisconsin System’s argument to the Court. Through their 
questions, the justices immediately identified three different issues of interest to 
them. First, the funds were allocated through the student govemment in a 
viewpoint neutral manner. Second, they reaffirmed that funding also resulted 
from a referendum (the WISPIRG was funded through referendum, and the Court 
questioned whether such a mechanism was viewpoint neutral). Third, the 
justices confirmed that some of the funds were used or could be used for political 
activity. As dialogue continued, the Court focused upon the fact that student fees 
created the metaphorical, not physical, public forum. This led to another
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question posed by the Court as to what were the reasons for adopting the forum 
analysis rather than to look directly at who gets the money (Germaneness Test)?
The Court gave close attention to the referendum that awarded significant 
funding to the WISPIRG. It appeared to the writer that Attorney Ullman did not 
convince the Court that the referendum, where 51 percent of student votes 
awarded $40,000 to the WISPIRG was viewpoint neutral. The Court articulated 
that the referendum was much different from the public forum analogy (Record at 
14, Southworth) as there was little or no protection of the speech of the minority.
It was at this point, the Court and Counsel Ullman appeared to agree that 
the issues were culled down to two. First, there was the referendum. The Court 
questioned its viewpoint neutrality status, but also acknowledged that it might be 
necessary when such an entity provided a service. The second issue involved 
the use of funding to create a public forum (Record at 15, Southworth). The 
Court questioned Counsel Ullman about how she would defend the WISPIRG 
funding if she could not defend it according to the public forum analogy. Ms. 
Ullman replied that she would defend it as a service organization funded through 
a service mechanism (referendum). The Court pointed out that it is an 
organization that provided a service but also propagated its political views as 
well. When the Court noted the stipulation that funding was distributed on a 
viewpoint neutral basis. Counsel Ullman was asked if the stipulation applied to 
the referendum as well as ASM and GSSF funding mechanisms? Attorney 
Ullman stated that it did and also admitted that student govemment voluntarily 
viewed the referendum as binding.
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When Mr. Jordan Lorence, attorney for the objecting students, began his 
argument before the Court, he claimed that the referendum was not a forum and, 
therefore, Rosenberoer was inapplicable. The Justice O’Connor reminded Mr. 
Lorence of the stipulation, but agreed to allow him to argue that the stipulation 
should not include the referendum mechanism. Mr. Lorence argued that the 
referendum went beyond the precedents of compelled speech, Abood and Keller, 
and that the two other funding mechanisms, ASM and GSSF were more aligned 
with Rosenberoer (Record at 29).
The Court then attempted to determine exactly where the objection 
existed. Was the students' objection directed towards the way the funding 
program was administered, or was the source of funding objectionable? Justices 
asked Mr. Lorence if the University of Wisconsin could salvage the program by 
abolishing student fees and increasing tuition in exactly the same amount? Mr. 
Lorence replied that there would be no challenge because it would be part of 
govemment (the University of Wisconsin) extending its agency/sponsorship over 
the event. Lorence noted that use of tuition would turn these groups into agents 
of the university and their speech would become part of the instruction program.
One justice then noted the difference between unions, professional 
organizations and universities and, thus, drew a difference between Southworth. 
Abood and Keller. Justice Breyer said that rather than one organization having 
one opinion as in the case of unions and professional organizations, universities 
give many dollars out to a variety of organizations, in a viewpoint neutral way. 
Therefore, all organizations have a chance to engage students in a certain
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amount of activity that was at least distantly related to an educational objective 
(Record at 44). Justice Kennedy was troubled with Mr. Lorence's position that 
students have the right not to speak. According to Lorence, to fund some voices 
they do agree with, some that they don’t care about, and some they disagree 
with, still violated the principle. To Justice Kennedy, Mr. Lorence was asking the 
Court to do something that was against the traditions of universities for many 
centuries. Justice Kennedy reflected that since ancient times, universities had 
been places where ideas, including political ideas, were debated. Mr. Lorence 
interjected that he believed that the wide range of debate would not disappear or 
be significantly diminished by allowing objecting students to opt out.
The Court again posed the question as to why they should look at this 
case as being funding for individual groups as opposed to funding a forum where 
a variety of voices and viewpoints have access (Record at 44)? Further, the 
Court noted that union organizations are membership organizations and that 
Southworth did not pose this issue. Attorney Lorence replied that unions do run 
multiple candidates. The justices appeared skeptical of that argument and stood 
by the very strong distinction they were making between unions and universities.
Finally, all the justices tumed their attention to the issue of an opt out 
policy according to Abood by posing this question to Mr. Lorence, "could students 
who opt out then make a demand for viewpoint-neutral funds" (Record at 56)? 
Attomey Lorence, replied that there might be a free rider question, but he was 
not sure.
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Counsel Uliman was then given the opportunity for a short rebuttal. She 
reiterated that setting aside the WISPIRG (and the referendum mechanism for 
funding it), the other groups that were funded through the GSSF were services 
and there was no claim for any viewpoint discrimination. She also reiterated that 
the University of Wisconsin had determined that it was important to facilitate the 
speech of diverse groups and this furthered the university’s educational mission 
and First Amendment values (Record at 57).
If oral arguments were any indication, it seemed that the Court was 
posturing to deal indirectly with the controversial issues that evolved around the 
WISPIRG. The justices were focusing their questions upon the referendum 
mechanism and indicated their doubts that the process adhered to the Viewpoint 
Neutral Standard. It seemed that the Court was not going to take the approach 
taken by lower courts of focusing on the services provided by WISPIRG and 
whether or not these services were germane to the university’s mission. The 
Court appeared to be leaning towards the forum analysis as it applied to the 
process for funding rather than analyzing each challenged organization, its 
activities, and how those activities related to the overall mission and role of the 
university (Germaneness Test). There was little indication conceming how the 
Court would handle the opt out remedy.
Summary
In this chapter, significant court decisions associated with jurisprudence of 
mandatory student fees programs were reviewed and analyzed. For the past
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thirty years, the courts struggled with the issue of universities utilizing mandatory 
student fees to create the limited public forum.
Two cases, Abood and Keller, became the precedents by which lower 
courts formulated their decisions. Circuit courts focused their legal reasons upon 
the challenged groups and attempted to evaluate whether the groups' activities 
were germane to the universities' educational missions. Ultimately, conflict 
between the circuits occurred.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Southworth case. At 
issue was the role of universities in establishing their educational environment; 
the rights of students not to speak; operating fees programs in accordance with 
viewpoint neutrality; whether students may opt out of paying fees to support 
groups they object to; and whether it is more appropriate to evaluate the entire 
forum or to evaluate individual groups to determine if their activities are germane 
to the university’s role or mission.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
The Qualitative Research Design 
The purpose of this study was to assess the impact of the Supreme Court 
Decision, Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Svs.. et al. v. Southworth. et al.. 120 
S. Ct. 1346 (2000), on student fee policies of selected major public universities 
within the Ninth Circuit Court's jurisdiction. It was intended that this research 
would assist administrators to audit and modify their respective mandatory 
student fee policies so that they best comply with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Southworth.
An inductive analysis design means that categories and patterns emerge 
from the data rather than being imposed on data prior to data collection 
(McMillan & Schumacher, 1997). The first step in this research effort was to 
apply the Social Science Approach to qualitative research, using NEON and 
LEXIS NEXIS to identify secondary sources, such as journals, law reviews, and 
books, to facilitate the exploration of more general subject matter associated with 
student fees and the First Amendment rights. By utilizing these procedures, 
specific legal issues and pertinent court cases emerged. These legal issues and 
court cases were then arranged in a logical order so that the legal research could
91
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be presented in a more organized and efficient manner. Evaluation of the 
usefulness of these cases for the topic of student fees and the First Amendment, 
and their relationship to the Southworth decision in particular proceeded from 
there.
An internal evaluation (Wren & Wren, 1986) was conducted on all relevant 
cases. The first step in the analytical process was to determine how similar the 
facts of each case were to the facts of the research problem. Second, an internal 
evaluation was carried out to determine the legal significance and impact of each 
case with respect to the research problem. When it was determined that a 
specific case applied to the research problem, an external evaluation (Wren & 
Wren, 1986) was conducted to determine how subsequent court decisions have 
interpreted and applied the principal cases. Secondary sources, law reviews, 
journals, newspapers, and other similar materials were utilized for legal 
commentary conceming judicial interpretations.
Further legal research involved case analyses of all Southworth briefs, 
petitions, amicus curiae briefs, oral arguments, and all pertinent court cases that 
were identified during the fact analysis stage. All cases and associated briefs 
were then arranged in a consistent brief format that made the case analysis more 
efficient; allowed for pertinent issues to be teased out of the cases; and ultimately 
guarded against research bias.
In addition to case analyses, I attended the oral arguments and utilized the 
transcripts of the oral arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court to draw
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analogies about their significance and impact upon the Court. Telephone 
interviews were also conducted with both attorneys who argued this case before 
the Court. I asked the following questions of each attorney: What has the Court 
resolved and not resolved? What does this mean for future litigation? What 
aspects of the decision offer guidance to universities regarding their programs? 
What is the scope of the remand? Will this remand go back to the Seventh 
Circuit Court and then will it remand to the U. S. District Court? What were the 
key aspects that led you to stipulate to the viewpoint neutrality of the Wisconsin 
student fees plan? Why did Justice Souter write the concurring opinion the way 
he did? What was he ultimately concerned about? These interviews were more 
helpful in deciding how to best approach the issues and controversies of the 
case. However, I found their responses to be very tactful in nature as they were 
too close to the conflict and could not make the kind of academic observations 
and contribution to this study that was necessary. I conducted an hour-long 
interview with law professor and former President of the University of Wisconsin, 
Madison, Dr. Robert O’Neil. Dr. O’Neil has written extensive legal commentary 
on this subject and was a Harvard Law School student with Justice Kennedy. He 
was very helpful in providing interpretation and perspective to the developing 
jurisprudence. I was in correspondence with Dr. O’Neil as the remand of 
Southworth (Fry) occurred. Dr. O’Neil’s perspective and observations were very 
valuable in helping be determine the judicial intent.
Extensive legal analysis was performed on the decision, Frv. et. al. v. 
Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs.. No. 96-C-0292-S (W.D. Wis. 2000 &
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2001 ). This decision was rendered by Judge John C. Shabaz after the 
Southworth decision and represent the first interpretations of viewpoint neutrality 
requirements in accordance with Southworth.
Ten large public universities within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit were 
selected that are similar to the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Student fee 
policies were solicited from each and they were analyzed to determine 
compliance with Southworth. The universities selected were the University of 
California Los Angeles; University of California Berkley; University of Oregon; 
University of Arizona; Arizona State University, Main; University of New Mexico; 
University of Nevada Reno; University of Nevada Las Vegas; University of Idaho; 
and University of Montana Missoula. Pertinent issues, associated with these 
policies, that emerged from that decision were noted and presented.
At the time when the research methodology was determined, the Rounds, 
et. a. V. Oregon Sate Board of Higher Education. 166 F.3d 1032 (1999) had just 
been decided. It was considered a very important development in that the Ninth 
Circuit Court cited the Seventh Circuit Court’s decision in Southworth and 
respectfully disagreed with it. Thus, while the U.S. Supreme Court was 
considering the petition for a writ o f certiorari for Southworth the disagreements 
and conflict between the circuits came to a climax. It was decided that the 
university policies selected for this study should come from the Ninth Circuit 
Court’s jurisdiction as the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Southworth would be noteworthy.
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CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
The Southworth Decision 
The research questions posed in Chapter I will be answered in this 
chapter. The U.S. Supreme Court’s final decision will be presented in this 
chapter along with important issues that emerged as a result of this decision; and 
an analysis of impact of the decision on the selected, major, public universities' 
student fee programs.
Research Questions and Analyses 
How did the U.S. Supreme Court resolve the conflict 
between the circuits in Southworth?
The oral arguments were heard before the U.S. Supreme Court on 
November 9,1999 and the final decision was handed down on March 22, 2000.
It was a unanimous decision with three justices joining in a concurring opinion. 
Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court and Justice Souter wrote the 
concurring opinion with which Justices Breyer and Stevens joined.
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Justice Kennedy began his opinion by reviewing the lower court opinions. 
The Federal District Court, in summary judgment, declared the University of 
Wisconsin, Madison's mandatory student fee program invalid under Abood and 
Keller and enjoined the university from using the fees to fund any Registered 
Student Organizations (RSO) engaging in political or ideological speech. The 
Seventh Circuit Court affirmed with the U.S. District Court and concluded that the 
program was not germane to the university's mission; did not further a vital 
university policy; and imposed too great a burden on the student’s free speech 
rights. The Seventh Circuit Court based its decision on the three-prong test in 
Lehnert. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that, like the objecting union members in 
Abood. the students had a First Amendment interest in not being compelled to 
contribute to an organization whose expressive activities conflicted with their own 
personal beliefs. It added that protecting those rights was a heightened concem 
following Rosenberoer. because, "if the university could not discriminate in 
distributing the funds, students could not be compelled to fund organizations 
engaging in political and ideological speech -  that is the only way to protect the 
individual’s rights” (Southworth at 730, n11 ). The Seventh Circuit Court extended 
the U.S. District Court’s order and enjoined the university from requiring students 
to pay that portion of the fee used to fund RSOs engaged in political or 
ideological expression. The Seventh Circuit Court did not extend the U.S. District 
Court’s injunctive relief and held that the Regents were free to devise a fee 
system consistent with the opinion of the Seventh Circuit Court and the U.S.
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Supreme Court precedents. The Seventh Circuit Court refused to mandate a 
system at that time.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, in part, and remanded this case to the 
Seventh Circuit Court. The Court held that the First Amendment permitted a 
public university to charge its students an activity fee to fund a program to 
facilitate extracurricular student speech if the program was viewpoint neutral; 
however, the Court questioned whether the student referendum mechanism of 
the university's program permitted the exaction of fees in violation of the 
viewpoint neutrality principle. The case was remanded for further proceedings to 
focus upon the referendum process.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s Reasoning 
The university’s justification for fostering the challenged expression was 
that it sprang from the initiative of the students, who alone gave it purpose and 
content in the course of their extracurricular endeavors. Unlike the Smith case, 
neither the university nor the State (government) was using its own funds to 
advance a particular message. While objecting students may insist upon certain 
safeguards with respect to the expressive activities that they are required to 
support, the Standard of Viewpoint Neutrality grounded in the public forum cases 
was found to be controlling. Based upon this. Justice Kennedy explained that the 
viewpoint neutrality requirement of the university program was generally 
sufficient to protect the rights of the objecting students. To Kennedy, the 
Southworth decision represented a logical progression from Rosenberoer by
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concluding that the University of Wisconsin could support the extracurricular 
activities of is programs by using mandatory student fees with viewpoint 
neutrality as the principle for operation (Southworth). The student referendum 
aspect of the program for funding speech and expressive activities, however, 
appeared to be inconsistent with the viewpoint neutrality requirement. Justice 
Kennedy wrote that the whole purpose of viewpoint neutrality is to ensure that 
access to the forum is not determined by a majority vote. He found this to be a 
controlling principle and remanded the case to resolve this issue.
According to Kennedy, Abood and Keller were found to be neither 
applicable nor workable in the context of extracurricular student speech at a 
university. In these cases the constitutional rule took the form of limiting the 
required subsidy to speech germane to the purposes of the union or bar 
association.
However, the Court held that recognition must be given to the important 
and substantial purposes of the university, which sought to facilitate a wide range 
of speech. The Standard of Germane Speech as applied to student speech at a 
university was unworkable, and gave insufficient protection both to the objecting 
students and to the university program itself. According to Kennedy, it was 
difficult to define germane speech with precision where a union or bar 
association is the party. The standard became all the more unmanageable in the 
public university setting, particularly where the State created a forum that invited 
a wide variety of speech and ideas. It was not for the Court to say what was or 
was not germane to the ideas being pursued in an institution of higher leaming.
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The Court declined from imposing a system where each student may list 
those causes which he or she will or will not support (opt out remedy). Such 
restriction, according to the Court, could be so dismptive and expensive that the 
program to support extracurricular speech would be ineffective. The Court 
concluded that the First Amendment did not require the university to put the 
student fees program at risk.
The Court concluded that the proper measure and principal standard of 
protection for objecting students was the requirement of viewpoint neutrality in 
the allocation of funding support. Viewpoint neutrality was given substance in 
Rosenberoer when the University of Virginia feared that any association with a 
student newspaper advancing religious viewpoints would violate the 
Establishment Clause. There the Court was concerned with the rights a student 
had to use an extracurricular speech program already in place. Southworth 
represented the antecedent question (acknowledged but left unresolved in 
Rosenberoer). whether a public university may require its students to pay a fee 
that creates a mechanism for the extracurricular speech in the first instance. 
When a university required its students to pay fees to support the extracurricular 
speech of other students, all in the interest of open discussion, it may not prefer 
some viewpoints to others. The Court held that there was symmetry in its 
holding here and in Rosenberoer. Viewpoint neutrality was the justification for 
requiring the student to pay the fees in the first place and for ensuring the 
integrity of the program’s operation once the funds have been collected. The 
Court concluded that the University of Wisconsin, Madison could sustain the
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extracurricular dimensions of its programs by using mandatory student fees with 
viewpoint neutrality as the operational principle. Further, the Court made no 
distinctions between on-campus and off-campus activities. Such activities, 
according to the Court, extended to the borders of the State. The Court stipulated 
that this decision did not imply that in other instances the university, its agents or 
employees, especially its faculty, were subject to the First Amendment analysis 
which controlled this case.
In turning their attention to the referendum, the justices concluded that, 
while not clear, it appeared that by majority vote of the student body a given RSO 
may be funded or defunded. The Court concluded that it was unclear what 
protection there was for viewpoint neutrality in that part of the process. To the 
extent the referendum substituted majority determinations for viewpoint 
neutrality, it would undermine the constitutional protection that the program 
required. The whole purpose of viewpoint neutrality was to insure that minority 
views are treated with the same respect, as are majority views. Thus, the Court 
reversed the decision of the Seventh Circuit and remanded the referendum 
portion of the case to the Seventh Circuit Court for further investigation.
Justice Souter wrote a concurring opinion and was joined by Justices 
Stevens and Breyer. The justices agreed that the university's funding scheme 
was permissible, but did not believe that the Court needed to take the occasion 
to impose a broad viewpoint neutrality requirement to uphold it. Instead, 
concurring justices argued that the First Amendment interest claimed by the 
objecting students here was simply insufficient to merit protection by anything
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more than the viewpoint neutrality already accorded by the university. Thus, to 
the concurring justices the question should not have been, is viewpoint neutrality 
required? The question should have been whether the students had claim for 
relief from this specific viewpoint neutral scheme? The university program 
required viewpoint neutrality and both parties stipulated that the funds were 
distributed accordingly. To the concurring justices, the majority should have 
focused on the Southworth specific circumstances only and should not have 
been so broad in its application of viewpoint standard.
The concurring justices agreed that Abood and Keller did not apply in this 
case, as the situations of students were significantly different from that of union 
or bar association members. Unlike Smith, student fees funded a distributing 
agency (student government) that had no political, social, or ideological character 
and engaged in no expression of any distinct message. According to the 
concurring justices, unions and bar associations were organizations with specific 
opinions and promoted specific messages. The concurring justices agreed that 
an opt out remedy should not be established in this case as the speech in 
question represented a variety of viewpoints rather than one, direct, offensive 
form. The weakness of the students' claim was underscored by its setting within 
the university, where students were inevitably required to support the expression 
of personally offensive viewpoints in ways that could not be constitutionally 
objectionable unless one was prepared to deny the university its choice over 
what to teach. Since tuition payments (not optional for anyone who wishes to 
stay in college) may fund offensive speech far more obviously than the student
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activity fees did, it was difficult to see fiow the activity fee could present a 
stronger argument for a refund. The concurring justices agreed with the relief 
administered, but would go no further, and concurred with the judgment.
Prior to the Southworth decision, some lower courts were relying on the 
narrow focus of union cases and focusing upon the activities of each challenged 
group to determine if such activities were germane to the universities’ missions. 
Lower courts were also not in agreement over exactly what represented the 
mission of the university. As a result, university fees programs and the 
matriculated students were treated very differently from jurisdiction to another.
The Southworth decision represents a broad application of the 
Standard of Viewpoint Neutrality. The decision was a unanimous decision, 
however, concurring justices believed that the decision should have been 
restricted to the Southworth specific circumstances only and not be so broadly 
applied. The fact that both parties agreed that the mandatory student fees 
program at the University of Wisconsin, Madison was operated on a viewpoint 
neutral basis, concurring justices believed that the Court should have decided the 
case on that limited ground, based solely upon the stipulation without deciding 
whether the Standard of Viewpoint Neutrality was a requirement. Kennedy and 
the majority of justices preferred to ensure that lower courts received the 
message, that viewpoint neutrality is a requirement or standard by which legal 
analysis of mandatory student fees programs will occur. Dr. Robert O’Neil, law 
professor and a former University of Wisconsin Madison President, believes that 
the Court created a template by which lower courts will balance First Amendment
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
103
rights and the Court’s broadly recognized educational mission of universities.
This action was taken in response to the decisive environment that existed 
between the circuit courts prior to the Southworth decision (Telephone Interview 
with Dr. Robert O'Neil, Professor of Law, University of Virginia Law School (Nov. 
8, 2000)).
Justice Kennedy completed what had begun in the Rosenberoer decision. 
Like in Rosenberoer. the Southworth Court held that the student fees created a 
non-spatial limited public forum. In Rosenberoer. the Court held that 
disbursement of mandatory student fees within the limited public forum must 
conform to the viewpoint neutral requirement. In Southworth. the Court held that 
collection of mandatory student fees for the purpose of creating a limited public 
forum is also justified so long as the disbursement process conforms to the 
viewpoint neutral requirement.
The Southworth Court held that the Germaneness Test of the union 
cases, Abood and Keller was not the appropriate standard. Previous lower court 
decisions had relied upon Abood and Keller and focused upon each group that 
received funding to determine if that particular group’s activities were germane to 
the university’s mission. In Southworth. the Court held that the applicable 
standard was viewpoint neutrality and they opted to place the university’s role or 
mission into a special category that was much broader than the unions involved 
in Abood and Keller. Ultimately, the Southworth Court held that as long as the 
university adheres to the viewpoint neutral requirement for collecting and 
disbursing mandatory student fees the Court would defer to the university when it
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comes to determining the educational environment both in and out of the 
classroom. Kennedy articulated the Court’s acknowledgement that the 
university’s compelling interest included creating a robust marketplace of ideas 
where a variety of ideas, opinions, and viewpoints may be debated. The only 
proper remedy would be more speech not less or restricted speech. Thus, 
students who disagree with opinions, views, and ideas of funded student 
organizations may, themselves, organize and apply for funding for their own 
agendas.
While the justices did not completely rule out the opt out remedy, they did 
not impose a requirement for an opt out policy as it could be detrimental to the 
entire student fees program. Justice Kennedy said. The First Amendment does 
not require the university to put the program at risk” (Southworth at 1356).
The Court questioned whether the referendum mechanism that had been 
used to fund the WISPIRG met the viewpoint neutral requirement. The whole 
purpose of viewpoint neutrality is to insure that the majority does not force its will 
upon the minority. Student référendums that require 51% of the vote to award 
funding, had the potential of doing just that. The Court remanded this portion of 
the decision to the Seventh Circuit Court to further analyze the referendum 
process and whether it met the Viewpoint Neutrality Standard.
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What were the major arguments in the judicial process that 
influenced the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision?
The two dissenting en banc opinions by Judges Rovner and Wood in the 
Seventh Circuit Court carried considerable influence with the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Together they argued that Abood and Keller did not apply to the 
Southworth question. According to Rovner and Wood, Abood and Keller 
represented single organizations with single viewpoints and, therefore, they were 
not viewpoint neutral. In Southworth. they argued, the university enjoyed a 
unique role and educational mission of providing an environment where issues 
and ideas could be explored and debated. According to Judge Wood, the only 
remedy in Southworth would be more speech not less. Judge Wood argued that 
the Rosenberoer forum (a limited public forum) was created in Southworth with 
mandatory student fees and Forum Analysis was more appropriate than the 
Germaneness Test associated with Abood which did not apply. Judge Wood 
argued that an opt out remedy would place the university’s fee program in 
jeopardy under severe administrative costs. Finally, the judges argued the best 
remedy in Southworth was more speech not less. The Court concurred with the 
reasoning of the dissenters.
In the brief for the petitioners, attorneys for the Board of Regents echoed 
Judges Rovner and Wood’s arguments that Abood and Keller did not apply in 
Southworth. The Board of Regents argued that Rosenberoer should apply as it 
created a limited public forum with the student fees and operated on the principle 
of viewpoint neutrality. Thus, again. Forum Analysis was appropriate instead of
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the Germaneness Test of Abood. The Board of Regents also reminded the 
Court that the Supreme Court had never recognized an opt out remedy.
Where previous circuit and state courts focused on the activities of 
individual groups, particularly the PIRGs, and whether those activities were 
germane to the university's role (Germaneness Test), the U.S. Supreme Court 
opted not to do this. The justices acknowledged and deferred to the university's 
broad educational mission and then limited their focus upon how fees were 
collected and distributed and set the Viewpoint Neutral Standard for such. Thus, 
the justices agreed with Judges Rovner, Wood, and the Board of Regents that 
the Forum Analysis Approach and the Viewpoint Neutrality Standard were more 
appropriate in Southworth. The result appears to be the creation of a template 
by which lower courts may decide student fees-related litigation.
The students' attorney, Jordan Lorence, was able to convince the Court to 
question whether the referendum process met the Standard of Viewpoint 
Neutrality. Ultimately, this question was remanded to the Seventh Circuit Court.
What areas were left in doubt?
Justice Souteris concurrence officially announced the new category and 
standard of First Amendment interests. The category rests on the premise that 
universities differ significantly from unions and professional associations. Unlike 
the unions or professional associations, universities provide an environment of 
deliberate debate on converging and conflicting issues. The recognition of this 
unique role or mission led the U.S. Supreme Court to conclude that more speech
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is the best remedy over restricting or limiting speech. This also justified the 
mandatory student fee system.
The new standard for collection and distribution of student fees is 
viewpoint neutrality. But to say that viewpoint neutrality is the key to analysis of 
university student fee programs does not eliminate controversy. In fact, scholars 
were puzzled by Justice Kennedy’s opinions in Rosenberoer and Southworth.
He was adamant that all fee systems be operated under the umbrella of 
viewpoint neutrality. However, in the Southworth case, both sides stipulated or 
agreed that the University of Wisconsin’s fee programs was, in fact, viewpoint 
neutral. This new Standard of Viewpoint Neutrality deserves further exploration 
as it is bound to present some confusion among legal scholars and university 
administrators.
The First Amendment implications of content discrimination first occurred 
in Police Deot. v. Moslev. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). A city ordinance was passed by 
the City of Chicago that prohibited all picketing within 150 feet of a school, except 
peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute. Seven months prior 
to the passage of this ordinance, Earl Mosley picketed Jones High School 
objecting to discriminatory practices and quotas. His was a lonely crusader and 
it was a peaceful picketing. Mosely petitioned the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois. He first sought declaratory and injunctive relief and 
alleged that the ordinance violated of his constitutional rights in that the statute 
punished activity protected by the First Amendment; and second, by exempting 
only peaceful labor picketing from its general prohibition against picketing, the
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statute denied him equal protection of the law in violation of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.
The U.S. District Court dismissed the complaint and the Seventh Circuit 
Court reversed it. Justice Marshall wrote the opinion for the U.S. Supreme Court 
affirming the Seventh Circuit's decision. It was a unanimous decision with Chief 
Justice Berger filing a concurring opinion with which Justices Blackmun and 
Rehnquist concurred. The central problem with Chicago's ordinance was that it 
described permissible picketing in terms of subject matter.
Peaceful picketing on the subject of a school's 
labor-management dispute was permitted, but all 
other peaceful picketing was prohibited. The operative 
distinction was the message on the picket sign. Above 
all, the First Amendment means that the government has 
no power to restrict expression because of its message, 
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. The essence 
of this forbidden censorship was content control. Under 
the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First 
Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of 
a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but 
deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more 
controversial views. (Moslev at 96).
Justice Marshall further stated that there was an "equality of status in the field of 
ideas," (Moslev. at 96, n4) and govemment must offer all points of view an equal
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opportunity to be heard. Once the forum is open to assembly or speech by some 
groups, govemment may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the 
basis of what they intend to say. Selective exclusions from a public forum may 
not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to content 
alone (Mgsejy).
Justice Marshall used the terms content and views interchangeably. Many 
legal scholars do the same. The jurisprudence continued to develop conceming 
this standard, however, the distinctions between these two terms have never 
really evolved. The judicial applications, particularly in the Rosenberoer decision 
only contributed to greater confusion.
In Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981 ), the University of Missouri at 
Kansas City, a state university, made its facilities available for the activities of 
RSOs. A registered student religious group. Cornerstone, had been utilizing the 
facilities when the university informed the group that a university regulation 
prohibited the use of its buildings or grounds for purposes of religious worship or 
religious teaching. The RSO sued in U.S. District Court alleging that the 
regulation violated their Free Exercise of Religion and Freedom of Speech under 
the First Amendment.
The U.S. District Court upheld the regulation. The Eighth Circuit Court 
reversed the decision stating that the regulation represented content-based 
discrimination against religious speech, for which the university had not 
demonstrated a compelling interest. In the majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, Justice Powell stated that the state's interest in achieving greater
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separation of church and state was already ensured under the Establishment 
Clause and it was not sufficiently compelling to justify content-based 
discrimination against religious speech of the student group. The U.S. Supreme 
Court affirmed the Circuit Court’s decision in favor of the religious student group. 
However, Powell recognized that the First Amendment must be analyzed in light 
of the special characteristics of the school environment and cited Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent School District. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). According to Powell, 
a university differed in significant respects from public forums such as streets or 
parks. A university’s mission was education, and previous decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court has never denied a university’s authority to impose reasonable 
regulations compatible with that educational mission upon which the use of its 
facilities are decided. While the Court ruled against the university, Justice Powell 
made this important acknowledgement about the unique role of the university 
and Justice Kennedy would do the same when writing the Southworth opinion.
In Perrv Education Association v. Perrv Local Educators’ Association. 406 
U.S. 37 (1983), the Court held that all public owned property or channels of 
communication fell into one of three categories; the traditional public forum, the 
limited public forum, or the non-public forum. Justice White wrote the opinion for 
the majority and made some important distinctions between the limited public 
forum and the traditional public forum. First, the limited public forum consisted of 
public property that the State had opened for use by the public as a place for 
expressive activities. According to White, the govemment held control over the 
designation of property, unlike public parks or streets. Second, the limited public
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forum remained open for expressive activity only at the pleasure of the 
govemment. For instance, the State can create a limited public forum open only 
to university students, and the State could later change the limitations on that 
forum (for example, from discussing Greek Mythology to discussing Military 
History); or it may shut it down altogether (McGill, 2000). Since 1983 the Court 
has held on several occasions that govemment property was designated as a 
traditional public forum or a non-public forum. It was not until Rosenberoer that 
the Court held that govemment property fell into the category of a limited public 
forum. Under that doctrine, content-based (subject matter) restrictions on 
speech within the forum are subject to strict scrutiny; must be justified by a 
compelling state interest; and be narrowly tailored. However, a university is 
entitled to restrict a limited public forum to certain subjects (McGill, 2000). In the 
1990's content discrimination (subject matter) became constitutionally acceptable 
in a limited public forum (like the Rosenberoer and Southworth forum) when 
determination of the purpose of the forum is made. However, viewpoint 
discrimination would never be constitutionally acceptable to the Court. Viewpoint 
discrimination is the act of allowing speech that adopts one point of view while 
prohibiting speech that takes an opposite or another position (Greenawalt, 1996). 
Content (subject matter) neutrality and viewpoint neutrality are grounded in the 
Limited Public Forum Doctrine.
In Citv Council v. Taxoavers for Vincent. 466 U.S. 789 (1984), §28.04 of 
the Los Angeles Municipal Code prohibited the posting of signs on public 
property. During a Los Angeles City Council election. Taxpayers for Vincent
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supporters posted election signs on utility poles and similar objects. They were 
ordered removed by the city based on its responsibility of preventing visual 
clutter, minimizing traffic hazards, and preventing interference with the intended 
use of public property. The Vincent supporters filed suit in U.S. District Court 
against the city and various city officials, alleging that §28.04 abridged their 
freedom of speech within the boundaries of the First Amendment. They sought 
damages and injunctive relief. The U.S. District Court concluded that §28.04 was 
constitutional and granted the city’s motion for summary judgment. The U.S. 
Circuit Court reversed the decision stating that the ordinance was presumptively 
unconstitutional because significant First Amendment interests were involved 
and that the city had not justified its total ban on all signs on the basis of its 
asserted interests in preventing visual clutter, minimizing traffic hazards, and 
preventing interference with the intended use of public property.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded this decision. Stating 
that §28.04 was not unconstitutional as it applied to the supporters’ expressive 
activity. The Court held that the property covered by §28.04 did not constitute a 
public forum that would be subject to First Amendment protection.
Public property, which is not by tradition or designation 
a forum for public communication may be reserved by the 
govemment for its intended purpose, communicative or 
otherwise, if the regulation on speech (as here) is reasonable 
and not an effort to suppress expression merely because
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public officials oppose the speaker’s view (Citv Council v. Taxoavers for
Vincent. 466 U.S. 789 (1984) at 813-815).
Thus, the city was free to decide that the aesthetic interest in avoiding visual 
clutter justified a removal of all signs creating or increasing that clutter.
Justice Brennen wrote a dissenting opinion where Justices Marshall and 
Blackmun joined. While acknowledging the important governmental function of 
improving and preserving the aesthetic environment, these justices feared that 
implementation of these functions created special dangers to First Amendment 
freedoms. Thus, there needed to be more stringent judicial scrutiny than the 
Court was willing to exercise in this case.
In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund. 473 U.S. 788 
(1985), by Executive Order, participation in the Combined Federal Campaign 
(CFC), a charity drive aimed at federal employees, was limited to voluntary, tax- 
exempt, nonprofit charitable agencies that provide direct health and welfare 
services to individuals or their families, and legal defense and political advocacy 
organizations are specifically excluded. The NAACP filed suit in U.S. District 
Court challenging their exclusion under the First Amendment right to solicit 
charitable contributions. The U.S. District Court granted summary judgment in 
the NAACP’s favor and enjoined the denial of their pending or future applications 
to participate in the solicitation of CFC contributions. The U.S. Circuit Court 
affirmed this decision on the grounds that the govemment restrictions in question 
were not reasonable.
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The U.S. Supreme Court held that the CFG, rather than the federal 
workplace, was the relevant forum. Although, as an initial matter, a speaker 
must seek access to public property or to private property devoted to public use 
to evoke First Amendment concerns. Forum analysis was not limited to only 
identifying the government property at issue. Rather, in defining the forum, the 
focus should be on the access sought by the speaker. Here, the NAACP sought 
access to a particular means of communications, the CFG. And the CFG was a 
nonpublic forum. This conclusion was supported both by the government's policy 
in creating the CFG to minimize the disturbance of federal employees while on 
duty formerly resulting from unlimited ad hoc solicitation activities; and by the 
govemment's practice of limiting access to the CFG to those organizations it 
considered appropriate. The government’s reasons for excluding the 
respondents from the GFG appeared, at least facially, to satisfy the 
reasonableness standard that required such reasons be assessed in the light of 
the purpose of the forum and all surrounding circumstances. Thus, avoiding the 
appearance of political favoritism was a valid justification for limiting speech in a 
nonpublic forum; and the First Amendment did not forbid a viewpoint neutral 
exclusion of speakers who would disrupt a nonpublic forum and hinder its 
effectiveness for its intended purpose.
In R.A.V. V. Gitv of St. Paul. 505 U.S. 377 (1992), R.A.V. burned a cross 
on a Black family’s lawn and was charged under St. Paul, Minnesota’s Bias 
Motivated Grime Ordinance, that prohibited the display of a symbol which one 
knew, or had reason to know, would arouse anger, alarm, or resentment in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
115
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender. The U.S. Supreme 
Court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it imposed special 
prohibitions on those speakers who express views on the disfavored subjects of 
race, color, creed, religion, or gender. In its practical operation, the ordinance 
went beyond mere content, to actual viewpoint discrimination. The ordinance 
would not regulate the non-racist fighting words of opponents of racism, but 
prohibit statements made by the proponents of racism (Wiggin, 1994).
Compelling interest of the State in ensuring the basic human rights of groups 
historically discriminated against did not justify content discrimination.
In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District. 508 U.S. 
385 (1993) a New York law authorized local school boards to adopt reasonable 
regulations permitting the after-hours use of school property for 10 specified 
purposes, not including meetings for religious purposes. Moriches School 
District issued rules and regulations allowing social, civic and recreational uses of 
its schools, but prohibiting use by any group for religious purposes. The school 
board denied two requests filed by an evangelical church and its pastor to use 
school facilities for a religious-oriented film series on family values and 
childbearing on the grounds that the film appeared to be church-related.
The church filed suit in U.S. District Court claiming that the school district’s 
actions violated the First Amendment Freedom of Speech Clause. The U.S. 
District Court granted summary judgment to the school district and the U.S. 
Circuit Court affirmed. The Circuit Court reasoned that the school property, as a 
limited public forum open only for a designated purposes, remained nonpublic
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except for the specified purposes and ruled that the exclusion of the church's film 
was reasonable and viewpoint neutral.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court's decision and held 
that denying the church access to school facilities to exhibit the film violated their 
freedom of speech. The Court held that the school district discriminated on the 
basis of viewpoint neutrality by permitting school property to be used for the 
presentation of all views about family issues and childbearing except those 
dealing with the subject from a religious standpoint.
The Rosenberoer decision served as prelude to Southworth. but not 
without its own controversies. As mentioned earlier the Rosenberoer Court held, 
for the first time since Perry, that the State created a (metaphysical) limited public 
forum through the disbursement of the mandatory student fees. Also as 
mentioned earlier, in order for the university to impose viewpoint-based 
restrictions in the Limited Forum Doctrine, the university must justify this by a 
compelling interest that is narrowly defined. However, the university may restrict 
a limited public forum to certain subjects (McGill, 2000). Justice Kennedy's 
central theme in Rosenberoer was that the university chose not to exclude 
religion as a subject matter but chose to not fund student journalistic efforts with 
religious editorial viewpoints. According to Kennedy, religion represents a vast 
area of inquiry, but it also provided here a specific premise, a perspective, or a 
standpoint from which a variety of subjects may be discussed and considered. 
The prohibitive viewpoint, not the general subject matter, resulted in the refusal 
to make payments (Rosenberoer).
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As mentioned in Chapter II, Justice Souter (joined by Justices Stevens, 
Ginsburg and Breyer) wrote a dissent accusing the Rosenberoer majority of, for 
the first time in Court history, approving direct funding to core religious activities 
by an arm of the State; and supporting evangelism by the direct funding of the 
newspaper that the dissenting justices believed to be an arm of religion. The 
Rosenberoer Court ruling added further confusion to the exact distinction 
between content discrimination (subject matter discrimination), which is 
constitutional in a limited public forum, and viewpoint discrimination, which has 
never been tolerated by the Court. The decision ultimately resulted in a blurring 
of the two standards. It perpetuated further confusion among legal scholars that 
is reflected in current literature addressed earlier in this chapter. Even the 
Rosenberoer Court acknowledged that the distinction between content 
discrimination (subject matter) and viewpoint discrimination was not a precise 
one. Certainly, “any content discrimination is likely to have some indirect effect in 
helping certain viewpoints in preference to others” (Greenawalt, 1996, p. 707). 
“The ultimate impending impact of Kennedy’s opinion concerning the viewpoint 
discrimination in Rosenberoer (and Southworth) is that government (the 
university) controls content (subject matter), but courts may decide that certain 
forms of content (subject matter) are, in fact, viewpoint" (Waring, 1997, p. 247). 
Obviously, there is an element of confusion between the two. If Waring's 
observations are true, administrators may struggle with implementing public 
policy as it applies to content and viewpoint in the limited public forums. Their 
actions will continue to be the focus of judicial scrutiny. This implies that the
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roles of lower courts, In student fees challenges, will take on a greater degree of 
activism and, thus, may explain the broad application of the Southworth decision 
as it applies to viewpoint neutrality.
In Southworth there was a stipulation between the parties that the 
University of Wisconsin’s mandatory student fees program was operated on a 
viewpoint neutral basis. Yet, Justice Kennedy and the majority of the Court 
chose to broadly prescribe the Standard of Viewpoint Neutrality. Justices Souter, 
Stevens and Breyer concurred with the majority but argued that because of the 
stipulation, the Southworth decision did not warrant such a broad endorsement of 
the Viewpoint Neutrality Standard. “The question before us is thus properly cast 
not as whether viewpoint neutrality is required, but whether Southworth has a 
claim to relief from this specific viewpoint neutral scheme” (Southworth at 1358 
(Souter, J., concurring)).
Under its own reasoning, the majority need not 
reach the question whether viewpoint neutrality 
is required to decide this case. The University 
program required viewpoint neutrality and both 
parties have stipulated that the funds are 
disbursed accordingly. If viewpoint neutrality 
is a sufficient condition, the majority could 
uphold the scheme here on that limited 
ground without deciding whether it is it is 
a necessary one (Southworth at 1358,
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fn2 (Souter, J „ concurring)).
Justice Souter’s concurring opinion was much different from his dissent in 
Rosenberoer. While he believed that the Southworth decision should have been 
more Southworth-specific and not so broadly applied, he was not so vehemently 
opposed to the Viewpoint Neutrality Standard being imposed upon a free speech 
issue like he was when it was imposed upon the Establishment Clause. Between 
Rosenberoer and Southworth. we may be seeing an evolving disagreement 
between Kennedy and Souter about how to apply viewpoint neutrality in an 
Establishment Clause case like Rosenberoer and with more tolerance for the 
same application in Free Speech Clause controversies.
The Court has recently granted certiorari to another Establishment Clause 
case (Good News Club, et. al. v. Milford Central School. 202 F.3d 502 (2000)) 
that involves the Standard of Viewpoint Neutrality. We must wait for this litigation 
to see where the Court will go with it. However, in an interview with Dr. Robert 
O’Neil, Director of the Jefferson Center for First Amendment Rights and former 
President of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, Dr. O’Neil articulated that he 
believes that as free speech issues relate to mandatory student fees, the 
Southworth Court, in its application of viewpoint neutrality and affirmation of the 
university’s broad role and mission, established a definitive template for lower 
courts to follow (Telephone Interview with Dr. Robert O’Neil, Professor of Law, 
University of Virginia Law School (Nov. 8,2000)).
Viewpoint neutrality as it has emerged from the Rosenberoer-Southworth 
decisions has left an element of confusion among legal scholars as how to define
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and apply the standard; how to make the distinction between viewpoint 
discrimination and content (subject matter) discrimination; and exactly where the 
fine line is drawn that separates the two concepts. The Court, in Rosenberoer. 
could not make such distinctions and did not even try to make the distinctions in 
Southworth.
In the remand of Southworth. now known as Frv. et. al. v. Board of 
Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs.. No. 96-C-0292-S (W.D. Wis. 2000), Jordan 
Lorence, attorney for the objecting students in Southworth returned to the U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, successfully abandoned the 
stipulation of viewpoint neutrality, and successfully challenged the University of 
Wisconsin’s distribution of mandatory student fees by arguing that the 
university’s students had too much discretion in distributing funds for viewpoint 
neutrality to be ensured. U.S. District Court Judge, John C. Shabaz, the same 
judge who heard the original trial case in Southworth. gave the University of 
Wisconsin 60 days to create a constitutionally acceptable fee program or he 
would order it eliminated.
The University of Wisconsin’s efforts to bring the mandatory student fees 
program into compliance with the U.S. District Court’s ruling include the following: 
The university created an appeals process for RSOs that challenged decisions 
based upon a violation of viewpoint neutrality. The university created a record for 
appeal purposes, which included the taping of decisions and the use of a 
standardized form that required the rationale for funding decisions. The 
university created an avenue for final appeal to the university’s chancellor;
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announced the prohibition of viewpoint discrimination; and student government 
decision-makers were required to take an oath to be viewpoint neutral in funding 
decisions or face removal from office. Twelve criteria were also created to 
determine funding eligibility and funding amounts.
Judge Shabaz ruled that the university did not fix the central constitutional 
defect. Students still exercised wide discretion in funding decisions, funding 
amounts, and, more particularly, in eligibility decisions. The criteria established 
allowed for too much subjectivity. According to Judge Shabaz, the greatest 
complication in the case was that the university’s commitment to fund diverse 
student speech was competing with its commitment to empower student 
government to be the arbiter of the funding. The mandatory student fees 
program did not balance those two competing interests. Thus, the U.S. District 
Court ruled that the mandatory student fees program at the University of 
Wisconsin, Madison campus was in violation of the First Amendment because 
the program failed to comply with the Standard of Viewpoint Neutrality (Frv. et. al. 
V. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs.. No. 96-C-0292 (W.D. Wis. 2001)).
The Standard of Viewpoint Neutrality is evolving very quickly, and Judge 
Shabaz’s first Memorandum and Order in Frv et. al. v. Board of Regents of the 
Univ. of Wis. Svs. No. 96-C-0292-S (W.D. Wis. 2000), offered the only definitive 
guidelines of how universities must comply with the requirements of viewpoint 
neutrality. Judge Shabaz, referring to Rosenberoer. stated that student activities 
fees form the limited public forum. Thus, the implication is that there must be 
equal access to the forum (in this case the funding) and such access must be
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allowed on a viewpoint neutral basis. According to Judge Shabaz’s interpretation 
and application of Southworth. a university policy would meet the requirements of 
viewpoint neutrality when, first, the university is required to refrain from 
distinguishing among student groups’ viewpoints In permitting or denying forum 
access (to the pool of money); second, decision-makers may not pick and 
choose any speakers in order to advance one ideology over another; and third, 
some discretion is constitutionally permissible when expressed objective 
standards of the limited public forum must be fulfilled (i.e. subject matter), 
however, discretion may never be based upon viewpoint or opinion of any given 
speakers (Frv). For student government procedures to meet the requirements 
for viewpoint neutrality. Judge Shabaz offered the following guidance. First, 
there must be documented, objective guidelines and criteria by which funding 
decisions are made. Without these guidelines, the funding process could not be 
distinguished from the referendum process because both the referendum and the 
legislative decision-making processes are based upon majority rule (the U.S. 
Supreme Court, in Southworth. questioned whether majority rule compromised 
viewpoint neutrality). Second, the university must not delegate the entire funding 
decisions to the student government. There must be adequate administrative 
oversight over the decisions conceming who receives funding and in what 
amounts. Third, when students make their funding decisions there must be 
adequate records of written justifications for these decisions in order to have a 
meaningful review or appeal process. Fourth, appeal processes offer some 
oversight to decisions made, but those processes must also have objectives and
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standards to hear the appeal as well as a record of justification for the original 
decision. Fifth, perhaps, even beyond the appeal process, there should be a 
documented administrative review process of all student government funding 
decisions. This administrative review process should require documented 
records of decisions and justifications for such (Fry). Judge Shabaz concluded 
by saying, “A viewpoint neutral system for distributing compelled fees cannot 
mean a system that completely delegates funding decisions to the student 
government without objective criteria or effective oversight" (Fry at 16).
However, Judge Shabaz’s second Memorandum and Order in Frv. et. al.
V. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs.. No. 96-C-0292-S (W.D. Wis.
2001), leads one to question whether a university could adequately balance the 
commitment to fund diverse student speech with the competing commitment to 
empower student government to make the funding decisions. While universities 
in the Ninth Circuit Court jurisdiction are encouraged to review the guidelines in 
the Fry decision, they are not bound by this decision. We will have to await 
further judicial guidance on this matter. The Fry decision is appended.
Legal practitioners will continue to bring forth more litigation conceming 
mandatory student activity fee programs that challenge free speech and the 
Establishment Clause. Certainly, university administrators and their student 
government representatives must be adequately trained to ensure that personal 
judgments and biases do not dominate their funding decisions. For now, until 
further guidance is given from the courts concerning viewpoint neutrality, it will be 
a very tenuous First Amendment environment.
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Are there continuing disagreements?
There seems to be some disagreements among the justices conceming 
viewpoint neutrality as it applies to the Establishment Clause and the Free 
Speech Clause. In Rosenberoer. Justice Souter wrote a scathing dissent saying 
that the decision should not have been based upon student views in a 
newspaper, but instead, the State should not be authorized to fund a student 
newspaper that, in the opinion of the dissenters, represented an arm of religion. 
In Southworth. Justice Souter wrote a concurring opinion agreeing with the 
Court’s decision, but believed that the Viewpoint Neutral Standard should not 
have been made a requirement since the parties had already agreed that the 
student fees program of the University of Wisconsin Madison was operated 
according to viewpoint neutrality. Justice Souter was more tolerant of viewpoint 
neutrality in challenges involving the Free Speech Clause than he was with 
Establishment Clause issues; and Justice Kennedy saw little difference between 
the two cases.
Are there questions left unanswered?
The following questions were presented to the U.S. Supreme Court:
First, whether the First Amendment was violated when a public university used a 
portion of student activity fees paid by students who have chosen to matriculate 
to fund a forum for the expression of the wide-range of ideas on diverse topics?
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Second, whether the First Amendment was violated when a public university 
used a portion of student fees to fund organizations that provided student 
services? Third, the U.S. Supreme Court had previously reserved the 
Constitutional question of whether an objecting student had the First Amendment 
right to demand an opt out remedy so not to fund speech that he/she did not 
agree? The Court answered the first two questions by affirming the 
constitutionality of the mandatory student fees program at the university. As for 
the third question, whether a student may opt out so not to fund objectionable 
speech, the Court ruled that such a policy could put the program at risk and the 
First Amendment does not require that. Thus, the Court chose not to impose an 
opt out remedy because objecting students could petition for funding to create 
their own forum.
The Court challenged the use of a referendum as a means for making 
funding decisions. Majority rule does not protect minority views and such 
fundamental rights like free speech should not be left to a vote. Thus, the Court 
questioned the very nature of the referendum as meeting the viewpoint neutral 
requirement. This portion of the case was remanded for further consideration. 
The Court addressed this same issue in a later decision, Santa Fe Independent
School Dist. V. DOE. 530 U.S. (2000). The question before the Court was
whether policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games 
violated the Establishment Clause. In this case, a student chaplain, elected by 
the student body, recited prayers before all football games. This practice was 
challenged in U.S. District Court as a violation of the Establishment Clause.
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While pending the district court’s decision the school adopted a different policy 
that allowed, but did not require, prayer that was initiated and led by a student at 
all home games. U.S. District Court entered an order that modified the school’s 
policy to permit only nonsectarian, non-proselytizing prayer. The Fifth Circuit 
Court ruled that even as modified, the football prayer policy was invalid. The 
U.S. Supreme Court, in a 7 to 3 decision, affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s decision. 
Justice Stevens wrote majority opinion the.
According to Justice Stevens, the invocations were authorized by 
government policy and took place on government property, at government- 
sponsored events. Although an individual’s participation in a government- 
sponsored forum doesn’t necessarily make it government speech (Rosenberoer). 
it was clear to the Court that these pre-game ceremonies were not the limited 
public Rosenberoer forum as it was not open to the entire student body and other 
views. Only one student, the same student for the entire season, held the stage. 
Further, the student chaplain was an elected representative of the student body. 
The concept of majority rule in the election process ensured that one view was 
presented (the view of the majority) and that minority candidates were effectively 
silenced. The Court cited the Southworth decision and compared the 
circumstances in Santa Fe with the referendum process in Southworth. As in 
Southworth. the student elections did not protect the views of the minority. And, 
fundamental rights could not be subjected to a vote. This particular reference 
indicated that for now, even with Southworth on remand, the Court would not
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tolerate a referendum as being viewpoint neutral when used in association with 
creating the limited public forum with mandatory student fees.
What, if anv. new questions or issues emerged 
from this decision?
As with most U.S. Supreme Court decisions, many questions are 
generated as a result of the decision. The Southworth decision is no exception. 
First, if a case should come forward where viewpoint neutrality is not stipulated, 
will that change the way the Court analyzes and rules on the case? Second, is 
there dissention among the justices concerning the Viewpoint Neutral Standard? 
Will this dissention further change the standard and how it is applied in 
mandatory student fees programs? In order to ensure the viewpoint neutrality 
requirement, must administrators be complacent like a public facility or park and 
allow those who apply to gather and speak? Or. must administrators be active 
not waiting for requests to come forward, and determine which views are 
underrepresented, and recruit those views that are not represented in the forum? 
If the latter were true, wouldn't that involve personal, and in some cases, bias 
judgment on the part of the administrators? Wouldn't such personal/bias 
judgment violate viewpoint neutrality? In Fry Judge Shabaz addressed this 
question by saying. The principle of viewpoint neutrality requires the University 
to refrain from distinguishing among student groups’ viewpoint in permitting or 
denying forum access ” (Fry, et. al. v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 
No. 96-C-0292-S (W.D. Wis. 2000) at 13).
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Third, what if student activities fees are derived from tuition (no 
mandatory, separate fee)? This could change the status of student organizations 
from independent organizations to official agents (like faculty) of the university 
and that could make their speech the opinions of the State and part of the 
institution's instruction. Then who would control the speech and to what degree 
would that speech be controlled? What if a student government enters into a SO­
SO funding partnership with an RSO for a political event that some students find 
repugnant? Would such activity fall under the Abood and Keller precedents? 
These are a few of the questions that await further clarification.
What is the impact on mandatory student fees policies of specific maior. state 
universities In the Ninth Circuit as a result 
of the Southworth decision?
In this section, the policies and procedures often major, public universities 
will be examined. The policies were obtained from student government by-laws, 
student handbooks, and official web sites. A summary of policies and 
procedures will be presented followed by an analysis of each institution's 
programs and procedures within the context of the recent Southworth decision.
In this analysis, the focus will be on the literature governing the funding for 
RSOs that is available to these student organizations for the purpose of writing 
their proposals and navigating such proposals through the bureaucratic 
processes that result in funding decisions. University student fees policies were 
assessed using criteria to determine the degree by which these policies met the
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Standard of Viewpoint Neutrality established by Southworth. First, they were 
examined to determine if the policy Included specific deadlines for proposals. 
Second, each policy was reviewed to see if it clearly explained the decision­
making process occurs. Third, the policy was analyzed to see if specific criteria 
were listed (and the more quantifiable the better) that are taken into 
consideration when the funding decisions are made. Fourth, the policy was 
reviewed to determine if written justifications for decisions were required. Finally, 
the policies were examined to see if there was an explicitly published appeals 
process with specific objectives or criteria, for a review of funding decisions. This 
aspect of the policy would provide a mechanism for holding the decision-makers 
accountable, and provide a basis for decisions to be reconsidered and 
overridden. The general trends and significant issues that emerge as a result of 
this analysis will be presented as closure for this chapter.
University of New Mexico 
At the University of New Mexico there exists a per student portion of 
mandated general fees to support student activities. The student government fee 
is separate and is a fixed dollar amount. There are four components of the 
mandatory tuition and fee rate; tuition, facility fees, student activity fees, and 
student government fees.
The Student Fee Review Board (SFRB) recommends to the university 
president the student activity fee amounts and the allocations. The president
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ultimately approves the annual unit allocations of the student activity fee and 
approves the expenditures from the Student Activity Fee Special Fund.
In the fall of each year, the SFRB initiates the budget process for 
organizations funded by student fees and organizations seeking funding from 
student activity fees. The criteria for RSO funding require the activities 
associated with funding enhance the academic and intellectual environment by 
encouraging, contributing to, or providing appropriate services, which create a 
more complete environment for the students at the University of New Mexico.
The SFRB’s recommendations for funding require a majority vote for those 
organizations seeking funding: and 2/3-majority vote for those organizations that 
are already receiving funding.
In order to enhance the process of long range planning, the SFRB will 
recommend that organizations be placed on a status that ensures continual 
funding. The total funding for such organizations will not exceed 95% of the 
student activity fee and will not be eliminated or reduced from year-to-year. For 
start up needs or seed money, the SFRB recommends that organizations be 
placed on a "non-receiving " funding status and will be funded through the 
Student Activity Fee Special Fund. There is no guarantee of continued funding 
of such organizations from on a year-to-year basis (Student Fee Review Board 
Policy, University of New Mexico, 1999).
While the president has final approval of the allocation of student activity 
fees, it appears that there is not a stringent review or appeal process in place 
that would hold decision makers accountable. The criteria used to make funding
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decisions are very vague. Therefore, funding decisions are open to wide 
interpretation may be the product of personal judgment and bias on behalf of the 
student government representatives.
An overwhelmingly large portion of the student activity fees (not to exceed 
95%) is dedicated to the long range funding of RSOs. While this policy promotes 
the process of long range planning, it could also lock out new applicants from 
access to opportunities funding. There is opportunity to receive seed money for 
new RSOs but beyond that, there is no assurance that there will be future 
funding. The policy tends to favor the status quo. This may inadvertently limit 
the range of expressive activity.
Because of the vague presentation of funding criteria and funding 
processes, it appears that the University of New Mexico's student fees program 
could be easily subjected to litigation based on Rosenbercer’s and Southworth’s 
viewpoint neutrality requirements.
Arizona State University, Main 
The State of Arizona does not authorize a student activity fee. A portion of 
tuition is given to student governments to disburse to RSOs. This practice could 
raise some legal questions. For instance, because RSO funding is derived from 
tuition, any RSO activity or speaker might be considered part of the university 
curriculum, instead of being an independent education experience beyond the 
classroom. The recipient RSOs and their speech and advocacy endeavors might 
be considered agents and speech of the university like faculty and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
132
administrators, thus, the university would no longer be considered neutral in the 
limited public forums. Legal issues such as these could easily entangle an 
institution in viewpoint neutrality challenges like Rosenberoer-Southworth and 
Abood-Keller. It is recommended that all funding earmarked for student activities 
be deposited and maintained in separate accounts from tuition or instructional 
dollars. If the funding mechanism is treated as a student fees program, there 
might be less likelihood that Rosenberoer and Southworth-related challenges 
would be successful. Because the U.S. Supreme Court, or lower courts for that 
matter, has not directly addressed this issue, there would be no guarantee.
At Arizona State University, Main the purpose of the RSO Program is to 
compliment the academic program and to enhance the overall experience of the 
students through development of, exposure to, and participation in social, 
cultural, intellectual and recreational activities.
RSOs are eligible to request funding through student government. They 
are encouraged to seek funding for programs that strive to further the educational 
enrichment, cultural development, and institutional integrity of the student body 
on campus.
Every May, the Senate allocates funding to groups who have completed 
the application or re-application process. Applications for funding are made 
available to RSOs in September and all funding applications must be completed 
by the end of the tenth week of classes. No organization can receive more that 
$1,500 in funding in a single fiscal year.
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The criteria for determining funding include number of students benefited, 
inside and outside the organization; quantity of students participating in the event 
or activity; the organization's previous use of funding; efforts by the organization 
to generate funds or provide services to students (ASASU Funding Application 
Information. 2000).
Arizona State University, Main has well established funding procedures 
and timeline that facilitate a good equal access policy. Funding limits are set and 
funding criteria are explicit. One exception might be the criteria of examining the 
organization's previous use of funding. When applying this criteria, decision 
makers could easily draw some conclusions based upon personal judgments and 
bias and generate a viewpoint neutrality challenge to the overall funding process. 
One excellent criterion is the number of students benefited inside and outside the 
organization. Instead of quantifying interest in a certain area or issue, the 
funding mechanism measures the overall impact of the program.
A procedural review or appeal process is not in place. This negates an 
opportunity to impose a system of accountability for viewpoint neutrality in 
funding procedures and overall program/activity intent.
The University of Arizona
At the University of Arizona there are basically two funding sources. 
McDonalds and Arizona Student Unions, through a contract agreement, offer 
additional funding for student and student organization initiated campus 
programs. In order to qualify for funding the program must include, but not be
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limited to the following criteria; Opportunities to enhance relations between the 
faculty and students; campus activity programs that encourage cross-cultural 
awareness among students; campus-wide programs that recognize student 
achievement and success; receptions for visiting artists, faculty, and community 
leaders that are open to the campus.
The criteria used to review the McDonalds-Arizona Student Government 
funding requests include; A definition of the program and how it meets the intent 
of the funding mechanism; how the program will provide an opportunity for the 
entire campus community to be involved; identify the source(s) and amount(s) of 
matching funds as well as the RSO s own financial commitment; describe the 
level of collaboration/partnership with another student organization; describe the 
impact the program will have on the campus community or specific population of 
students within the campus community; provide a detailed budget that outlines all 
income and anticipated expenses. All proposals for the McDonalds-Arizona 
University Student Government funding must be turned in by the first of each 
month and decisions are announced by the 15*''.
The second source of funding at the University of Arizona is through the 
Arizona University Student Government (Associated Students of the University of 
Arizona, or ASUA). Funding is offered to RSOs who have undergraduates as the 
majority of their members. The ASUA Appropriations board is the non-political 
funding advisory board to the ASUA Senate for all RSOs. All of its procedures 
ensure fair and proper allocation of funds in accordance with the ASUA 
Constitution and By-laws.
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The primary criteria to be considered for funding includes; Enrichment 
and growth of the campus community; level of the RSOs fundraising activities; 
size of the organization's membership; its community or campus service. ASUA 
provides money to RSOs for the purposes of getting club activities started. Clubs 
must complete an Initial Funding Request form and sign up for a brief fifteen- 
minute Initial Funding inten/iew at ASUA. After September 15"', the full 
Appropriations Board at their regular Monday meetings will hear Initial Funding 
requests by newly formed recognized organizations.
Special funding for events or activities is also available through the ASUA. 
Such activities include special events that are open to the entire student body 
and travel to conferences and meetings. RSOs must complete a Special 
Funding Request form and meet with an ASUA Club Advocate. Only an ASUA 
Club Advocate may place an RSO on the Appropriations Board meeting agenda 
to request funding. The full Appropriations Board at the regular Monday 
meetings during the regular semester only hears special funding requests. In 
order to qualify for special funding, RSO representatives must contact the Club 
Advocate for special funding a minimum of ten business days prior to the event 
for which funds are being requested. Requests initiated fewer than ten business 
days prior to an event are not be considered. The Appropriations Board submits 
recommendations to the Senate for special funding in the form of a detailed 
consent agenda, and itemizing initial and current levels, no less than 24 hours 
before the Senate meeting following the Appropriations Board meeting at which 
action was taken. If an Appropriations Board Director is also a member of the
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RSO requesting the special funding, that director is ineligible to take part in the 
discussion or vote except as a member of the audience in the capacity of a club 
member. The amount of times an RSO appears before the board will also be 
taken into consideration.
All appeals must be submitted in writing to the ASUA Executive Vice 
President within 5 business days and that officer will forward the appeal to an 
Appeals Committee made up of the Executive Vice President and two other 
Senate members. The Appeals Committee will fonvard the appeal to the full 
Senate with a 2/3 vote. Decisions to forward appeals to the full Senate will be 
made in five working days after receiving the appeal. The Senate and the ASUA 
Supreme Court will grant appeals on the bases of one of the following two 
criteria: First, due process was violated; second, an issue dealing with ambiguity 
in the ASUA bylaws or with an issue of legality. New information or a 
change/alternation of the original funding proposal is not be considered grounds 
for an appeal. All appeals must be initiated by an organization representative of 
the RSO and a RSO representative must be present at the appeal. If an RSO 
has been granted an appeal and is dissatisfied with a decision of the Senate, or 
was not granted an appeal by the Senate Appeals Committee, the organization 
might file an appeal with ASUA Supreme Court within 10 working days of a 
Senate appeal decision.
Of particular interest at the University of Arizona, is the position of Club 
Advocate. Club Advocates receive a stipend and are appointed by the Executive 
Vice President and approved by the ASUA Senate. They provide assistance to
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RSOs in organizational affairs. They hold regular office hours and make 
themselves available to RSOs 20 hours a week. They are required to have a 
working knowledge of the ASUA and university funding guidelines; be able to 
articulate those guidelines to RSOs requiring assistance; provide assistance to 
RSOs in preparing and present funding requests and appeals; work with the 
ASUA Business Manager in accounting for monies allocated to and spent by the 
RSOs; help RSOs navigate bureaucratic difficulties related to recognition and 
funding; help with all university procedures including room scheduling, facility 
management, and requisition forms; assist RSOs in developing any programming 
endeavors, fostering effective recruitment and retention of members, developing 
strategies to improve club effectiveness; work to staff, develop, and enhance the 
ASUA Club Recourse Center under the coordination of the Executive Vice 
President; proactively visit RSOs, meet with presidents and club officers, and 
serve as liaisons to ASUA for all RSOs (ASUA Student Organization Handbook. 
2000-2001).
The University of Arizona’s McDonald-Arizona University Student 
Government funding program contains very specific criteria for funding. It 
provides an excellent guide for those who are requesting funding, and it is an 
excellent template by which funding allocation decisions may be made.
However, the student activity fees program that passes funds through 
student government to RSOs contains criteria for funding that are very vague. 
This allows for personal judgment and bias on the part of the decision makers. 
One criteria, the size of the organization, is particularly troubling because it
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implies that the program will reward a level of interest within the organization 
rather than the level of interest the organization generates throughout the 
campus community. Such criteria could be applied at the expense of viewpoint 
neutrality. The appeals process is well defined as well as the reasons appeals 
will be accepted. However, objectives and standards should also be part of the 
appeals decision-making process so it may fulfill the requirement of viewpoint 
neutrality. The program’s timeline is well established and written well enough to 
be evenly applied to all RSOs. Thus, it facilitates equal access to funding.
As a further means to facilitate equality of access, the university employs 
club advocates through a stipend. The individuals work with RSOs from the very 
beginning of the budgetary process all the way through to the end of the appeals. 
It would appear that such advocates are critical to ensuring the integrity of the 
entire funding process. They ensure RSOs are properly advised, understand the 
bureaucratic process, and they could identify potential challenges that might 
result in litigation. If properly trained and adequately supervised, the club 
advocates could perform critical evaluations as the funding process evolves and 
progresses so as to ensure that the program complies with the Viewpoint Neutral 
Standard.
The University of Nevada Reno 
Like the State of Arizona, Nevada does not authorize a student activity 
fee. Any RSO activity or speaker might be considered part of the university 
curriculum because student activity funding is derived from tuition. Like in the
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case of Arizona, it Is recommended that all funding earmarked for student 
activities be deposited and maintained in separate accounts from tuition or 
Instructional dollars. If the funding mechanism Is treated as a student fees 
program, there might be less likelihood that Rosenberoer and Southworth-related 
challenges would be successful. Because the U.S. Supreme Court, or lower 
courts for that matter, have not directly addressed this issue, there would be no 
guarantee.
At the University of Nevada Reno, the Student Government (Associated 
Students of the University of Nevada. ASUN) receives a portion of the tuition. If 
a student objects to funding a program, he/she may request a portion of his/her 
tuition returned which, when pro-rated, amounts to less than $0.25.
The maximum amount that an RSO may request for Its operations budget is 
$150 per semester. An RSO may borrow seed money from the ASUN to get 
started. The funding must be paid back by May 1®‘ of that academic year. A 
maximum of $1,500 to each RSO is available as matching funds for a school- 
wide event that benefits the entire student body. Any profit must be 
proportionally split between the ASUN and the RSO. The ASUN may also co­
sponsor an event with a RSO under a 50-50 partnership. Funding requests for a 
spring semester must be submitted no later than November 15*^  in the previous 
fall semester. A hearing Is conducted and each RSO has 10 minutes to make a 
presentation. If the funds are not exhausted, the RSO may request funding for 
the entire academic year. All funding decisions are based on the following: 
Equity In that all clubs are treated equally and have the same opportunity to seek
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funds; and balance In that the governing board looks to fund programs that 
enhance the collegiate experience of students outside the classroom and 
address six dimensions of growth -  social, spiritual, educational, cultural, 
immediate needs, and recreational (ASUN Clubs and Organizations Manual.
1999). A referendum process to access funds is in place at the University of 
Nevada Reno, however; the referendum mechanism has not been used to 
address the collection or disbursement of fees (Telephone Interview with Erik 
Dickson, Director of Student Activities, University of Nevada Reno (Dec. 8,
2000)).
UNR's timeline and procedures are well established to ensure that RSOs 
have equal access to funding. The other criteria, social, spiritual, educational, 
cultural, immediate needs and recreational, are rather vague and subjective. It 
does not provide much guidance to those RSOs wishing to request funding and 
could easily entangle the ASUN in litigation. More quantitative criteria, such as 
operational expenses, would be easier for ASUN to administer and be easier to 
justify In terms of equity and viewpoint neutrality issues. There is no appeals 
process, with Its own standards and objectives, spelled out in the university’s 
policies. An appeal process would allow for further review and ensure 
accountability of the decision makers.
ASUN provides matching funds for student events and enters Into a 50-50 
partnership with the RSO. Student government organizations should avoid such 
activities as there could compromise the organization's neutrality and, thus, 
compromise the requirements of viewpoint neutrality. However, UNR has an opt
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out remedy which gives the ASUN a little more latitude In adopting political or 
ideological positions. While the referendum mechanism is In place, it has not 
been used In relation to student fees for a very long time. ASUN should amend 
its by-laws to remove the use of referendum for funding decisions.
Nevada State law authorized the creation of campus student governments 
and determined them to be self-governing and financially Independent from the 
administration of the system (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 396.547 (1999). In the light of the 
recent Fry decision, this could be problematic. Fry struck down the University of 
Wisconsin, Madison’s mandatory student fees program because there was no 
diligent administrative oversight and, thus, too much student discretion in student 
funding and eligibility for funding decisions. While universities In the Ninth Circuit 
Court’s jurisdiction are not bound by the Fry decision, administrators should pay 
particularly close attention to the university’s appeal of the Fry decision. Should 
the U.S. Supreme Court affirm the U.S. District Court’s decision in Fry, the 
constitutionality of the student fees program at UNR would compromise the 
Standard of Viewpoint Neutrality and be unconstitutional.
The University of Nevada Las Vegas 
Student activity funding is derived from tuition. An RSO in good standing 
and not on probation may request up to $300 in one academic year. Requests 
are taken by Student Government (Consolidated Students of the University of 
Nevada, CSUN) so long as there is funding available. Such funding may be
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used for events, merchandise, publications, or travel, so long as It can be 
demonstrated that the funding will benefit the UNLV campus community.
All funding Is open to all UNLV student organizations that conform to the 
University Code of Conduct, UNLV policies and procedures, State of Nevada, 
and federal laws ordinances. For the academic year 2000-2001, funding 
requests must be made between June 2000 and May 2001 (CSUN Student 
Activities Packet. 2000). A referendum process is in place. Back in 1993, a 
ballot question was submitted to CSUN, “Would you pay $1.00 for a recycling 
program?” The CSUN Senate approved the question with a 2/3 vote and the 
question was placed on the ballot. UNLV students approved the measure by a 
three-to-one margin and the new fee was presented to the Board of Regents for 
approval. It was placed on the Regents'agenda and it was approved. As a 
result of this referendum process, UNLV students now pay a separate fee of 
$1.00 for the Rebel Recycling Program (Telephone Interview with James Moore, 
Business Manager, University of Nevada Las Vegas (Jan. 5, 2001 )).
UNLV has established a well-defined timeline for proposals and decisions 
to be made. Criteria for decisions are nonexistent. A publicized process for how 
decisions are made Is absent. An appeal process, or review process. Is 
nonexistent. A referendum mechanism was utilized in 1993 that imposed a 
student fee of $1.00 per student for a service called “Rebel Recycling.”
The university should stop the referendum mechanism, as it applies to 
decisions concerning services and student fees, based on the Southworth 
decision. They should also present very specific criteria for making the funding
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decisions and conducting the appeals process. This would allow for stricter 
review and accountability of funding decisions. The constitutional obligation to 
abide by viewpoint neutrality in funding decision-making should be included in 
the policy.
As mentioned In the analysis of UNR's student fees policies, Nevada State 
law authorized the creation of campus student govemments and determined 
them to be self-governing and financially independent from the administration of 
the system (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 396.547 (1999). In the light of the recent Fry 
decision, this could be problematic. Fry struck down the University of Wisconsin, 
Madison's mandatory student fees program because there was no diligent 
administrative oversight and, thus, too much student discretion In student funding 
and eligibility for funding decisions. While universities in the Ninth Circuit Court's 
jurisdiction are not bound by the Fry decision, administrators should pay 
particularly close attention to the university's appeal of the Fry decision. Should 
the U.S. Supreme Court affirm the U.S. District Court's decision in Fry, the 
constitutionality of the student fees program at UNLV would compromise the 
Standard of Viewpoint Neutrality and be unconstitutional.
The University of Oregon 
Like the University of Wisconsin, the University of Oregon's student fees 
program Is governed by state statute. An incidental fee charged each term to 
each student produces the revenue to pay for the operations of the Student 
Government (Associated Students of the University of Oregon, ASUO). All
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students who have paid the current term or semester student Incidental fee are 
members of the ASUO and generally have access to all ASUO programs and 
services. People who are not enrolled as full time students may not be eligible 
for all services or funding.
Incidental fees, collected from each student on a per term basis, are 
allocated by the Student Senate with a recommendation from the three Major 
Program Finance Committees (ASUO Programs Finance Committee, Athletic 
Department Finance Committee and the EMU Board Finance Committee).
These allocations are appropriated to finance student activities and programs. A 
program must be an ASUO RSO to request incidental fee funding but this does 
not guarantee funding. Whether a RSO receives funding Is the decision of its 
respective Major Program Finance Committee and the Student Senate.
The Student Senate determines program funding based on 
recommendations from the three Major Program Committees and the ASUO 
Executive. The budget approval process begins Fall Terms and continues until 
April. Funds are released to RSO according to the line items of their approval 
budgets. Budgeting packets are available in October of each year. The Student 
Senate and the Finance Committees meet once a week during the year. Any 
requests for funds not included In the regular budgeting process are considered 
special requests and will be heard by the full Student Senate.
All meetings conceming student fees are conducted in accordance with 
the Oregon Public Meetings Law at the University of Oregon. The Finance 
Committees establish, publish, and disseminate a schedule of hearings affording
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at least one public hearing on the budget request of each program seeking 
funding within their respective jurisdictions. The Student Senate also 
establishes, publishes, and disseminates a schedule of hearings affording at 
least one public hearing on each lump sum budget recommended by the three 
Finance Committees.
Each program within a Major Program must submit a goal statement 
which allows each Finance Committee to determine for itself whether the 
program or activity meets the statutory standard which authorizes the university 
to collect fees to fund programs for the cultural and physical development of 
students. Multlple-year funding commitments are authorized only through the 
initiative or referendum process and approved by direct vote of the student body. 
Multiple funding commitments can only be approved for services for students 
provided by agencies or programs external to (not managed by) the student 
union, ASUO, and Athletic Department or for capital projects. The Student 
Senate and Finance Committee will include the results of any such vote in favor 
of funding In their fee recommendations.
Incidental fee allocation recommendations are divided into three major 
categories: Student union activities; educational, cultural, and student 
government activities; and Intercollegiate athletics. Each of these categories is 
considered a Major Program. A distinct activity within a Major Program that has 
been funded for six consecutive years Is considered a Traditionally Funded 
Program (TFP). Capital projects and services for students funded in whole or
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part with incidental fees typically will be included in the category of ASUO 
program.
A decrease in the level of fee support for any Major Program shall not 
exceed 10% of the preceding years allocation unless the Program voluntarily 
requests such a reduction. The 10% reduction limit may be exceeded if either 
the university president or the student body, in an initiative or referendum, 
approves such a reduction. The same criteria are applied to recommendations 
conceming TFPs, except that the allowable reduction is 25%. A 
recommendation to reduce funding by more than 25% requires a unanimous vote 
of the Finance Committee responsible for allocating fees to the affected TFP.
The entire Student Senate will hear appeals to the Finance Committee's funding 
decisions with a 2/3-majority vote. Appeals must be submitted within 72 hours 
after all lower appeals have been exhausted.
The president of the university notifies the ASUO in writing within seven 
working days of receipt of the complete incidental fee budget allocation. It is in 
that written notification that the president indicates approval, denial, or 
disagreement with any portion, or whether he/she wishes to suggest changes to 
the recommended allocation(s). If an agreement cannot be reached within ten 
working days, either the ASUO president or the university president then may 
request a Hearings Board. Both parties notify the Hearings Board and each 
other within five working days and in writing whether they accept or reject the 
recommendations of the Hearings Board (ASUO Green Tape Notebook. 1998).
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Oregon law governs the University of Oregon’s student fees program.
The process is very specific and the timeline provide for equity among RSOs in 
terms of access to funding. The University of Oregon wishes to ensure that each 
RSO submits a goal statement so it can be measured against the statute that 
authorizes the university to collect the fees in the first place. This would be in 
accordance with Abood. by ensuring that the group's activity is germane to the 
university's mission. This criterion is not necessary in the wake of the 
Southworth decision because the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged and 
accepted the broad educational mission of universities. Analyzing individual 
activities to determine whether they are germane to the university's mission is no 
longer necessary.
Decreasing the level of funding support for major programs does not occur 
except through a decision by the university president or through initiative or 
referendum approval by the student body. Constant levels of funding for RSOs 
may prohibit equal access to the funding for all RSOs, especially new RSOs.
This could be interpreted and challenged on the basis of content-based or 
viewpoint-based discrimination. Since the Southworth decision, the referendum 
mechanism should be removed as a funding mechanism. The University of 
Oregon's policies were challenged in the Rounds case, which, although the court 
upheld the policies, they should be reviewed, evaluated and rewritten to ensure 
compliance with the viewpoint neutrality principle established by Rosenberqer- 
South worth.
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The University of California System 
The Office of the President of the University of California provided 
guidelines to all University of Califomia campuses conceming their respective 
policies on mandatory student activity fees. Citing Rosenberoer and Smith, the 
President of the University of Califomia System provided the following guidelines 
to all campuses. Registered campus organizations and related programmatic 
activities that are predominantly educational, recreational, or social in nature may 
be funded, on a content and viewpoint neutral basis by mandatory student fees, 
and objecting students are not entitled to a pro-rata refund. Registered campus 
organizations and related programmatic activities that are predominantly political, 
religious, or ideological in nature may be funded, on a content and viewpoint 
neutral basis, by mandatory student fees in support of the university's purposes, 
and objecting students are entitled to a pro-rata refund. Mandatory student fees 
available to such student govemments may fund official student government 
lobbying activities on student-related matters, provided that the student is entitled 
to a pro-rata refund fUniversitv of California Guidelines for Funding Registered 
Campus Organizations and Related Programmatic Activities bv Compulsorv 
Student Fees. 1999).
The president further defined educational, recreational, or social 
organizations as well as organizations that are predominantly political, religious, 
or ideological in nature. Educational, recreational or social organizations were 
defined as those organizations that supplement or enhances academic 
preparation and development; promotes or recognizes academic performance
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and excellence; promotes an awareness and understanding of the ideas, 
customs, art, languages, and social contributions of a culture or cultures; 
promotes, sponsors, or provides community service; promotes discussion, 
debate, or awareness of public issues from a variety of perspectives or 
viewpoints; promotes participation in voter registration and similar nonpartisan 
civic activities; develops personal, professional, or career-related skills; or is 
recreational or social in nature. Political, religious, or ideological organizations 
were defined as organizations that support or sponsor ballot initiatives, 
candidates seeking election, or other political purposes; support or sponsor 
lobbying; support or sponsor religious rites or services; co-sponsor activities in 
connection with one or more off-campus organizations whose principal purposes 
are political, religious, or ideological and the RSO either provides substantial 
financial support to, or receives such support from, the off-campus organization; 
or is principally dedicate to effecting political, religious, or ideological purposes 
presented from a single perspective, as distinguished from educational purposes 
such as promoting discussion or debate from different perspectives fUniversitv of 
Califomia Guidelines for Funding Registered Campus Organizations and Related 
Programmatic Activities bv Compulsory Student Fees. 1999).
All campus implementation plans must be reviewed by the Office of the 
General Counsel to ensure that the plans are consistent with the court decisions 
cited earlier and the policies of the University of Califomia. Further, campuses 
are encouraged to consult with the Office of the General Counsel whenever a 
question arises conceming whether particular allocations follow the content and
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viewpoint neutral requirements, and meets the legitimate mission or purpose of 
the university fUniversitv of Califomia Guidelines for Funding Registered Campus 
Organizations and Related Programmatic Activities bv Compulsory Student 
Fees. 1999).
The University of Califomia System provided explicit guidelines for 
campus RSO funding policies. Definitive guidelines like these were absent in 
other systems analyzed. Relying upon Smith , the UC System determined that 
student fees could fund any official student government lobbying activities on 
behalf of students so long as students have an opportunity to opt out. Further, if 
a group's activities were political, religious or ideological in nature, and such 
activities were explicitly defined, students must be afforded an opportunity to opt 
out as well. If the group's activities were educational, recreational or social, and 
these activities were explicitly defined, students may not have opportunity to opt 
out. The system relied upon the Rosenberoer decision and directed campuses 
to ensure that RSOs are entitled to funding in a content and viewpoint neutral 
basis to support the university's purpose.
These guidelines have served the purpose of assisting universities within 
the system to formulate more specific funding policies that conform to the 
Rosenberoer and Smith decisions. These guidelines were written in October 
1999, one month before the U.S. Supreme Court heard the Southworth case. 
However, by applying the principles of viewpoint neutrality of Rosenberoer. these 
policies seem to be very much in compliance with Southworth. While the 
Southworth Court chose not to impose the pro rata refund for students, it is
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understandable why the UC System chose to adhere to Smith. The challenge in 
Smith involved the UC Berkeley campus and student government 
representatives were involved in active lobbying. When students pay their 
mandatory activity fees, they automatically become members of student 
government. This scenario appears to fall outside the Southworth precedent (in 
Southworth. student govemment did not get involved in political advocacy) and 
could possibly fall under the precedent set in Abood -  Keller union cases. That 
is, fees that cause an automatic funding for an organization that engages in 
political advocacy, a pro-rata refund for students who do not agree with the 
opinions of the student govemment may prevent compelled speech litigation.
The University of Califomia Berkeley 
The Student Govemment (Associated Students of the University of 
Califomia, ASUC) allocates the mandatory student fees to qualified RSOs. The 
ASUC Office of Student Affairs makes the initial review and funding 
determination within three weeks of receipt of all funding applications. Staff of 
the Office of Student Affairs compiles the factual information together with 
recommendations as to whether the RSOs are eligible or ineligible for funding 
with mandatory student fees. The Finance Committee is charged with the review 
of all funding applications to determine whether the RSO is eligible for funding.
In making its determination, the Finance Committee considers the RSO s mission 
statement, character, or constitution; the purpose of the proposed or anticipated 
funded activities; and the purpose of funded activities carried on by the RSO in
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the past regardless of source(s) of funding. When considering allocations for 
RSOs, the ASUC considers the group's telephone bill, postage, office overhead, 
photocopying/printing, guest speaker fees, office equipment, or marketing.
RSOs are limited to only $125 in the first year that they receive funding from the 
ASUC; no more than $200 in the second year; no more than $300 in the third 
year; and in the fourth year funding will be at the discretion of the Senate. 
Publication groups receive a little more funding each year.
In order to be eligible for funding an RSO must comply with the following 
requirements; The RSO must be composed primarily of registered students of 
the Berkeley campus; the RSO must submit a current constitution to the Office of 
Student Affairs; the RSO must submit a budget to the Senate and Finance 
Officer; the RSO must be recognized by the ASUC; the RSO may not use funds 
for any activities in support of or against ASUC candidates and propositions; all 
elected and appointed officers of the RSO must be registered Berkeley students; 
only registered Berkeley students will have access to the funds; only registered 
UC Berkeley students can vote to form/alter the RSO s constitution; and the 
RSO s activities cannot jeopardize the ASUC's non-profit status.
In each fall semester, the ASUC advertises a list of ASUC funded RSOs 
and the amounts they received from mandatory student fees. They also publish 
instructions and information on how a student may object to the funding of a 
particular RSO. Any student attending UC Berkeley who pays mandatory fees 
may object to the funding of one or more student groups by filing a written 
objection with the ASUC Office of Student Affairs within 15 days of public of
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publication of funded groups. A student is entitled to a pro rata refijnd of their 
mandatory student fees if they object to an RSO (or an activity of any such 
organization funded by a separate allocation) that is predominantly political, 
religious, or ideological in nature. A student is not entitled to a pro rata refund of 
their mandatory fees if the subject group is predominantly educational, 
recreational, or social in nature. Once a notice of objection is received, the 
ASUC Finance Committee determines whether the group in question is religious, 
ideological, or political in nature using the following criteria that has been spelled 
out in the ASUC’s bylaws: The RSO supports or sponsors ballot initiatives, 
candidates seeking election, or other political purposes; the RSO supports or 
sponsors lobbying; the RSO supports or sponsors religious rites or services; the 
RSO co-sponsors activities in connection with one or more off-campus 
organizations whose principal purposes are political, religious, or ideological and 
either provides substantial financial support to, or receives such support from, an 
off-campus organization; the RSO is principally dedicated to effecting political, 
religious, or ideological purposes presented from a single perspective, as 
distinguished from an educational purpose that promotes discussion or debate 
from a different perspective. If the RSO is found to be predominantly religious, 
ideological, or political in nature, the committee will then determine the pro rata 
amount due to the objecting student and deduct them from the budget of the 
subject group in question. If the RSO is found not to be predominantly religious, 
ideological, or political in nature, it is not subject to deduction from their budget. 
Any student who objects to the decision of the Finance Committee may file an
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appeal to be heard by a committee appointed by the University and the ASUC 
(ASUC Bv-laws. 1999).
The University of Califomia Berkeley’s student fees program policies 
practically mirrors the UC System’s guidelines. Of particular interest is the 
funding criteria used by ASUC. Instead of program goals, intent, and 
germaneness as found in most universities’ policies presented here, ASUC 
considers the RSO s telephone bills, postage, printing, overhead, speaker fees, 
office equipment, and marketing expenses. The criteria, thus, is based more on 
operations and level of activity rather than mission and philosophy. These 
criteria are much more quantitative and less subjective. Certainly, such criteria 
meet the Viewpoint Neutral Standard of Southworth. Funding requirements 
promote equal access among the RSOs and there doesn’t appear to be a policy 
where funding is already tied up in long-range commitments to long established 
RSOs. The appeals process should be clearly defined and have stated 
objectives and standards for conduct.
The pro rata refund is very clearly written and well laid out. There is little 
room for misinterpretation of this process and policy. The UC Berkeley policies 
are the best written of the ten universities analyzed. UC Berkeley’s mandatory 
student fees program would stand up to judicial scrutiny utilizing both the 
Rosenberoer and Southworth decisions as precedents.
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The University of Califomia Los Angeles 
The Student Govemment (Undergraduate Students Association, USA) is 
responsible for the allocation of USA funding to RSOs. The USA Programming 
Fund Committee notifies all RSOs of the available programming funds. All RSOs 
requesting funds sign up for a hearing date and time when they turn in their 
proposals and all groups will have equal representation before the committee. 
The RSO funding proposal must contain the RSO s name; name of the RSO s 
representative; program abstract that adequately describes the program; 
statement of purpose; goals and objectives; projected target population 
(attendance); proposed program schedule; itemized program budget with 
justifications; facility/equipment cost estimate sheet, when applicable; ASUCLA 
facility to be used, or reason why the RSO is not using an ASUCLA facility; USA 
programming agreement between the USA and the requesting RSO; a signature 
by the RSO certifying that the proposal has been reviewed and the RSO has 
been advised on the event. The proposals must be submitted at least four 
school days prior to the scheduled programming hearing to the USA 
Programming Fund Chair. The RSO is required to meet with the advisor two 
weeks prior to the proposal deadline submission date, and any additional 
meetings required by the advisor. The committee chair proposes a calendar of 
meetings for the year at the committee's first meeting (which is no later than 
September 30''' of each year) and this is subject to the committee’s approval.
The calendar is then advertised and posted.
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The USA Programming Fund Committee designs a program evaluation form 
that will be used throughout the fiscal year before the proposals are circulated. 
Each funded organization must submit an evaluation to the USA Programming 
Fund Chair within two weeks following the program or event. The evaluation 
must contain the following information: The name of the program; date and 
location program occurred; evaluation model; programming funds received; 
programming funds spent; name of evaluator; title of evaluator; whether the 
program achieved its goals; cost per student; number of students in attendance; 
ratings of the effectiveness of the program; the quality of speakers; effectiveness 
of entertainment; publicity impact on the UCLA community, logistics, and 
planning; and suggested changes for future programs. This evaluation must 
include a summary of audience questionnaires, news clippings, copies of 
advertisements, and any handouts and/or documentation passed out at the event 
as part of the evaluation package. Failure by a RSO to submit an evaluation 
within two weeks of the program will make the RSO ineligible for the next funding 
hearing date. A proper evaluation must be submitted before any further 
consideration will be given to that group.
The USA Council hears appeals to the decisions of the USA Programming 
Fund Committee. Appeals are not considered based upon merit or quality of the 
program in question; USAC will investigate to ensure that the RSO was treated 
fairly by the committee and received is proper due process. Grounds for appeal 
include: Alleged lack of a reasonable opportunity to appear before the 
committee; a procedural error or discrepancy which caused a proposal to be
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
157
substantially disadvantaged before the committee; alleged unfair treatment or 
inconsistent treatment by the committee. Petitions for appeals must be typed 
and must contain the following information; The RSO s name and group 
representative name; statement of grievance; remedy sought by the RSO; a copy 
of the original proposal; a copy of the amended proposal (if applicable). Petitions 
for appeals must be filed within two weeks of the USA Programming Fund 
Committee's decision, and must be filed with the chair of the committee, the USA 
president and the internal vice president. It requires three-fourths of the voting 
members of the USAC to overrule any committee decision.
In addition to the mandatory student fee allocations described above, UCLA 
students participated in two référendums that approved the increase of student 
fees to create two additional community service funds. The Undergraduate 
Academic Success Fund (UASF) was created from a designated portion ($0.50 
per quarter per student) of the mandatory student fees in May 1993. In May 
1999, the undergraduate students approved the Community and Retention 
Empowerment (CARE) fund through referendum that provides funds (an 
additional $0.50 per quarter per student) to support the efforts of student-initiated 
community, retention, and outreach programs to increase access to the 
university and serve the surrounding community. Funding allocation and appeal 
guidelines are very similar to those described above (Associated Students UCLA 
Undergraduate Student Association Guidelines for Allocation of USA 
Programming Funds. 1996).
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The University of Califomia Los Angeles’ policies are also well written, 
however, they do not go into the detail covering the pro rata refund policy and 
process like UC Berkley's policy does. The funding process is very explicit so as 
to facilitate equity in access. One item of particular interest is the event/activity 
evaluation that must be completed at its conclusion if the RSO is to be eligible for 
future funding. Such an evaluation allows for a review process that will compare 
the intent and goals of an event/activity, and then measure the success of 
attaining the goals as well as describe unexpected controversies that may have 
occurred. The evaluation could be an excellent tool to ensure viewpoint 
neutrality and to intervene early if challenges arise.
Two student référendums approved increases in student fees to create two 
additional community service funds. In light of the Southworth decision, 
référendums that are associated with student fees to service organizations 
should be abandoned as it is questionable that such référendums comply with 
the viewpoint neutrality requirements.
The University of Idaho
The Student Govemment (Associated Students of the University of Idaho, 
ASUI) provides funding to RSOs through mandatory student fees that are divided 
into three categories: Regular fee allocation; special fee allocation; and new 
organization funding (a one-time funding of up to $250). Funding determinations 
are made according to the following criteria: That there be no violation of law or 
university policies; all funding be at the discretion of the ASUI Student Activities
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Board; a maximum of $1,000 will be funded to an RSO in any given fiscal year; 
such funds must be used for programs, events; and services that benefit the 
students at the University of Idaho and enhance the image of the university; all 
funding will be considered on a matching-funds basis, thus, requiring proof of 
income to be verified with bank receipts, and the RSO must develop a total cost 
budget for the activity.
Regular fee allocation hearings occur monthly in September, October, 
November, and December and cover the program requests for the fall semester 
only. Spring fee allocation hearings occur once monthly in February, March, 
April, and May and cover only the expenses for the spring semester. Any eligible 
RSO hosting a program that is open to all University of Idaho students may be 
considered for funding during the regular allocation hearings. Special fee 
allocation hearings may be held during December and May for additional 
programs if funds are available. The deadline for allocation requests and the 
date of the allocation hearings will be publicized each semester. No allocation 
requests will be accepted after the deadline.
When considering allocation requests, the board will use the following 
criteria to judge the merits of each; The number of students affected, the quality 
of the experience and benefits to students, and the contributions to enhancing 
campus life for all students; the RSO s efforts to raise money from other sources; 
the amount of financial contribution the RSO is making toward the 
event/program/service; how well planned the event/program/service was; the 
timing and spacing of events and programs over the fiscal year; the past
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accountability of the RSO, such as its past programming, involvement of students 
in the RSO, degree of success for the RSO s programs in the past, goals and 
objectives of the RSO as stated in its constitution; the amount of demonstrated 
financial need shown by the RSO. No appeal process is mentioned in these 
bylaws (ASUI Activities Board Bv-Laws. 1999).
The University of Idaho's mandatory fees program has a well-defined 
process for making funding proposals and decisions. The criteria by which 
funding decisions are made are somewhat vague and subjective. The criteria 
should be quantitative and based upon operational expenses to promote equity 
access to funding. A process for appeals needs to be included in the by-laws, 
with objectives and standards for the process to ensure accountability of the 
decision makers. A commitment to an operational principles based upon 
viewpoint neutrality should also be articulated in the by-laws.
The University of Montana-Missoula 
The Student Govemment (Associated Students of the University of 
Montana, ASUM) makes allocation of approximately $500,000 of student activity 
fees to RSOs. There are over 100 RSOs and approximately three-fourths 
receive direct funding from ASUM. The ASUM fiscal policy abides by Smith and 
has created an opt out remedy by stating, “ASUM may not compel a person to 
contribute money to support political, religious or ideological causes” (ASUM Bv- 
Laws. 2000, p. 2). Thus, all activity fee paying students may request a pro-rata 
refund of any activity fee monies allocated to support organizations whose sole
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purpose is political, ideological, or religious; or organizations or agencies for 
events or activities that are political, ideological or religious. In following 
Rosenberoer. ASUM will not deny funding to organizations that are religious in 
nature or promote religion on the basis of the views, beliefs and opinions they 
promote and support. Further, no student news, information, opinion, 
entertainment, academic or media communication will be deemed ineligible for 
funding because of the ideas or viewpoints expressed or advocated by the RSO.
All decisions regarding financial matters must be passed by a simple 
majority vote of the ASUM Board. Budgeting for each academic year is 
completed within the first seven weeks of the spring semester. During the 
second academic week of the spring semester, the business manager and 
accountant determine the total allocation figures for the coming fiscal year. 
These figures are forwarded to the president, board and senate. The board 
holds a minimum of one publicized student forum, held during the second week 
of the spring semester. The business manager explains the budgeting 
procedures and the board presents categorical funding percentages at this 
student forum. The board then categorizes every ASUM RSO into one of the 
following funding categories: Interest organizations - groups that provide 
education and activities centered around a specific idea or area of interest; 
academic/honors organizations -  groups that provide enhancement in a field or 
study by providing a specific service or support to students involved in that field 
or area of study; ASUM administrative agency/student service organizations -  
groups that provide service to the campus or community and may develop skills
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used when perfomning the service; sports organizations -  groups that provide 
recreation primarily for students at the university; student support organizations -  
groups that provide support for minority students on campus and/or ethnic or 
cultural celebration or education of underrepresented groups; and music 
organizations. All budget requests are due at the end of the third academic week 
of spring semester. The executive proposes the overall budget to the Board with 
the advice of the vice president and business manager. A minimum of three 
formal lobbying sessions is scheduled in advance for the fifth academic week. 
Each organization is then scheduled for 10 minutes to explain their respective 
budget requests. A minimum of one hour informal lobbying occurs after each 
night of formal lobbying. All budgeting decisions are made in accordance with 
the open meeting laws and the order by which the categories described above is 
selected by lottery (ASUM Fiscal Policv. 2000).
The University of Montana-Missoula's funding program is grounded upon 
the Smith and Rosenberoer decisions in that it offers an opt out remedy to 
objecting students and will not deny funding to RSOs that are religious in nature 
or promote religious views. This opt out policy is strictly voluntary and could be 
eliminated with a statement of commitment in the fiscal policy to base all funding 
decisions on the viewpoint neutrality requirement established in Rosenberoer 
and Southworth. The process by which funding is decided is very specific and 
timelines are well defined. Such information is the best way to promote equity 
access to funding for all RSOs. The appeals process is not presented in the 
university's policies and procedures. The appeals process, which has stated
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objectives and standards for its conduct, would provide critical information to 
RSOs that are making proposals and provide some form of review process that 
would also ensure accountability of the decision makers.
Summary
Student governance is a long respected tradition in higher education. Like 
the student-related activities, student govemment representation, participating in 
the management of student activities fees, and ultimately making the funding 
decisions represent valuable educational experiences beyond the classroom. If 
university policies and procedures do not adhere to the Standard of Viewpoint 
Neutrality, the tradition of student governance could be placed in jeopardy. Add 
to this the fact that the Standard of Viewpoint Neutrality is still very vague, 
confusing and, thus, controversial. It makes it all the more critical that public 
universities establish well defined and published processes for funding objectives 
and criteria, making funding decisions, appeals with objectives and criteria, and 
administrative reviews. Requiring RSOs to evaluate each funded event for intent 
and impact would provide further information that could be used in performing 
administrative oversight functions. Such processes should be predictable and 
offer guidelines by which RSOs may create their funding proposals. The student 
govemment organizations must ensure that they strictly adhere to timelines and 
the stated objectives and criteria for their funding decisions as well as publish a 
record of justifications for such decisions. Because there is always a chance that 
student decision-makers may base their decisions on personal judgment or bias.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
164
an effective appeal process, based on objectives and criteria, and an on-going 
administrative review process will offer opportunities to ensure equal access to 
funding (the Rosenbercer limited public forum) and that the Standard of 
Viewpoint Neutrality is satisfied.
Universities that derive student activity fees from tuition should be mindful 
that a funded RSO’s political or ideological speech could be linked to the 
university by identifying an RSO as an official agent of the university, much like a 
faculty member. All student activity fees should be separated from instructional 
funding; and student fee allocations processes should ensure equity in access 
and viewpoint neutrality.
Universities should carefully consider how to best assign staff who assist 
RSOs through the bureaucratic funding process. The more RSOs understand 
and can positively predict the funding process as well as understand the criteria 
by which decisions are made, the less likely litigation will occur.
In Southworth. the U.S. Supreme Court did not impose an opt out remedy 
for objecting students as it could place extreme administrative burden upon the 
funding program. However, if the student government chooses to forego 
viewpoint neutrality in funding decisions and (as in Southworth). instead, chooses 
to engage in political speech and lobbying efforts, it is wise to allow for an opt out 
remedy for objecting students. This recommendation should also be applied to 
those student govemments that enter into a 50-50 partnership in campus events 
with an RSO. Such partnerships could entangle the student government in
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political speech and advocacy, undermining their obligation to act in a viewpoint 
neutral manner.
Those institutions that have the referendum mechanism in place should 
refrain from that practice in association with student fees. In light of the recent 
Fry Santa Fe decisions, without well-defined objectives and criteria for funding, 
and assertive administrative oversight procedures, the entire legislative funding 
process (also based upon majority rule) might be interpreted as sacrificing 
viewpoint neutrality as well.
Chancellors, presidents, and regents at the system level should provide 
explicit guidance to all state institutions that will promote compliance with 
Southworth and Rosenbercer. This will ensure consistency throughout the state. 
The best available resource for the review process is the guidance provided by 
the University of California System to all its campuses throughout the State. This 
guidance represents administrative policy that removes the opportunity for 
discretion.
Finally, it is imperative that student services administrators, university 
legal staff, and the student be adequately trained concerning the Southworth 
decision and the Standard of Viewpoint Neutrality. If university policies and 
procedures do not adhere to the Standard of Viewpoint Neutrality, the tradition of 
student governance could be placed in jeopardy. Courts will not tolerate 
personal discretions in the decision-making process and may revoke student 
authority altogether. A recent example is the F ^  decision. Judge John C. 
Shabaz ruled that the University of Wisconsin’s mandatory student fees program
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was unconstitutional because the level of student government’s discretion in 
determining funding, funding eligibility, and funding amounts compromised the 
Standard of Viewpoint Neutrality (Frv. et. al. v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of 
Wis. Svs.. No. 96-C-0292-S (W.D. Wis. 2001)).
What should administrators do to come into compliance with 
the Southworth decision/precedent?
Administrators should carefully review all policies pertaining to the 
collection and disbursement of mandatory student fees in order to provide 
appropriate safeguards and procedures to minimize constitutional infringements 
upon student rights. They should also provide extensive training to student 
representatives and student service administrators to ensure that they 
understand the required Standard of Viewpoint Neutrality.
Administrators should consult legal counsel to validate the institution’s 
mandatory student fees program policy once it has evolved. If fees are derived 
from tuition, administrators should ensure that the portions of tuition that 
constitute student activity fees are deposited in separate accounts. While not 
completely clear at this time, the institution probably would stand a better chance 
in litigation if the binding is treated as a student activity fee that is separate from 
the tuition. By doing this, the university and student government would maintain 
a posture of neutrality.
Administrators should carefully review and monitor the agendas of the 
student government. Students become members of the student government
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when they pay their fees. If student government is engaged in its own political 
activity and lobbying, student fees could be challenged as compelled on 
condition of matriculation. This could place such funding under the 
Germaneness Test of Abood and Keller and would involve strict scrutiny of 
student government activities. Where student govemments engage in political 
speech and lobbying efforts, student fee programs should offer an opt out 
remedy to objecting students.
Student government advisors must ensure that when student government 
representatives are engaged in the funding decision-making process, they are 
not making personal judgments about the viewpoint of the group requesting 
funding. This necessitates a more diligent administrative oversight process. 
Administrators should work with student government representatives to publish a 
timeline for receipt of proposals; adequately explain the bureaucratic process for 
funding decisions; and ensure that all RSOs are treated equably. Administrators 
and student government representatives should establish criteria for funding 
eligibility and awards. The criteria would also serve as benchmarks in the appeal 
processes and regular administrative reviews. By using the criteria, decision 
makers can explain the reason for their decisions and, thus, be held accountable. 
Finally, the referendum process should not be used for funding decisions. Rule 
by a majority compromises the Standard of Viewpoint Neutrality.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary of the Southworth Decision 
The Southworth decision established a new category where the U.S. 
Supreme Court recognizes and defers to the broad, educational mission of the 
university. The decision also established a standard known as the Standard of 
Viewpoint Neutrality. The decision was unanimous; however, concurring justices 
argued that the decision should have been restricted to the issues specific to 
Southworth. Because the parties stipulated that the mandatory student fees 
program at the University of Wisconsin, Madison was operated on a viewpoint 
neutral basis, the concurring justices argued that the Court should have decided 
the case on that limited ground, based solely upon the stipulation, without 
announcing whether the Standard of Viewpoint Neutrality was a requirement. 
Kennedy and the majority of justices preferred to ensure that lower courts 
received the message that viewpoint neutrality is now a requirement or standard 
by which the jurisprudence of mandatory student fees programs will be 
assessed. Dr. Robert O’Neil, law professor and a former University of Wisconsin 
Madison President, believes that the Court created a template by which lower 
courts will balance First Amendment rights and the Court’s broadly recognized
168
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educational mission of universities. This action was most likely taken in 
response to the decisive environment that existed among the circuit courts prior 
to the Southworth decision.
As in Rosenberoer. the Southworth Court held that the student fees 
created a Rosenbercer limited public forum. In Rosenbercer. the Court held that 
disbursement of mandatory student fees within the limited public forum must 
conform to the viewpoint neutral requirement. In Southworth. the Court held that 
collection of mandatory student fees for the purpose of creating a limited public 
forum is justified so long as the disbursement process conforms to the viewpoint 
neutral requirement.
The Southworth Court held that the Germaneness Test of Abood and 
Keller was not the appropriate standard forjudging student fee disbursements. 
Previous lower court decisions had relied upon Abood and Keller and focused 
upon each group that received funding to determine if that particular group's 
activities were germane to the university’s mission. In Southworth. the Court 
held that the applicable Standard was Viewpoint Neutrality and they opted to 
place the university’s role or mission into a special category that was much 
broader than the unions involved in Abood and Keller.
Ultimately, the Southworth Court held that as long as the university 
adheres to the viewpoint neutral requirement for collecting and disbursing 
mandatory student fees, the Court would defer to the university when it comes to 
determining the educational environment both in and out of the classroom. 
Kennedy articulated the Court's acknowledgement that the university’s
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compelling interest included creating a robust marketplace of ideas where a 
variety of ideas, opinions, and viewpoints may be debated. Thus, the only proper 
remedy would be more speech, not less or restricted speech. Those students 
who disagree with opinions, views, and ideas of funded student organizations 
may organize, apply for and receive funding for their own agendas.
While the Court did not completely rule out the opt out remedy, the 
justices decided not to impose a constitutional requirement for an opt out policy 
as it could be detrimental to the entire student fees program. Justice Kennedy 
said. The First Amendment does not require the university to put the program at 
risk” (Southworth at 1356). The Seventh Circuit Court had previously ruled that 
any opt out remedy may not include a refund as the taking of students' money, 
even for a short period of time, would violate their First Amendment rights. The 
U.S. Supreme Court did not address this in the Southworth opinion. Thus, it is 
implied that opting out prior to fee payment is not required at this time 
(Telephone Interview with Dr. Robert O’Neil, Professor of Law, University of 
Virginia Law School (Nov. 8, 2000)).
The students’ attorney, Jordan Lorence, was able to convince the Court to 
question whether the referendum mechanism that had been used to fund the 
WISPIRG met the viewpoint neutral requirement. The whole purpose of 
viewpoint neutrality is to ensure that the majority cannot force its will upon the 
minority. Student référendums that require 51% of the vote to award funding had 
the potential of doing just that. The Court ultimately remanded this portion of the 
decision to the Seventh Circuit Court to further analyze the referendum process
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and determine whether it met the Viewpoint Neutrality Standard. In light of the 
Santa Fe decision, the referendum mechanism for funding RSOs should be 
abandoned.
The two dissenting en banc opinions by Judges Rovner and Wood in the 
Seventh Circuit Court were in tune with the U.S. Supreme Court. Together they 
argued that Abood and Keller did not apply to the Southworth question. 
According to Rovner and Wood, Abood and Keller represented single 
organizations with single viewpoints and, therefore, they were not viewpoint 
neutral. In Southworth. they argued, the university enjoyed a unique role and 
educational mission of providing an environment where issues and ideas could 
be explored and debated. According to Judge Wood, the only remedy in 
Southworth would be more speech, not less. Judge Wood also argued that the 
Rosenberoer forum (a limited public forum) was created in Southworth with 
mandatory student fees. Therefore, the Germaneness Test associated with 
Abood did not apply. Judge Wood argued that an opt out remedy would place 
the university's fee program in jeopardy under severe administrative costs. 
Review of these opinions may be of assistance to administrators wishing further 
discussion of the issue beyond Justice Kennedy's terse opinion.
In the brief for the petitioners, attomeys for the Board of Regents echoed 
Judges Rovner and Wood's arguments that Abood and Keller did not apply in 
Southworth. The Board of Regents argued that Rosenberoer should apply as it 
created a limited public forum with the mandatory student fees and operated on 
the principle of viewpoint neutrality. Thus, again, forum analysis was appropriate
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instead of the strict scrutiny associated with the Germaneness Test of Abood. 
The Board of Regents also reminded the Court that there had never been a 
recognized opt out remedy by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Viewpoint neutrality as it has emerged from the Rosenberoer-Southworth 
decisions has left an element of confusion among legal scholars as how to define 
and apply the standard. For example, when and how must the policy make the 
distinction between viewpoint discrimination and content (subject matter) 
discrimination? Where is the fine line drawn that separates the two concepts? 
For now, the recent Fry decision offers excellent guidelines to administrators for 
ensuring that their respective student fee programs meet the requirement of 
viewpoint neutrality. Most specifically. Judge Shabaz in Fry has made it very 
clear that there must be adequate oversight over the student government's 
decision-making process to ensure that personal biases and discretions do not 
dominate the funding process. However, because this standard is still evolving, 
university administrators will continue to work in an environment of confusion as 
they create the limited public forums with mandatory student fees and try to 
ensure that such programs meet the viewpoint neutral requirement imposed by 
the Southworth Court.
Recommendations to Administrators 
One thing is for certain concerning viewpoint neutrality. If university 
policies and procedures do not adhere to the Standard of Viewpoint Neutrality, 
the tradition of student govemance could be placed in jeopardy. Courts will
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either do away with mandatory student fees programs all together or they may 
transfer the funding authority from student govemments to university 
administrators. Unfortunately, the Standard of Viewpoint Neutrality is still very 
vague, confusing and, thus, controversial. It makes it all the more critical that 
public universities establish well defined and published processes for funding, 
objectives and criteria for funding decisions, how and when funding decisions are 
made, appeal processes with objectives and criteria, and administrative reviews. 
Such processes should be predictable and offer guidelines by which RSOs may 
create their funding proposals. The student government organizations must 
strictly adhere to those timelines and the stated objectives and criteria for their 
funding decisions. They must publish records of decisions made and 
justifications for each. Because there is always a chance that student decision­
makers may base their decisions on viewpoint or biases, an effective appeals 
process must be in place, based on objectives, criteria, and the original record of 
decisions. Finally, there should be a diligent administrative review process to 
ensure equal access to funding (the Rosenbercer limited public forum, and to 
monitor student govemment representatives' decisions so that the Standard of 
Viewpoint Neutrality is satisfied.
Universities that derive student activity fees from tuition should be mindful 
that a funded RSO s political or ideological speech could be linked to the 
university by identifying an RSO as an official agent of the university, much like a 
faculty member. All student activity fees should be separated from instructional
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funding; and student fee allocation processes should reflect the processes 
described above to ensure equity in access and viewpoint neutrality.
Universities should carefully consider how to best assign staff who can 
assist RSOs through the bureaucratic funding process. The more RSOs 
understand and can positively predict the funding process as well as understand 
the criteria by which decisions are made, the least likely litigation will occur. The 
University of Arizona model should be reviewed and considered.
In Southworth. the U.S. Supreme Court chose not to impose an opt out 
remedy for objecting students as it could place extreme administrative burden 
upon the funding program. However, if the student govemment chooses not to 
be a neutral funding source (as in Southworth). but instead chooses to engage in 
political speech and lobbying efforts (as in Smith), it is recommended that an opt 
out remedy be offered to objecting students. This recommendation should also 
be applied to those student govemments that enter into a 50-50 partnership in 
campus events with RSOs. Such partnerships could entangle the student 
govemment in political speech and advocacy.
Those institutions that have the referendum mechanism as a means to 
allocate student fees should abandon that process. The Court in Southworth 
questioned whether a vote of the majority compromises viewpoint neutrality in 
that it does not protect the minority's voice. The Santa Fe decision seems to be 
a confirmation that the Court will not tolerate use of the vote in free speech 
issues. Further, in light of the recent Fry decision, without well-defined objectives
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and criteria for funding, the entire legislative funding process (also based upon 
majority rule) might be interpreted as sacrificing viewpoint neutrality as well.
Chancellors, presidents, regents at the system level should provide 
explicit guidance to all state institutions that will promote compliance with 
Southworth and Rosenberoer. This will ensure consistency throughout the state.
I would suggest that all system level officers review the directives provided by the 
University of California System to all its campuses throughout the State. It is 
imperative that presidents, student services and academic administrators, 
system legal staff, and the student government representatives receive adequate 
training conceming the Southworth decision and the Standard of Viewpoint 
Neutrality so that adequate, constitutionally sanctioned student fee policies can 
be constructed and implemented.
Certainly, it is important that universities spend time reviewing their 
policies to ensure that they are current with the recent Southworth decision, and 
that the processes associated with funding criteria, making the funding decisions, 
and the appeals processes are explicit and functional. Administrators should use 
the Fry decisions as a benchmark by which to review and modify their respective 
programs.
Recommendations for Further Research 
The illusive concept of viewpoint neutrality will provide ample opportunity 
for further research. There seems to be some dissention within the Court over 
viewpoint neutrality as it applies to the Establishment Clause and the Free
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Speech Clause. In Rosenberoer. Justice Bouter wrote a scathing dissent saying 
that the decision should not have been based upon student views in a 
newspaper, but instead, the State should not be authorized to fund a student 
newspaper that, to the dissenters, represented an arm of religion. In Southworth. 
Justice Souter wrote a concurring opinion agreeing with the Court's decision, but 
argued that the Viewpoint Neutral Standard should not have been made a 
requirement since the parties had already agreed that the student fees program 
of the University of Wisconsin Madison was operated according to viewpoint 
neutrality. It seems that Justice Souter was more tolerant of viewpoint neutrality 
in challenges involving the Free Speech Clause than he was with the 
Establishment Clause issues; and Justice Kennedy saw little difference between 
the two cases. It is recommended an analysis be conducted on Justices 
Kennedy's and Souteris opinions on viewpoint neutrality within the context of the 
Free Speech Clause, and the Establishment Clause, perhaps a more extensive 
comparison could be made between their opinions in Rosenberoer.
Further study is warranted as to how a university might create and enforce 
policy governing speaker programs within the context of political or ideological 
speech and viewpoint neutrality requirements. Review of speaker selection 
policies may be appropriate in light of Southworth and Fry.
In an effort to determine how a university may create and operate a 
constitutionally sanctioned student fees program, one may wish to conduct a 
comparative study on the federally imposed requirements for student fees 
programs and federal laws goveming campaign financing.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
177
The Fry decision represents the first judicial application of Southworth’s 
Standard of Viewpoint Neutrality. It occurred on remand by the same judge that 
ruled in the eariy Southworth decision. Upon remand, the attorney for the 
students brought a motion to dissolve the parties’ stipulation that the Wisconsin 
program was administered on a viewpoint neutral basis. The motion was 
granted. After trial, the judge determined that the student fees program was 
constitutionally flawed. Where Southworth questioned the right of the University 
of Wisconsin Madison to collect mandatory student fees, Fiy challenged the 
University of Wisconsin's policies conceming disbursement of those mandatory 
student fees. The fees collection challenge of Southworth questioned the broad 
educational role or mission of the university to provide the marketplace of ideas 
where issues and opinions could be openly debated. The disbursement 
challenge of Fry now questions the role of student govemance. Thus, this issue 
is very dynamic as demonstrated by the speed with which it has maneuvered 
through the judicial system. The issue also illustrates a pressure for change that 
is not occurring within the ivory tower, but instead by forces from the outside.
It is recommended that research be initiated to analyze the ultimate impact 
of Southworth and Fry, and the appeal to Fry should it occur, upon student 
govemance and viewpoint neutrality in the operation of student fees funding 
programs at public universities. There has been some question conceming the 
degree of administrative oversight a university should implement in the student 
fees funding decisions. In light of the recent Ry decision, it appears that without 
an aggressive administrative oversight process, viewpoint neutrality might be
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considered sacrificed. Such research could also include the change-agents at 
work that are calling into question the long traditions of the academic culture and 
elements of self-governance.
Conclusions
In Chapter I, an introduction to the development of First Amendment 
jurisprudence associated with mandatory student fees programs was presented 
and the research problem was established. Some lower courts were relying on 
the narrow focus of union cases and focusing upon the activities of each 
challenged group to determine if such activities were germane to the universities' 
missions. Lower courts were not in agreement over exactly what represented the 
mission of the university. As a result, university fees programs and their 
matriculated students were treated very differently from one jurisdiction to 
another. The intent of this study was to analyze how the U.S. Supreme Court 
resolved the conflict among the circuits and to provide guidelines to 
administrators in order to bring student fees programs into compliance with 
Southworth. Research questions were determined and common terms used 
throughout the research were provided.
In Chapter II, an extensive review of literature was presented which 
illustrated the evolution of court interpretations of college student rights, 
university roles and missions, mandatory student fees programs, and the U.S. 
District Court’s decision in Southworth. The result was general confusion and 
extensive conflicts in judicial interpretations among the circuit courts. All briefs
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and petitions were presented in this chapter. These briefs and petitions 
highlighted the issues and controversies that resulted in the writ o f certiorari 
granted by the U.S. Supreme Court. The oral arguments before the U.S. 
Supreme Court concluded this chapter. A summary of these arguments provided 
an opportunity to reflect upon the justices' questions to the attorney's arguments 
and, thus, determine what issues were important to the Court in anticipation of 
their final ruling.
Chapter III outlined the procedures by which this legal analysis would 
occur. The first step was to apply the Social Science Approach to qualitative 
research, using NEON and LEXIS NEXIS to identify secondary sources that 
facilitated the exploration of the general subject matter associated with student 
fees and First Amendment rights. As a result, legal issues and pertinent court 
cases emerge. They were arranged in a logical order so that the legal research 
could be presented in a more timely and efficient manner. An evaluation of the 
usefulness of these cases for the topic of student fees and the First Amendment 
and their relationship to the Southworth decision occurred.
An internal evaluation was conducted on all relevant cases to determine 
how similar the facts of each case were to the facts of the research problem and 
the legal significance and impact of each case with respect to the research 
problem. For those cases that applied to the research problem, an external 
evaluation was conducted to determine how subsequent court decisions have 
interpreted and applied the principle cases. Secondary sources were used
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throughout the research project for the purpose of gathering legal commentary 
conceming the legal interpretations.
Case analysis was conducted on all Southworth briefs, petitions, oral 
arguments, and all pertinent cases identified during the fact analysis stage. The 
cases were then arranged in a brief format to make the case analysis more 
efficient; to allow for pertinent issues to be teased out of the cases; and to guard 
against research bias. In addition to case analyses, I attended the oral 
arguments and utilized the transcripts of the oral arguments before the U.S. 
Supreme Court to draw analogies about their significance and impact upon the 
Court. Telephone interviews were also conducted with key legal scholars and 
the parties' attomeys, which aided this researcher in determining significant 
issues and trends.
Ten large public universities within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit were 
selected that are relatively similar to the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Their 
student fees programs were analyzed to determine the level of compliance with 
the Southworth decision. Pertinent issues associated with these policies that 
emerged were noted and presented.
The final result of this research effort was the development of guidelines 
that were offered to public university administrators conceming how they could 
best evaluate and modify their respective student fee policies in order to bring 
them into compliance with the Southworth ruling.
In Chapter IV, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Southworth was 
reported. Extensive analysis into the Court's reasoning was conducted. Justice
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Souteris concurring opinion was also analyzed. The impact of the decision was 
also presented in this chapter, along with an analysis of arguments that had the 
greatest impact on the Court’s decision. The Court created the new Standard of 
Viewpoint Neutrality and the new First Amendment Category, which 
distinguished the role and mission of a university from that of a union or bar 
association. It was determined that the Standard of Viewpoint Neutrality 
represented a significant development that evolved from Rosenberoer and 
Southworth. Therefore, a focused historical analysis of the legal controversies 
involving viewpoint neutrality was conducted and findings were presented in this 
chapter.
All research questions were answered in this chapter. The ten public 
university student fees policies were also analyzed and recommendations were 
presented as to how they could better comply with the Southworth decision. 
Recommendations were provided to administrators conceming how to best 
create, implement, and operate mandatory student fees programs in accordance 
with the Southworth decision.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WlSCgggggf# / I ^
WA DISTRICT COURT 
WEST. OIST. O f WISCONSm
KENDRA FRY and BENJAMIN | | 200Q
THOMPSON,
Plaintiffs,
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM AND 
ORDER
V. 96-C-0292-S
BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY 
OF WISCONSIN SYSTEM,
Defendant.
The parties conducted a trial to the Court on December 7-8, 2000 
in the cUaove captioned matter. From the evidence submitted by the 
parties the Court makes the following findings.
FINDING S OP PACT
The Parties
Plaintiffs are students currently enrolled at the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison. Defendant has been sued in its official capacity 
as the governing body of che University of Wisconsin. Plaintiffs 
object to a policy of the defendant, the segregated university fee, 
because it is used to subsidize ideological and political expressive 
speech with which they disagree.
Cow 0» IMa dopinwnt Iw  oaan
v.MeS55T^S^to---------
Judge John C. Shabaz
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Program Structure 
Students enrolled full-time at the University of Wisconsin- 
Madison must pay a mandatory fee each semester. This fee is called 
the segregated university fee (SUF) . The segregated fee money 
collected from the students is deposited in state accounts.
Wisconsin law gives both the University's Board of Regents and 
the students control over the funds generated by the segregated fee. 
This is known as "shared govemance." The Associated Students of 
Madison (ASM) exists as the student govemment entitled to represent 
University students on campus. The ASM Student Council is composed 
of 33 representatives elected from the University's student body. 
The ASM Finance Committee and the Student Services Finance Committee 
(SSFC) are sub-committees of the ASM that review intemal ASM budgets 
euid extemal university budgets that are funded by the segregated 
fee. The ASM Finance Committee is composed of nine members who are 
appointed by the ASM Student Council. The SSFC is composed of 
members elected from the student body and members appointed by the 
ASM and other bodies.
The Board of Regents has divided the segregated fee into two main 
categories -- allocable fees and nonallocable fees. The allocable 
fee category includes che General Student Service Fund (GSSF) and the 
ASM budget. Only allocable fees are relevant to this action.
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For the 2000-2001 academic year, full-time students at the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison are each charged a segregated student 
fee of $249 per semester. Of this amount, $53.12 represents the 
allocable portion. Of the allocable portion, $8.53 is allocated to 
the ASM both to support the operation of the UW-Madison student 
government and to provide funding for ASM grants to student groups 
requesting funding. Another $19.06 of the allocable portion is 
allocated to the GSSF.
The Board of Regents has determined that student responsibility 
for the direct disposition of student fees exists only for the 
allocable portion of the segregated fee. Under Wisconsin law 
students have primary responsibility for the formulation and review 
of policies concerning "student life, services and interests." At 
UW-Madison, the Chancellor has agreed that "student life, services 
and interests" include; (l) the registration and regulation of 
student organizations; (2) non-academic social, cultural and 
recreational programs for students; and (3) those services that are 
initiated and operated by students.
The ASM, in conjunction with the SSFC and ASM Finance Committee, 
in consultation with the Chancellor and subject to final confirmation 
by the Board of Regents, has responsibility for the disposition of 
allocable fee funding. All students are permitted to participate in 
the process of reviewing and approving allocations by attending and
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participating in ASM Finance Committee and SSFC meetings where 
allocation determinations are discussed. Students are also free to 
campaign for election or appointment to the ASM and SSFC.
Registered Student Organizations (RSOs)
To be considered for GSSF funding or for an ASM grant a student 
group must be a Registered Student Organization (RSO). To qualify as 
a Registered Student Organization, a student group must meet the 
following criteria: (1) it must be a not-for-profit, formalized
group; (2) it must be composed mainly of students; (3) it must be 
controlled and directed by students; (4) it must be related to 
student life on campus ; (5) it must abide by all federal, state, city 
and University nondiscrimination laws and policies; (6) it must 
identify a student as a primary contact person for the organization 
and provide the Student Organization office with the information 
required on the registration form; (7) it must abide by the financial 
and other regulations specified in the Student Organization Handbook.
The RSOs cam seek funding from the segregated fee in several 
ways: (1) GSSF funding through the SSFC; (2) grants through the ASM 
Finance Committee. The use of a third method to obtain funding, a 
student body referendum, has been discontinued by the University 
after the United States Supreme Court noted its inherent problems on 
appeal.
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All hearings relating to GSSF funding and ASM grant funding are 
public. The committees' allocation process produces a documentary 
record, as in a legislative branch. In the case of ASM grants that 
record consists of the grant guidelines, the RSO's application, 
notation upon the application showing the finance committee's action, 
and perhaps the notes of a staff advisor attending the meeting. GSSF 
funding decision records consist of funding guidelines, the group's 
application, and a spread sheet showing the funding decisions. 
Neither body records its rationale for funding decisions. Sometimes 
minutes auid roll call votes are included in the records. The records 
do not contain a formal rationale for any decision to grant or deny 
funding, or to increase or decrease a requested funding amount.
GSSF Funding
Student groups seeking funding from the GSSF apply to the SSFC. 
Applications for GSSF funding must be submitted in September 
preceding the academic year for which funding is requested. The SSFC 
holds hearings from October through December and announces its 
funding decisions by mid-December. Funding applications are decided 
by a majority vote of the committee. Members of RSOs and the student 
body are free to lobby and discuss funding applications with SSFC 
members.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
188
If a student organization receives GSSP funds, it may not 
receive an ASM Operations Grant at the same time. However, it may 
receive an ASM Events Grant while receiving GSSF funds. Student 
organizations seeking funding through this method must apply for 
funding to begin the next fiscal year.
The SSFC uses ten guidelines, subject to change, in making GSSP 
funding determinations:
1. An applicant must be a 
registered student organization that provides 
an important, on-going service to significant 
numbers of UW-Madison students. These 
services should contribute significantly to 
student health, safety, well-being, 
participation, opportunity or education.
2. The service must be not-for-
profit .
3. When serving both students amd
non-students, the SSFC will generally only
consider funding portions of programs serving 
students.
4. The SSFC will generally consider 
funding only those portions of programs 
directed by students.
5 . Services receiving fees are 
expected to abide by all SSFC, campus, state 
and federal wage policies.
6. GSSF funding is not intended to
replace euiy reductions in funding previously 
exclusively funded through tuition or "GPR" 
moneys.
7. Capital expenditures are
provided for equipment that will substcuitially 
enhance the service offered to students only 
when other funding avenues have been 
exhausted.
8. All expenditures and revenues by 
student groups must be documented and made 
available.
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9. Where possible, there must be a 
record system for measuring the number of 
students served.
10. Services that receive more than 
30% of their budget from student fees and have 
an advisory board shall have a SSFC-appointed 
liaison.
"Service" as used in these guidelines has never been defined and 
has been the subject of contentious debate among SSFC committee 
members. A group seeking to appeal an SSFC funding decision can 
appeal to the ASM Council or ASM Judiciary, and then may appeal to 
the UW-Chancellor.
ASM Grants
Most RSOs seek funding through grants from the Student 
Government Activity Fund administered by the ASM Finance Committee. 
These funds come from the segregated fee. Student organizations 
receiving funding do not get cash or a lump sum payment from the 
ASM. The organizations must submit a requisition form for a 
specific expenditure. The RSOs can apply for Operations Grants, 
Event Grants, or Travel Grants.
Operations Grants - RSOs seeking an Operations Grant must 
apply in person to the ASM by March for funding in the next school 
year. Appeals from denials are made to the ASM Finance Committee 
or the ASM Council. A minimum of 8% of the total allocable funds 
budgeted for operations grants must be reserved for "last minute" 
operations grants that are awarded at the beginning of the
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following school year. Grant applications are decided by a 
majority vote of the ASM Finance Committee. Denials of such grants 
can be appealed to the ASM Council.
Guidelines state that operations grants cannot be awarded or 
used for (1) fund raisers, (2) food and beverages, (3) gifts, 
donations or contributions, (4) financial aid, (5) legal services, 
(6) expenses incurred prior to ASM approval, (7) wages, (8) non­
university printing services, (9) event funding, (10) telephone 
charges, and (11) conference/travel costs.
Event Grants - Registered Student Organizations apply in 
person for funding for a specific event prior to the event. Event 
grants are subject to the same funding use restrictions as 
operation grants. Funded events must be in the Madison area and 
open to all students.
Travel Grants - Registered Student Organizations may apply for 
funding of travel that is central to the purpose of the 
organization.
Board of Regents Involvement 
After the ASM Finance, the SSFC, and the ASM have approved the 
disbursements of allocable money, their decisions are sent to the 
Chancellor and the Board of Regents for their review and approval.
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Under Wisconsin Statute §36.09(5), the Board of Regents has final 
authority to approve or disapprove the allocations of funds by the 
student government. However, as a matter of practice, absent an 
RSO's appeal from a specific funding decision, the Board does not 
approve or disapprove individual decisions by the student 
officials. Instead, the Board votes on the approval of a budget 
which contains a line item or line items representing an aggregate 
amount of segregated fee expenditures.
In the last five years no student organization has appealed a 
funding decision to the student government, the Chancellor, or the 
Board of Regents. In considering any such appeals the Board is 
required to consider whether the student-proposed budget item 
requires the university to violate any statute, administrative 
code, policy or contract.
Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Board of 
Regents v. Southworth. the University's president has amended the 
school's "Financial and Administrative Policies" to include that 
"[i]t is the policy of the University of Wisconsin System to ensure 
that SUF is collected, allocated and expended in a manner 
consistent with the requirements of the United States Constitution, 
the Wisconsin Constitution and applicable state statutes, 
regulations and policy directives." Further, “[ejpenditures of SUF 
must conform with constitutional requirements, including the
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decision of the United States Supreme Court in Board of Regents v. 
Southworth. . The SSFC and ASM Finance Committee are expected
to conçly with these provisions.
Additional Findings of Fact 
In addition to providing other campus services, some RSOs use 
segregated fee funding to engage in a wide range of ideological and 
political expression.
The ASM Finemce Committee and the SSFC's objective guidelines 
for funding do not on their face condition the allocation of funds 
on the basis of a student group's viewpoint. While both 
committees' guidelines contain restrictions on funding politically 
partisan and religious activities the University's president 
amended the University's superceding "Financial and Administrative 
Policies" to eliminate these former prohibitions.
The required RSO status and the SSFC and ASM's objective 
guidelines are only threshold criteria that define what student 
groups euid expenditures are eligible for funding support. Once a 
student group is deemed eligible for funding these guidelines 
provide no criteria for determining whether to fund the group and 
its proposed activity. They do not provide guidance on the funding 
amount. There are no objective criteria guiding the SSFC or ASM 
Finance Committee in determining whether to grant funds to an
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otherwise eligible student group. The decision to fund an eligible 
student group, and in what amount, is left entirely to the 
discretion of student government officials. Each voting member of 
the ASM Finance Committee and the SSFC choose and use his or her 
own criteria to judge otherwise eligible funding applications.
The same processes, guidelines and discretionary 
considerations are used in considering applications for both 
expressive speech and non-expressive activities. Most of the 
specific examples of funding applications presented in evidence 
involve student groups that do not engage in any discernible 
expressive activity. Where the SSFC's funding decisions involve 
student groups that do engage in political and ideological 
expressive activity, such as WISPIRG and the UW Greens, SSFC 
members often disagree over the propriety of funding them. 
Attempts have been made effectively to defund WISPIRG and the UW 
Greens. Students and student groups have lobbied SSFC members both 
for and against funding WISPIRG and the UW Greens.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The University, through its segregated fee program, promotes 
both expressive sind non-expressive activities. Applications for 
expressive speech and non-expressive activities are subject to the 
same guidelines, prerequisites and discretion. The parties have
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presented several examples of the allocation process in action 
relating to non-expressive activities. However, the compelled 
funding of non-expressive activities does not raise a 
constitutional issue. It is only the compelled funding of 
expressive activities which is at issue in this case. Moreover, 
the Court is unconcerned with the political history of the 
University of Wisconsin student government. The only issue before 
the Court is the constitutionality of the current system for 
compelling and distributing student fees to fund the political and 
ideological activities on campus.
To require University of Wisconsin students to pay a fee to 
subsidize expressive speech without any protection for the rights 
of students who object to the funded speech is a violation of the 
First Amendment. Board of Regents v. Southworth. 120 S.Ct. 1346, 
1354-55 (2000). That protection is achieved through the operation 
of the segregated fee program upon the principle of viewpoint 
neutrality. The Supreme Court has held that "when a university 
requires its students to pay a fee to support extracurricular 
speech, all in the interest of open discussion, it may not prefer 
some viewpoints to others." Southworth. 120 S.Ct. at 1356. 
Therefore, the University may not compel its students to pay fees 
to fund expressive speech if those fees are not distributed to
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speeücers on a viewpoint neutral basis. The University's program 
must respect amd safeguard the principle of viewpoint neutrality.
The segregated university fee program is a limited public 
forum. Rosenberoer v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va.. 515 
U.S. 819, 829-31 (1995). The principle of viewpoint neutrality
requires the University to refrain from distinguishing among 
student groups' viewpoints in permitting or denying forum access. 
Here the access is to a pool of money. Those allocating funds 
cannot "pick and chose among similarly situated speakers in order 
to advance or suppress a particular ideology or outlook." Berner 
V. Delahantv. 129 F.3d 20,28 (l“ Cir. 1997)(citing Lamb's Chanel 
V. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.. 508 U.S. 384, 393-94 
(1993). Viewpoint neutrality requires that no viewpoint be 
preferred, and that no viewpoint is disadvantaged relative to other 
viewpoints. Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion Ctv Bldg. Auth.. 100 
F.3d 1287, 1298 (7th Cir. 1996) "It is incumbent upon the State (] 
to ration or allocate scarce resources on some acceptable neutral 
principle." Rosenberoer. 515 U.S. at 819.
The use of "unbridled discretion" is not such a neutral
principle. The Supreme Court has stated:
(A] law or policy permitting communication in 
a certain manner for some but not for others 
raises the specter of. . viewpoint
censorship. The dctnger is at its zenith when 
the determination of who may speak and who may 
not is left to the unbridled discretion of a
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government official. . . . [B]ecause without
stamdards governing the exercise of 
discretion, a government official may decide 
who may speak and who may not based upon the.
. . viewpoint of the speaker.
Citv of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. . 486 U.S. 750, 763-
64 (1988). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that
allowing government officials to make decisions as to who may speak
in a limited public forum and who may not, without any criteria or
guidelines to circumscribe their power, strongly suggests the
potential for unconstitutional conduct. Summum v. Callaaahan. 130
P.3d 906, 920 (10^ Cir. 1997) . In the absence of express objective
standards the use of "post hoc rationalizations" and "shifting or
illegitimate criteria* by decision-makers hinders the detection of
viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 920 (citing Citv of Lakewood. 486
U.S. at 758) . These concerns have been recognized in the context
of access to a limited public forum. See id. Some degree of
discretion may be both necessary and constitutionally permissible
in the segregated fee program, but discretion not limited by
express objective standards is insufficient to adequately safeguard
the principle of viewpoint neutrality in funding expressive
activities.
This Court has found that no objective standards exist to 
determine which eligible student groups receive the funds compelled 
from the student body. The University has delegated its power to
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the student government. Decisions as to who receives funding and 
in what amounts are left to the complete discretion of the student 
officials on student government committees. While appeals 
processes exist for funding denials, those hearing the appeals are 
no more bound by objective steindards than the original decision­
makers . Any body hearing an appeal, however, has no record of the 
SSFC or ASM Finance Committee's rationale for its decision. 
General and vague prohibitions in University policy provide no 
meaningful constraint on the student government. No meaningful 
oversight of the allocations decisions exists.
The absence of objective guidelines and criteria creates a 
second problem. The present system for allocating fees cannot be 
distinguished from the student referendum. Both the referendum and 
the student government operate on the principle of majoritarian 
rule. As the Supreme Court stated in Southworth. and re-iterated 
in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, "access to a public 
forum cannot depend upon majoritarian consent. Southworth. 120
S.Ct. at 1357; Santa Fe Independent Sch. Dist. v. Doe. 120 S.Ct. 
2266, 2276 (2000). Instead of a decision by 40,000 students the 
present system places a vote in the hands of committee members who 
represent those 40,000 students. Direct democratic referenda and 
representative legislatures both produce majority determinations 
that necessarily sacrifice viewpoint neutrality. Such
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determinations are not sufficient to safeguard diverse student 
speech. Santa Fe. 120 S.Ct. at 2276.
While the Court recognizes the University's interest in 
administering an effective program to promote student speech, the 
absence of express objective standards vests unfettered and 
unbridled discretion in the program decision-makers in a manner 
inconsistent with viewpoint neutrality. A viewpoint neutral system 
for distributing compelled fees cannot mean a system that 
completely delegates funding decisions to the student government 
without objective criteria or effective oversight. Because the 
program fails to protect the rights of objecting students by 
curtailing the unregulated discretion possessed by the student 
government the program fails to adhere to emd safeguard viewpoint 
neutrality and therefore compelling fees from students to subsidize 
expressive activities violates the First Amendment.
In summation the Court determines that the University of 
Wisconsin's current system for compelling, allocating and 
distributing segregated university fees to fund expressive 
activities does not operate in a viewpoint neutral manner and 
accordingly constitutes impermissible compelled speech in violation 
of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
accordingly.
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Kendra Pry et al. v. Board of Regents of the UW System 
96-C-292-S
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that defendant Board of Regents of the 
University of Wisconsin System is enjoined from compelling, 
allocating and distributing segregated university fees to fund 
expressive activities unless and until defendant establishes an 
allocation system that operates in a viewpoint neutral manner.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that judgment as aforesaid shall be in 
favor of plaintiffs against defendant for that injunctive relief 
set forth herein together with costs to be entered February 14, 
2001, allowing defendant to establish a system which operates in a 
viewpoint neutral manner.
Entered this 11th day of December, 2000.
BY THE COURT:
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
KENDRA FRY, BENJAMIN 
THOMPSON and SCOTT SOUTHWORTH,
Plaintiffs,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
V. 96-C-0292-S
BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY 
OF WISCONSIN SYSTEM,
Defendant.
The procedural history of this litigation is well known. The 
above-entitled action was tried to the Court on December 7 and 8, 
2000, and defendant's program was found to be violative of the First 
Amendment. Judgment was stayed pending defendant's attempts to 
remedy the constitutional infirmities. Based on its proposed changes 
to the segregated fee system defendant moves to amend the judgment to 
state that the revised system is constitutionally adequate, or in the 
alternative to limit the scope of any injunctive relief to the named 
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs move to reinstate the original plaintiff 
Scott Southworth as a plaintiff to which defendant does not object.
MEMORANDUM
This Court concluded that defendant vested the university's 
elected student government with unbridled discretion in the
Cow  of M l  doounwiil I
by ___________
V.MeNM.Saer«tafyto
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allocation of segregated university fees to groups engaging in 
expressive ideological activities. It held that such discretion 
inadequately protected the principle of viewpoint neutrality and the 
constitutional rights of objecting students where student fees were 
compelled. Since December 8, 2000 defendant has made extensive
efforts to bring its segregated fee system into compliance with this 
Court's ruling.
Defendant's efforts have centered on attempts to create an 
effective appeals process for registered student organizations 
("RSOs") complaining of viewpoint discrimination in the allocation 
process. To create a record for appeal defendant now requires that 
proceedings involving segregated fee allocations be taped and that 
committee members use standardized forms requiring their rationale in 
deciding RSO funding applications. After exhausting student review 
aggrieved RSOs may appeal as of right to the university's chancellor. 
Review of funding decisions is de novo, although deference is given 
to the amount of funding granted so long as it is comparable to 
amounts given to a "substantially representative and accurate set of 
similar [student] groups." Defendant has also attempted to add 
enforcement to its announced prohibition on non-viewpoint neutral 
decision-making. Committee members must take an oath to be viewpoint 
neutral in funding decisions and face removal from office if they 
fail to comply.
More significantly defendant has attempted to establish specific 
criteria for both RSO funding eligibility and funding amounts. Part
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
202
Three, Article V, Section 1(c) of the ASM By-Laws lists twelve 
requirements that must be met before an RSO is eligible for GSSF 
funding. Eligible RSOs are assured funding equal to a minimum amount 
taking into consideration their student organization space, one part- 
time student position and basic supplies. RSOs may be granted 
additional funds upon meeting six monetary criteria under Part Three, 
Article V, Section 2 (b) of the ASM By-Laws. Similar requirements are 
contemplated for ASM Grant funding.
Despite defendant's efforts, the measures undertaken fail to 
address the central constitutional defect in the segregated fee 
program. The level of the student government's discretion is 
unchcuiged. No proffered changes address the discretion held by the 
student government committees in making their eligibility and funding 
decisions. Determining funding eligibility remains a discretionary 
exercise. Only five of the twelve criteria utilized in such 
decisions can be labeled objective —  the remainder are inherently 
subjective and malleable and provide for the use of expansive, 
discretion. Questions such as whether an RSO has a "clear" purpose 
and goals, whether it offers a "substantially equivalent service" as 
provided elsewhere, and whether it "adequately answered" the 
questions of the funding committee, to name a few, illustrate the 
broad discretion to be utilized by the relevant committees. 
Moreover, the requirement, problematic in the past, that an RSO 
provide an undefined "educational benefit and service" to university 
students remains in place. If eligible the RSO must clear additional
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subjective hurdles to be funded in excess of an individualized 
minimum. The RSO must prove to the satisfaction of the committee 
that it can "effectively expense" additional funds, that it has 
accomplished its past objectives, that its request is reasonable, and 
that it is in need of the funds. The system continues to fail to 
address the apportionment of funds to those RSOs who run the gauntlet 
of subjective criteria and are entitled to funds in excess of the 
minimum. Differentials in funding amounts have no objective root but 
reflect only the discretionary judgment of the student government. 
Admonishments to student government officials and a de novo appeals 
process are not sufficient to cure this violation. The appeals 
process protects the rights of complaining RSOs, not the objecting 
students.
While this Court declines to impose any system requirements upon 
defendant, it does note that creating a viewpoint neutral allocation 
mechanism is not difficult. The complications in this case relate to 
defendant's pursuit not only of its commitment to fund diverse 
student speech but its competing commitment to empower student 
government to be the arbiter of that funding. The present system 
does not balance those competing commitments, if, indeed, they can be 
balanced, so that it is viewpoint neutral and protects the First 
Amendment rights of objecting students.
Having rejected defendant's contention that the revised system 
is constitutionally adequate, the Court agrees that injunctive relief 
should be tailored to the named plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have agreed
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to defendant's alternative, and, indeed, have informally endorsed it. 
See Third Affidavit of Peter C. Anderson Ex. B. It is appropriate to 
provide relief no broader than that requested by plaintiffs.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion to add Scott Southworth as 
a plaintiff is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that judgment be entered in favor of 
plaintiffs with costs declaring that defendant's segregated 
university fee utilized at the University of Hisconsin-Madison campus 
is in violation of the First Amendment because it fails to conform to 
the principle of viewpoint neutrality in allocating fees compelled 
from plaintiffs to fund RSOs engaged in expressive activities to 
which plaintiffs object; and that defendant Board of Regents is 
enjoined from compelling plaintiffs to pay those portions of 
segregated university fees used to fund expressive RSO activities to 
which plaintiffs object.
Entered this 15“ day of March, 2001.
BY THE COURT:
JOHN C/ SHABAZ 
Distriq&yjudge
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
REFERENCES
Periodicals
Bevilacqua, T.M. (1995) Public universities, mandatory student activity fees, and 
the first amendment. Journal of Law & Education. 24,1,1-31.
Cote, D.M. (1995). The first amendment and compulsory funding of student 
government political resolutions at state universities. The Journal of College & 
University Law. 21,4, 723-764,
Evangelical Press News Service, (1999). Courts back “freedom of belief in 
university fee cases. Marantha Christian Journal, {on-line}, available: Internet, 
mejonline.com
Frank, D.E. (2000). First amendment protection from mandatory subsidization of 
political speech in public colleges and universities: The marketplace just got a lot 
less expensive. Drake Law Review. 48, i2, 359-377.
Gibbs, A. (1999). Are mandatory student activity fees really mementos of the 
past? Journal of Law and Education. 28,1, 65-69.
Gibbs, A. & Crisp, G. (1979). The question of first amendment rights vs. 
mandatory student activity fees. Journal of Law and Education. 8, 2,185-196.
Greenawalt, K. (1996). Viewpoints from Olympus. Columbia Law Review. 3.
Greenhouse, I. (1999). Justices hear students’ case on the withholding of fees. 
The New York Times. A20.
Kramer, K.M. (1995). The free rider problem and first amendment concerns: A 
balance upset by new limitations on mandatory student fees. Journal of College 
and University Law. 21,4, 691-722.
McGill, M.D. (2000). Unleashing the limited public forum: A modest revision to a 
dysfunctional doctrine. Stanford Law Review. 52,929-957.
205
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
206
O'Neil, R.M. (1999). Student fees and student rights: Evolving constitutional 
principles. The Journal of College and Universitv Law. 25, 3, 569-580.
Sadurski, W. (1997). Does the subject matter? Viewpoint neutrality and freedom 
of speech. Yeshiva Universitv Cardoza Arts & Entertainment Law Journal. 15. 
Schmidt, P. (1999). U.S. Supreme Court agrees to hear case on mandatory 
student fee at public colleges. The Chronicle of Higher Education. 45, i31, A38.
Schmitz, M.G. (1996). Mandatory student activity fees in public colleges and 
universities: the impact of Smith v. University of California. Journal of Law & 
Education. 25,4, 601-645.
Steele, C.T. (1987). Mandatory student fees at public universities: Bringing the 
first amendment within the campus gate. Journal of College and Universitv Law. 
13, 4, 353-372.
Waring, R.L. (1997). Wide awake or half-asleep? Revelations from jurisprudential 
tailings found in rosenberger v. university of Virginia. The Northern Illinois 
Universitv Law Review. 17.
Wells, C.E. (1983). Mandatory student fees: first Amendment concerns and 
university discretion. Universitv of Chicago Law Review. 55,1, 363-395.
Wiggins, C. (1994). A funny thing happens when you pay for a forum: Mandatory 
student fees to support political speech at public universities. Yale Law Journal. 
103, 7, 2009-2038.
Zirkel, P.A. (1999). Introduction: Mandatory student activity fees: Is smith an 
infringement or an improvement? Journal of Law & Education. 28,1,65-69.
Books
Gifis, S.H. (1996). Law Dictionary. Hauooauae: Barron’s Educational Series, Inc.
Janda, K., Berry. J.. & Goldman, J. (2000). The challenge of democracy. New 
York: Houghton Mifflin Company.
McMillan, J.H. & Schumacher, S. (1997). Research in education: A conceptual 
introduction. New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc.
Olivas, M.A. (1989). The law and higher education: Cases and materials on 
colleges in court. Durham: Carolina academic Press.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
207
Wren, C., & Wren, J R. (1986). The legal research manual: A game plan for legal 
research and analysis. Madison: Adams & Ambrose Publishing.
Other Sources
Associated Students of Arizona State University Funding Application Information 
(2000).
Associated Students of the University of Arizona Student Organization Handbook 
(2000-2001).
Associated Students of the University of California By-Laws (1999).
Associated Students of the University of Idaho Activities Board By-Laws (1999). 
Associated Students of the University of Montana By-Laws (2000).
Associated Students of the University of Montana Fiscal Policy (2000).
Associated Students of the University of Nevada Club and Organizations Manual
(1999).
Associated Students of the University of Oregon Green Tape Notebook (1998).
Associated Students of the University of California Los Angeles Undergraduate 
Student Association Guidelines for Allocation of USA Programming Funds 
(1996).
Consolidated Students of the University of Nevada Student Activities Packet
(2000).
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 396.547 (1999).
O'Neil, R.M. (1998). What a recent court ruling means for required student fees. 
The Chronicle of Higher Education, {on-line}, available: Internet, 
http://chronide.com/weeklv/v45/i05
Or. Rev. Stat. § 351.070 (3) (d) (1997).
Rouse, M., & Howard, R. (1998, February). Student activity fees: Judicial 
decisions and current trends. Paper presented at the meeting of the NASPAIV 
East, Minneapolis, MN.
Telephone Interview with Dr. Robert O'Neil, Law Professor, University of Virginia 
Law School (Nov. 8, 2000).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
208
Telephone Interview with Erik Dickson, Director of Student Activities, University 
of Nevada Reno (Dec. 8,2000).
Telephone Interview with James Moore, Business Manager, University of 
Nevada Las Vegas (Jan. 5, 2001).
University of California Guidelines for Funding Registered Campus Organizations 
and Related Programmatic Activities by Compulsory Student Fees (1999).
University of New Mexico Student Fee Review Board Policy (1999).
Wis. Rev. Stat. § 36.01 (2) (1993-1994).
Wis. Rev. Stat. § 36.07 (1) (1993-1994).
Wis. Rev. Stat. § 36.09 (1993-1994).
Wis. Rev. Stat. § 36.09 (1-5) (1993-1994).
Court Cases
Abood V. Detroit Board of Education. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
Carroll v. Blinken. 957 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1992) (Carroll I).
Carroll v. Blinken. 42 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 1994) afFd 899 F.Supp 1214 (Carroll II).
Chaolinskv v. New Hampshire. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
Citv Council v. Taxoavers for Vincent. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund. Inc.. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
Dixon V. Alabama State Board of Education. 294 F.2d 150 (5**’ Cir. 1961).
Frv. et. al. v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs.. No. 96-C-0292-S (W.D. 
Wis. 2000 & 2001).
Galda v. Blowstein. 686 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1982) (Galda I).
Galda v. Rutgers. 772 F.2d 1060,1065 (3d Cir. 1985), cert, denied 106 S. Ct. 
1375 (1986) (Galda W).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
209
Good V. Associated Students of the Universitv of Washington. 86 Wash. 2d 94, 
542 P.2d 762 (1975).
Good News Club, et. al. v. Milford Central School. 202 F.3d 502 (2000).
Good News/Good Soorts Club v. School Dist. 28 F.3d 1501 (8“' Cir. 1994).
Hamilton v. Board of Regents of California. 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
Havs Countv Guardian v. Suoole. 969 F.2d 111(5* Cir. 1992), cert, denied, 506 
U.S. 1087 (1993).
Healv V. James. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
Kania v. Fordham. 702 F.2d 475 (4* Cir. 1983).
Keller v. State Bar of California. 496 U.S. 1,110 L.Ed.2d1 (1990).
Kevishian v. Board, of Regents. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
Lace V. Universitv of Vermont. 131 Vt. 170, 303 A. 2d 475 (1973).
Lamb’s Chaoel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District. 580 U.S. 384,
390,124 L. Ed. 2d 352,133 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
Larson v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Nebraska. 204 NW2d. 568 (1973).
Lehnert v. Ferris Facultv Association. 500 U.S. 507 (1991).
Perrv Educ. Ass’n v. Perrv Local Educators’ Ass n. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
Police Deot. v. Moslev. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
R.A.V. V. Citv of St. Paul. 505 U.S. 377(1992).
Regents of the Universitv of California v. Bakke. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs. et. al. v. Southworth. et. al.. 120 S. Ct. 1346 
(2000).
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Universitv of Virginia. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
Rounds, ét al, v. Oregon State Board of Higher Education. 166 F.3d 1032 (1999). 
Santa Fe Independent School Dist. V. DOE. 530 U.S. (2000).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
210
Smith V. Regents of Universitv of California. 4 Cal. 4* 843, 844 P.2d 500, cert, 
denied, 510 U.S. 863 (1993).
Southworth v. Grebe. No. 96-C-0292-S (W.D. Wis.1996).
Southworth v. Grebe. 151 F.3d 717 (7* Cir. 1998).
Southworth v. Grebe. 157 F.3d 1124 (7* Cir. 1998) (on petition for rehearing en 
banc).
Steiner v. New York State Education Commission. 271 F.2d 13 (2"“ Cir. 1959), 
cert, denied, 361 U.S. 966 (1960).
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Communitv School District. 393 U.S. 503 
(1969).
Veed V. Schwartzkoof 353 F. Supp. 149 (D.Neb. 1973), afTd mem. 478 
F.2d 1407 (8* Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974).
Widmar v. Vincent. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
Associated Briefs
Appendix for Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Regents of the Univ. of 
Wis. Svs.. et. al. v. Southworth. et. al. 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000).
Brief for the American Center for Law and Justice Supporting Respondents, 
Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs.. et. al.v. Southworth. et. al. 120 S. Ct. 1346 
(2000).
Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, The ACLU of Wisconsin, and People 
for the American Way, Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs.. et. al. v. Southworth. 
et. al. 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000).
Brief for the Council on Education, American Association of Community 
Colleges, American Association of State Colleges and Universities, American 
College Personnel Association, Association of American Colleges and 
Universities, Association of American Universities, National Association of State 
Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, National Association of Student Financial 
Aid Administrators, NAWE: Advancing Women in Higher Education, and the 
College Board, Regents of the Univ.o f  Wis. Svs.. et. al. v. Southworth. et. al.. 
120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
211
Brief for the Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Anti- 
Defamation League, and Hadassah, Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs.. et. al. 
v.Southworth. et. al. 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000).
Brief for the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of 
Law, Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs.. et. al. v. Southworth. et. al. 120 S. Ct. 
1346(2000).
Brief for the Family Research Institute, Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs.. et. al. 
V. Southworth. et. al. 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000).
Brief for the Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, 
Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs .et. al.. v. Southworth. et. al. 120 S. Ct. 1346 
(2000).
Brief for the First Freedoms Foundation, Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs.. et. al. 
V. Southworth. et. al. 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000).
Brief for the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexuals and Transgender Campus Center at UW- 
Madison, Forty-Nine Other Student Groups, the National Consortium of Directors 
of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Resources in Higher Education, and 
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs.. 
et. al. V. Southworth. et. al. 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000).
Brief for the National Education Association, Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs.. 
et. al. V. Southworth. et. al. 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000).
Brief for the National Smokers Alliance, Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs.. et. al. 
V. Southworth. et. al.. 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000).
Brief for the New York Public Interest Research Group, Regents of the Univ. of 
Wis. Svs.. et. al. v. Southworth. et. al. 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000).
Brief for Owen Brennen Rounds, Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs.. et al. v. 
Southworth. et. al. 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000).
Brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation, Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs.. et. al.
V. Southworth. et. al. 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000).
Brief for the State of Oregon, Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs.. et. al. v. 
Southworth. et. al. 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000).
Brief for the States of New York, et. al.. Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs.. et. al. 
V. Southworth. et. al. 120 S. C t 1346 (2000).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
212
Brief for the Student Press Law Center, the Associated Collegiate Press, and 
College Media Advisers, Inc, Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs.. et. al. v. 
Southworth. et. al. 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000).
Brief for the Student Rights Law Center, Inc., Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs. 
et. al. V. Southworth. et. al. 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000).
Brief for the United Council of University of Wisconsin Students, Inc., Regents of 
the Univ. of Wis. Svs.. et. al. v. Southworth. et. al. 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000).
Brief for the United States Student Association, et al. University of California 
Student Association, Wisconsin Student Public Interest Research Groups. 
Associated Students of Madison, and Other Interested Student Organization, 
Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs.. et. al. v. Southworth. et. al. 120 S. Ct. 1346
(2000).
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs.. et. al.. v 
Southworth. et. al.. 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000).
Petitioner’s Reply Brief, Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs.. et. al. v Southworth. 
et. al.. 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000).
Respondent’s Reply Brief, Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Svs.. et. al. v. 
Southworth. et. al.. 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
VITA
Graduate College 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Christine Chairsell
Local Address:
5550 W. Flamingo Ave. C-1 
Las Vegas, Nevada 89103
Home Address:
4056 E. Autumn Street 
Las Vegas, Nevada 89120
Degrees:
Bachelor of Arts, Political Science, 1983 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Masters of Arts, Political Science, 1985 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Special Honors and Awards
Pi Sigma Alpha Honor Society, 1983 & 1985
Phi Kappa Phi National Honor Society, 1983 & 1985
AquaVision’s Linn Mills Award for Community Water Education, 1995
UNLV Faculty Excellence Award for Leadership and Community 
Education, 1995
UNLV Faculty Award for Women in Education, 1994
UNLV Faculty Award for Leadership, 1994
Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce, Woman of Achievement 
Award in Education, 1993
213
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
214
Distinguished Women in Southern Nevada Award, 1990,1991,1999
Outstanding Graduate Student, The Honor Society of Pi Sigma 
Alpha, 1985
Publications:
Chairsell, C. (1989). The califomia-nevada compact: Battling for water 
in the north,” Battle Bom: Federal and State Conflicts in Nevada. Dina 
Titus, editor.
Chairsell, 0. (1989). The congress, introduction to american politics, 
issues and challenges of the 1990s." Robert M. Bigler, editor.
Chairsell, C. (1989). “Social forces involved in the evolution of westem 
water policies and the nevada experience," Social Science Perspectives 
Journal, vol. 3, no. 6, pp. 1-19.
Chairsell, C. (1990). “Competition for water in southern nevada -  local 
needs vs federal control," ASCE Perspectives Joumal on the 
Hvdraulics/Hvdroloov of Arid Lands. Richard French, editor.
Soden, D.L., & Chairsell, C. (1991). “Assessing attitudes about instream 
flow protection programs,” Rivers. 1991, vol. 2, no. 3.
Dissertation Title: analysis of the Application of First Amendment Jurisprudence 
to University Student Fees Policy
Dissertation Examination Committee:
Chairperson, Dr. Gerald C. Kops, Ph.D.
Committee Member, Dr. Paul E. Meacham, Ph.D 
Committee Member, Dr. Dale Andersen, Ph D 
Committee Member, Dr. Dina Titus, Ph D
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
